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
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Edith Barbingham.

ESSAYS

AND

TREATISES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

By DAVID HUME, Esq;

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ESSAYS,

MORAL, POLITICAL,

AND

LITERARY.

PART II.*

* Published in 1752.

ESSAY I.

Of Commerce.

THE greateſt part of mankind may be divided into two claſſes; that of *ſhallow* thinkers, who fall ſhort of the truth; and that of *abſtruſe* thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter claſs are by far the moſt uncommon; and I may add, by far the moſt uſeful and valuable. They ſuggeſt hints, at leaſt, and ſtart difficulties, which they want, perhaps, ſkill to purſue; but which may produce very fine diſcoveries, when handled by men who have a more juſt way of thinking. At worſt, what they ſay is uncommon; and if it ſhould coſt ſome pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleaſure of hearing ſomething that is new. An author is little to be valued, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-houſe converſation.

All people of *ſhallow* thought are apt to decry even thoſe of *ſolid* underſtanding, as *abſtruſe* thinkers, and metaphyſicians, and refiners; and never will allow

any thing to be juſt which is beyond their own weak conceptions. There are ſome caſes, I own, where an extraordinary refinement affords a ſtrong preſumption of falſehood, and where no reaſoning is to be truſted but what is natural and eaſy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms ſchemes in politics, trade, oeconomy, or any buſineſs in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of conſequences together. Something is ſure to happen, that will diſconcert his reaſoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reaſon upon *general* ſubjects, one may juſtly affirm, that our ſpeculations can ſcarce ever be too fine, provided they be juſt; and that the difference between a common man and a man of genius is chiefly ſeen in the ſhallowneſs or depth of the principles upon which they proceed. General reaſonings ſeem intricate, merely becauſe they are general; nor is it eaſy for the bulk of mankind to diſtinguiſh, in a great number of particulars, that common circumſtance in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixed, from the other ſuperfluous circumſtances. Every judgment or concluſion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to thoſe univerſal propoſitions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole ſcience in a ſingle theorem. Their eye is confounded with ſuch an extenſive proſpect; and the concluſions

derived

derived from it, even tho' clearly expreſſed, ſeem intricate and obſcure. But however intricate they may ſeem, 'tis certain, that general principles, if juſt and ſound, muſt always prevail in the general courſe of things, tho' they may fail in particular caſes; and 'tis the chief buſineſs of philoſophers to regard the general courſe of things. I may add, that 'tis alſo the chief buſineſs of politicians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of caſes; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few perſons. This therefore makes the difference betwixt *particular* deliberations and *general* reaſonings, and renders ſubtilty and refinement much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former.

I THOUGHT this introduction neceſſary before the following diſcourſes on *commerce*, *money*, *intereſt*, *balance of trade*, *&c.* where, perhaps, there will occur ſome principles which are uncommon, and which may ſeem too refined and ſubtile for ſuch vulgar ſubjects. If falſe, let them be rejected: But no one ought to entertain a prejudice againſt them, merely becauſe they are out of the common road.

THE greatneſs of a ſtate, and the happineſs of its ſubjects, however independent they may be ſuppoſed

in ſome reſpects, are commonly allowed to be inſeparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater ſecurity, in the poſſeſſion of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, ſo the public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extenſive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in general; tho' I cannot forbear thinking, that it may poſſibly admit of ſome exceptions, and that we often eſtabliſh it with too little reſerve and limitation. There may be ſome circumſtances, where the commerce, and riches, and luxury of individuals, inſtead of adding ſtrength to the public, will ſerve only to thin its armies, and diminiſh its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being, and ſuſceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found falſe when he has embraced an oppoſite ſet of manners and opinions.

THE bulk of every ſtate may be divided into *huſbandmen* and *manufacturers*. The former are employed in the culture of the land: The latter work up the materials furniſhed by the former, into all the commodities which are neceſſary or ornamental to human life. As ſoon as men quit their ſavage ſtate, where they live chiefly by hunting and fiſhing, they muſt fall into theſe two claſſes; tho' the arts of agriculture employ *at firſt* the moſt numerous part of the ſociety.

ciety *. Time and experience improve ſo much theſe arts, that the land may eaſily maintain a much greater number of men, than thoſe who are immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furniſh the more neceſſary manufactures to ſuch as are ſo employed.

If theſe ſuperfluous hands apply themſelves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happineſs of the ſtate; ſince they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherwiſe have been unacquainted. But may not another ſcheme be propoſed for the employment of theſe ſuperfluous hands? May not the ſovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increaſe the dominions of the ſtate abroad, and ſpread its fame over diſtant nations? 'Tis certain, that the fewer deſires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ;

* Monſ. Melon in his political eſſay on commerce aſſerts, that even at preſent, if you divide France into 20 parts, 16 are labourers or peaſants; a only artizans; one belonging to the law, church, and military; and one merchants, financiers, and bourgeois. This calculation is certainly very erroneous. In France, England, and indeed moſt parts of Europe, half of the inhabitants live in cities; and even of thoſe who live in the country, a very great number are artiſans, perhaps above a third.

and conſequently the ſuperfluities of the land, inſtead of maintaining tradeſmen and manufacturers, may ſupport fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great many arts are required to miniſter to the luxury of particular perſons. Here therefore ſeems to be a kind of oppoſition between the greatneſs of the ſtate and the happineſs of the ſubjects. A ſtate is never greater than when all its ſupeſſluous hands are employed in the ſervice of the public. The eaſe and convenience of private perſons require, that theſe hands ſhould be employed in their ſervice. The one can never be ſatisfied, but at the expence of the other. As the ambition of the ſovereign muſt entrench on the luxury of individuals; ſo the luxury of individuals muſt diminiſh the force and check the ambition of the ſovereign.

NOR is this reaſoning merely chimerical; but is founded on hiſtory and experience. The republic of SPARTA was certainly more powerful than any ſtate now in the world, conſiſting of an equal number of people: and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The HELOTES were the labourers: The SPARTANS were the ſoldiers or gentlemen. 'Tis evident, that the labour of the HELOTES could not have maintained ſo great a number of SPARTANS, had theſe latter lived in eaſe and delicacy, and given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures.

tries. The like policy may be remarked in ROME. And indeed, thro' all antient hiſtory, 'tis obſervable, that the ſmalleſt republics raiſed and maintained greater armies, than ſtates conſiſting of triple the number of inhabitants, are able to ſupport at preſent. 'Tis computed, that, in all EUROPEAN nations, the proportion between ſoldiers and people does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read, that the city of ROME alone, with its ſmall territory, raiſed and maintained, in early times, ten legions againſt the LATINS. ATHENS, whoſe whole dominions were not larger than YORKSHIRE, ſent to the expedition againſt SICILY near forty thouſand men *. DIONYSIUS the elder, 'tis ſaid, maintained a ſtanding army of a hundred thouſand foot and ten thouſand horſe, beſide a large fleet of four hundred ſail †; tho' his territories extended no farther than the city of SYRACUSE, about a third part of the iſland of SICILY, and ſome ſea-port towns or garriſons on the coaſt of ITALY and ILLYRICUM. 'Tis true, the antient armies, in time of war, ſubſiſted much upon plunder: But did not the enemy plunder in their turn? which was a more ruinous way of levying a tax, than any other that could be deviſed. In ſhort, no probable reaſon

* THUCYDIDES, lib. 7.

† DIOD. SIC. lib. 2. This account, I own, is ſomewhat ſuſpicious, not to ſay worſe; chiefly becauſe this army was not compoſed of citizens, but of mercenary forces.

can be aſſigned for the great power of the more antient ſtates above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury. Few artiſans were maintained by the labour of the farmers, and therefore more ſoldiers might live upon it. TITUS LIVIUS ſays, that ROME, in his time, would find it difficult to raiſe as large an army as that which, in her early days, ſhe ſent out againſt the GAULS and LATINS *. Inſtead of thoſe ſoldiers who fought for liberty and empire in CAMILLUS's time, there were in AUGUSTUS's days, muſicians, painters, cooks, players, and tailors; and if the land was equally cultivated at both periods, 'tis evident it could maintain equal numbers in the one profeſſion as in the other. They added nothing to the mere neceſſaries of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

'TIS natural on this occaſion to aſk, whether ſovereigns may not return to the maxims of antient policy, and conſult their own intereſt, in this reſpect, more than the happineſs of their ſubjects? I anſwer, that it appears to me almoſt impoſſible; and that becauſe antient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and uſual courſe of things. 'Tis well known with what peculiar laws SPARTA was govern-

* TITI LIVII, lib. 7. cap. 24. "Adeo in quæ laboramus," ſays he, "ſola crevimus, divitias luxuriemque."

ed,

ed, and what a prodigy that republic is juſtly eſteemed by every one, who has conſidered human nature, as it has diſplayed itſelf on other nations, and other ages. Were the teſtimony of hiſtory leſs poſitive and circumſtantial, ſuch a government would appear a mere philoſophical whim or fiction, and impoſſible ever to be reduced to practice. And tho' the ROMAN and other antient republics were ſupported on principles ſomewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary concurrence of circumſtances to make them ſubmit to ſuch grievous burthens. They were free ſtates; they were ſmall ones; and the age being martial, all the neighbouring ſtates were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public ſpirit, eſpecially in ſmall ſtates; and this public ſpirit, this *amor patriæ*, muſt increaſe, when the public is almoſt in continual alarm, and men are obliged, every moment, to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt dangers for its defence. A continual ſucceſſion of wars makes every citizen a ſoldier: He takes the field in his turn; and during his ſervice is chiefly maintained by himſelf. And, notwithſtanding that his ſervice is equivalent to a very ſevere tax, 'tis leſs felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honour and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and induſtry as well as pleaſure †. Not to mention the great equa-

† The more antient ROMANS lived in perpetual war with all their neighbours: and in old LATIN, the term, *hoſtis*, expreſſed both

lity of fortunes amongſt the inhabitants of the antient republics, where every field belonging to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and rendered the numbers of citizens very conſiderable, even without trade and manufactures.

BUT tho' the want of trade and manufactures, amongſt a free and very martial people, may *ſometimes* have no other effect than to render the public more powerful, 'tis certain, that in the common courſe of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency. Sovereigns muſt take mankind as they find them, and

both a ſtranger and an enemy. This is remarked by CICERO; but by him is aſcribed to the humanity of his anceſtors, who ſoftened, as much as poſſible, the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the ſame appellation which ſignified a ſtranger. *De Off.* lib. 2. 'Tis however much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of thoſe people was ſo great as to make them regard all ſtrangers as enemies, and call them by the ſame name. It is not, beſides, conſiſtent with the moſt common maxims of policy or of nature, that any ſtate ſhould regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preſerve any ſuch ſentiments for them as the ROMAN orator would aſcribe to his anceſtors. Not to mention, that the early ROMANS actually exerciſed piracy, as we learn from their firſt treaties with CARTHAGE, preſerved by POLYBIUS, lib. 3. and conſequently like the SALLEE and ALGERINE rovers, were actually at war with moſt nations, and a ſtranger and an enemy were with them almoſt ſynonymous.

cannot

cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long courſe of time, with a variety of accidents and circumſtances, are requiſite to produce thoſe great revolutions, which ſo much diverſify the face of human affairs. And the leſs natural any ſet of principles are, which ſupport a particular ſociety, the more difficult will a legiſlator meet with in raiſing and cultivating them. 'Tis his beſt policy to comply with the common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is ſuſceptible. Now, according to the moſt natural courſe of things, induſtry, and arts, and trade increaſe the power of the ſovereign as well as the happineſs of the ſubjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will eaſily appear from a few conſiderations, which will preſent to us the conſequences of ſloth and barbarity.

WHERE manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people muſt apply themſelves to agriculture; and if their ſkill and induſtry increaſe, there muſt ariſe a great ſuperfluity from their labour beyond what ſuffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to increaſe their ſkill and induſtry; ſince they cannot exchange that ſuperfluity for any commodities, which may ſerve either to their pleaſure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lies uncul-

uncultivated. What is cultivated, yields not its utmoſt, for want of ſkill or aſſiduity in the farmers. If at any time the public exigencies require, that great numbers ſhould be employed in the public ſervice, the labour of the people furniſhes now no ſuperfluities, by which theſe numbers can be maintained. The labourers cannot increaſe their ſkill and induſtry on a ſudden. Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for ſome years. The armies, mean while, muſt either make ſudden and violent conqueſts, or diſband for want of ſubſiſtence. A regular attack or defence, therefore, is not to be expected from ſuch a people, and their ſoldiers muſt be as ignorant and unſkilful as their farmers and manufacturers.

EVERY thing in the world is purchaſed by labour; and our paſſions are the only cauſes of labour. When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, ſtudy agriculture as a ſcience, and redouble their induſtry and attention. The ſuperfluity, which ariſes from their labour, is not loſt; but is exchanged with the manufacturers for thoſe commodities which mens luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land furniſhes a great deal more of the neceſſaries of life, than what ſuffices for thoſe who cultivate it. In times of peace and tranquility, this ſuperfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers, and the improvers of liberal arts. But 'tis eaſy for the public to convert many

many of theſe manufacturers into ſoldiers, and maintain them by that ſuperfluity, which ariſes from the labour of the farmers. Accordingly we find, that this is the caſe in all civilized governments. When the ſovereign raiſes an army, what is the conſequence? He impoſes a tax. This tax obliges all the people to retrench what is leaſt neceſſary to their ſubſiſtence. Thoſe who labour in ſuch commodities, muſt either enliſt in the troops, or turn themſelves to agriculture, and thereby oblige ſome labourers to enliſt for want of buſineſs. And to conſider the matter abſtractly, manufactures increaſe the power of the ſtate only as they ſtore up ſo much labour, and that of a kind to which the public may lay claim, without depriving any one of the neceſſaries of life. The more labour, therefore, is employed beyond mere neceſſaries, the more powerful is any ſtate; ſince the perſons engaged in that labour may eaſily be converted to the public ſervice. In a ſtate without manufactures, there may be the ſame number of hands; but there is not the ſame quantity of labour, nor of the ſame kind. All the labour is there beſtowed upon neceſſaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.

THUS the greatneſs of the ſovereign and the happineſs of the ſtate are, in a great meaſure, united with regard to trade and manufactures. 'Tis a violent method, and in moſt caſes impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raiſe from the land more than what ſubſiſts himſelf and family. Furniſh

him with manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of himself. Afterwards you will find it easy to seize some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it in the public service, without giving him his wonted return. Being accustomed to industry, he will think this less grievous, than if, at once, you obliged him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The case is the same with regard to the other members of the state. The greater is the stock of labour of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any sensible alteration upon it.

A PUBLIC granary of corn, a storehouse of cloth, a magazine of arms; all these must be allowed real riches and strength in any state. Trade and industry are really nothing but a stock of labour, which, in time of peace and tranquility, is employed for the ease and satisfaction of individuals; but in the exigencies of state, may, in part, be turned to public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified camp, and infuse into each breast so martial a genius, and such a passion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greatest hardships for the sake of the public; these affections might now, as in antient times, prove alone a sufficient spur to industry, and support the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps, to banish all arts and luxury; and, by restrictions on equipage and tables, make the provisions and forage last longer than the army were loaded with a number of superfluous

ous retainers. But as theſe principles are too diſintereſted and too difficult to ſupport, 'tis requiſite to govern men by other paſſions, and animate them with a ſpirit of avarice and induſtry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this caſe, loaded with a ſuperfluous retinue; but the proviſions flow in proportionably larger. The harmony of the whole is ſtill ſupported; and the natural bent of the mind being more complied with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the obſervance of thoſe maxims.

The ſame method of reaſoning will let us ſee the advantage of *foreign* commerce, in augmenting the power of the ſtate, as well as the riches and happineſs of the ſubjects. It increaſes the ſtock of labour in the nation; and the ſovereign may convert what ſhare of it he finds neceſſary to the ſervice of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports, furniſhes materials for new manufactures; and by its exports, it produces labour in particular commodities, which could not be conſumed at home. In ſhort, a kingdom, that has a large import and export, muſt abound more with induſtry, and that employed upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom which reſts contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of theſe commodities, ſo far as they gratify the ſenſes and appetites. And the public is alſo a gainer, while a greater ſtock of labour is,

by

by this means, ſtored up againſt any public exigency; that is, a greater number of laborious men are maintained, who may be diverted to the public ſervice, without robbing any one of the neceſſaries, or even the chief conveniencies of life.

If we conſult hiſtory, we ſhall find, that in moſt nations foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domeſtic luxury. The temptation is ſtronger to make uſe of foreign commodities, which are ready for uſe, and which are entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domeſtic commodity, which always advance by ſlow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is alſo very great, in exporting what is ſuperfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations, whoſe ſoil or climate is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the *pleaſures* of luxury and the *profits* of commerce; and their *delicacy* and *induſtry*, being once awakened, carry them to farther improvements, in every branch of domeſtic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage which ariſes from a commerce with ſtrangers. It rouſes men from their indolence; and preſenting the gayer and more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dreamed of, raiſes in them a deſire of a more ſplendid way of life than what their anceſtors enjoyed. And at the ſame time, the few merchants,

merchants, who poſſeſs the ſecret of this importation and exportation, make exorbitant profits; and becoming rivals in wealth to the antient nobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce. Imitation ſoon diffuſes all thoſe arts; while domeſtic manufacturers emulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up every home commodity to the utmoſt perfection of which it is ſuſceptible. Their own ſteel and iron, in ſuch laborious hands, become equal to the gold and rubies of the INDIES.

WHEN the affairs of the ſociety are once brought to this ſituation, a nation may loſe moſt of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people. If ſtrangers will not take any particular commodity of ours, we muſt ceaſe to labour in it. The ſame hands will turn themſelves towards ſome refinement in other commodities, which may be wanted at home. And there muſt always be materials for them to work upon; till every perſon in the ſtate, who poſſeſſes riches, enjoys as great plenty of home commodities, and thoſe in as great perfection, as he deſires; which can never poſſibly happen. CHINA is repreſented as one of the moſt flouriſhing empires in the world; tho' it has very little commerce beyond its own territories.

IT will not, I hope, be conſidered as a ſuperfluous digreſſion, if I here obſerve, that as the multitude of mechanical arts is advantageous, ſo is the great number

ber of perſons to whoſe ſhare the productions of theſe arts fall. A too great diſproportion among the citizens weakens any ſtate. Every perſon, if poſſible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full poſſeſſion of all the neceſſaries, and many of the convenience of life. No one can doubt, but ſuch an equality is moſt ſuitable to human nature, and diminiſhes much leſs from the *happineſs* of the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It alſo augments the *power of the ſtate*, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impoſitions be paid with much more chearfulneſs. Where the riches are engroſſed by a few, theſe muſt contribute very largely to the ſupplying the public neceſſities. But when the riches are diſperſed among multitudes, the burthen feels light on every ſhoulder, and the taxes make not a very ſenſible difference on any one's way of living.

ADD to this, that where the riches are in few hands, theſe muſt enjoy all the power, and will readily conſpire to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppreſs them ſtill farther, to the diſcouragement of all induſtry.

IN this circumſtance conſiſts the great advantage of ENGLAND above any nation at preſent in the world, or that appears in the records of any ſtory. 'Tis true, the ENGLISH feel ſome diſadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labour, which is in part the effect

fect of the riches of their artiſans, as well as of the plenty of money: But as foreign trade is not the moſt material circumſtance, 'tis not to be put in competition with the happineſs of ſo many millions. And if there were no more to endear to them that free government under which they live, this alone were ſufficient. The poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infallible effect of abſolute monarchy; tho' I doubt, whether it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches are an infallible reſult of liberty. Liberty muſt be attended with particular accidents, and a certain turn of thinking, in order to produce that effect. Lord BACON, accounting for the great advantages obtained by the ENGLISH in their wars with FRANCE, aſcribes them chiefly to the ſuperior eaſe and plenty of the common people amongſt the former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the labourers and artizans are accuſtomed to work for low wages, and to retain but a ſmall part of the fruits of their labour, 'tis difficult for them, even in a free government, to better their condition, or conſpire among themſelves to heighten their wages. But even where they are accuſtomed to a more plentiful way of life, 'tis eaſy for the rich, in a deſpotic government, to conſpire againſt *them*, and throw the whole burthen of the taxes on their ſhoulders.

IT may ſeem an odd poſition, that the poverty of the common people in FRANCE, ITALY, and SPAIN, is, in ſome meaſure, owing to the ſuperior riches of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate; and yet there want not many reaſons to juſtify this paradox. In ſuch a fine mold or ſoil as that of thoſe more ſouthern regions, agriculture is an eaſy art; and one man, with a couple of ſorry horſes, will be able, in a ſeaſon, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty conſiderable rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his ground fallow for a year, ſo ſoon as it is exhauſted; and the warmth of the ſun alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and reſtore its fertility. Such poor peaſants, therefore, require only a ſimple maintenance for their labour. They have no ſtock nor riches, which claim more; and at the ſame time, they are for ever dependant on their landlord, who gives no leaſes, nor fears that his land will be ſpoiled by the ill methods of cultivation. In ENGLAND, the land is rich, but coarſe; muſt be cultivated at a great expence; and produces ſlender crops, when not carefully managed, and by a method which gives not the full profit but in a courſe of ſeveral years. A farmer, therefore, in ENGLAND muſt have a conſiderable ſtock and a long leaſe; which beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of CHAMPAGNE and BURGUNDY, that oft yield to the landlord above five pounds *per* acre, are cultivated by peaſants,

peaſants, who have ſcarce bread: And the reaſon is, that ſuch peaſants need no ſtock but their own limbs, with inſtruments of huſbandry, which they can buy for twenty ſhillings. The farmers are commonly in ſome better circumſtances in thoſe countries. But the graziers are moſt at their eaſe of all thoſe who cultivate the land. The reaſon is ſtill the ſame. Men muſt have profits proportionable to their expence and hazard. Where ſo conſiderable a number of the labouring poor as the peaſants and farmers are in very low circumſtances, all the reſt muſt partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

WE may form a ſimilar remark with regard to the general hiſtory of mankind. What is the reaſon, why no people living between the tropics could ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police in their government, and any military diſcipline; while few nations in the temperate climates have been altogether deprived of theſe advantages? 'Tis probable, that one cauſe of this phænomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, which render cloaths and houſes leſs requiſite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in part, that neceſſity, which is the great ſpur to induſtry and invention. *Curis acuens mortalia corda*: Not to mention,

tion, that the fewer goods or poſſeſſions of this kind any people enjoy, the fewer quarrels are likely to ariſe amongſt them, and the leſs neceſſity will there be for a ſettled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies, or from each other.

ESSAY

ESSAY II.

Of REFINEMENT in the ARTS.

LUXURY is a word of a very uncertain ſignification, and may be taken in a good as well as a bad ſenſe. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the ſenſes; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the perſon. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral ſubjects. To imagine, that the gratifying any of the ſenſes, or the indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itſelf a vice, can never enter into a head, that is not diſordered by the frenzies of enthuſiaſm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, becauſe the windows of his cell opened upon a very noble proſpect, made a *covenant with his eyes* never to turn that way, or receive ſo ſenſual a gratification. And ſuch is the crime of drinking CHAMPAGNE or BURGUNDY, preferably to ſmall beer or porter. Theſe indulgences are only vices, when they are purſued at

the expence of ſome virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himſelf to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample ſubject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generoſity or compaſſion, they are intirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged ſuch by almoſt all moraliſts. To be intirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for inſtance, without any reliſh for the pleaſures of ambition, ſtudy, or converſation, is a mark of groſs ſtupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius. To confine one's expence intirely to ſuch a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart intirely devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man reſerve time ſufficient for all laudable purſuits, and money ſufficient for all generous purpoſes, he is free from every ſhadow of blame or reproach.

SINCE luxury may be conſidered either as innocent or blameable, one may be ſurprized at thoſe prepoſterous opinions which have been entertained concerning it; while men of libertine principles beſtow praiſes even on vicious luxury, and repreſent it as highly advantageous to ſociety; and on the other hand, men of ſevere morals blame even the moſt innocent luxury, and repreſent it as the ſource of all the corruptions, diſorders, and factions, incident to

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civil government. We ſhall here endeavour to correct both theſe extremes, by proving, *firſt*, that the ages of refinement are both the happieſt and moſt virtuous; *ſecondly*, that where-ever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, tho' perhaps not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

To prove the firſt point, we need but conſider the effects of refinement both on *private* and on *public* life. Human happineſs, according to the moſt received notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients; action, pleaſure, and indolence: And tho' theſe ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſitions of the perſon; yet no one ingredient can be intirely wanting, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the reliſh of the whole compoſition. Indolence or repoſe, indeed, ſeems not of itſelf to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure. That quick march of the ſpirits, which takes a man from himſelf, and chiefly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe, which, tho' agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy, that deſtroy all enjoyment. Education, cuſtom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to

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norant of aſtronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The ſpirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themſelves on all ſides, and carry improvements into every art and ſcience. Profound ignorance is totally baniſhed, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

THE more theſe refined arts advance, the more ſociable do men become; nor is it poſſible, that, when inriched with ſcience, and poſſeſſed of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to remain in ſolitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that diſtant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to ſhow their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in cloaths or furniture. Curioſity allures the wiſe; vanity the fooliſh; and pleaſure both. Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where formed: Both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, beſide the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of converſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus

induſtry, *knowledge*, and *humanity*, are linked together by an indiſſoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reaſon, to be peculiar to the more poliſhed, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages.

NOR are theſe advantages attended with diſadvantages which bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſſes. One may ſafely affirm, that the TARTARS are oftener guilty of beaſtly gluttony, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than EUROPEAN courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenneſs, on the other hand, is much leſs common: A vice more odious, and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal, not only to an OVID or a PETRONIUS, but to a SENECA or a CATO. We know, that CÆSAR, during CATALINE's conſpiracy, being neceſſitated to put into CATO's hands a *billet-doux*, which diſcovered an intrigue with SERVILIA CATO's own ſiſter, that ſtern philoſopher threw it back to him with indignation; and, in the bitterneſs of his wrath, gave him the appellation of drunkard,

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as a term more opprobrious than that with which he could more juſtly have reproached him.

BUT induſtry, knowledge, and humanity, are not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuſe their beneficial influence on the *public*, and render the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous. The increaſe and conſumption of all the commodities which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of *ſtorehouſe* of labour, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turned to the public ſervice. In a nation, where there is no demand for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indolence, loſe all the enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot maintain nor ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſlothful members.

THE bounds of all the EUROPEAN kingdoms are, at preſent, pretty near the ſame they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe kingdoms? Which can be aſcribed to nothing but the increaſe of art and induſtry. When CHARLES VIII. of FRANCE invaded ITALY, he carried with him about 20,000 men: And yet this armament ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from GUICCIARDIN, that for ſome years it was not

able to make ſo great an effort. The late king of FRANCE, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men *; tho', from MAZARINE's death to his own, he was engaged in a courſe of wars that laſted near thirty years.

THIS induſtry is much promoted by the knowledge inſeparable from the ages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects. Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reaſon has refined itſelf by exerciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt, of commerce and manufactures. Can we expect, that a government will be well modelled by a people, who know not how to make a ſpinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infeſted with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

KNOWLEDGE in the arts of government naturally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects into rebellion, and render the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cut-

* The inſcription on the PLACE-DE-VENDOME ſays 400,000.

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ting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are ſoftened as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic which diſtinguiſhes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then leſs inveterate, revolutions leſs tragical, authority leſs ſevere, and ſeditions leſs frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and intereſt ſteel men againſt compaſſion as well as fear, the combatants diveſt themſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.

NOR need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; a ſenſe of honour, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigour by that elevation of genius, which ariſes from knowledge and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any uſe, when not accompanied with diſcipline and martial ſkill, which are ſeldom found among a barbarous people. The antients remarked, that DATAMES was the only barbarian

that ever knew the art of war. And PYRRHUS ſeeing the ROMANS marſhal their army with ſome art and ſkill, ſaid with ſurprize, *Theſe barbarians have nothing barbarous in their diſcipline!* 'Tis obſervable, that as the old ROMANS, by applying themſelves ſolely to war, were the only civilized people that ever poſſeſſed military diſcipline; ſo the modern ITALIANS are the only civilized people, among EUROPEANS, that ever wanted courage and a martial ſpirit. Thoſe who would aſcribe this effeminacy of the ITALIANS to their luxury or politeneſs, or application to the arts, need but conſider the FRENCH and ENGLISH, whoſe bravery is as unconteſtable, as their love for luxury, and their aſſiduity in commerce. The ITALIAN hiſtorians give us a more ſatisfactory reaſon for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They ſhew us how the ſword was dropt at once by all the ITALIAN ſovereigns; while the VENETIAN ariſtocracy was jealous of its ſubjects, the FLORENTINE democracy applied itſelf intirely to commerce; ROME was governed by prieſts, and NAPLES by women. War then became the buſineſs of ſoldiers of fortune, who ſpared one another, and, to the aſtoniſhment of the world, could engage a whole day in what they called a battle, and return at night to their camp, without the leaſt bloodſhed.

WHAT has chiefly induced ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt refinement in the arts, is the example of antient

antient ROME, which, joining to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from its conquered provinces the ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; whence aroſe ſedition and civil wars, attended at laſt with the total loſs of liberty. All the LATIN claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and univerſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the Eaſt: Inſomuch that SALLUST repreſents a taſte for painting as a vice no leſs than lewdneſs and drinking. And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments, during the latter ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old rigid ROMAN virtue, tho' himſelf the moſt egregious inſtance of modern luxury and corruption; ſpeaks contemptuouſly of GRECIAN eloquence, tho' the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſſions and declamations to this purpoſe, tho' a model of taſte and correctneſs.

BUT it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writers miſtook the cauſe of the diſorders in the ROMAN ſtate, and aſcribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conqueſts. Refinement on the pleaſures and conveniencies of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value which all men put upon any particular pleaſure, de-

pends on comparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money, which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchases champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men, because they always purchase pleasures, such as men are accustomed to, and desire: Nor can any thing restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement.

Of all European kingdoms, Poland seems the most defective in the arts of war, as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; and yet 'tis there that venality and corruption do most prevail. The nobles seem to have preserved their crown elective for no other purpose, but regularly to sell it to the highest bidder. This is almost the only species of commerce with which that people are acquainted.

The liberties of England, so far from decaying since the improvements in the arts, have never flourished so much as during that period. And tho' corruption may seem to increase of late years; this is chiefly to be ascribed to our established liberty, when our princes have found the impossibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails infinitely more among

among the electors than the elected; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcribed to any refinements in luxury.

IF we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that improvements in the arts are rather favourable to liberty, and have a natural tendency to preſerve, if not produce a free government. In rude unpoliſhed nations, where the arts are neglected, all the labour is beſtowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety divides into two claſſes, proprietors of land, and their vaſſals or tenants. The latter are neceſſarily dependent, and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter for the ſake of peace and order; or if they will preſerve their independency, like the GOTHIC barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts among themſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch confuſion, as is perhaps worſe than the moſt deſpotic government. But where luxury nouriſhes commerce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſideration to that middling rank of men, who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty. Theſe ſubmit not to ſlavery,

ſlavery, like the poor peaſants, from poverty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign. They covet equal laws, which may ſecure their property, and preſerve them from monarchical, as well as ariſtocratical tyranny.

THE houſe of Commons is the ſupport of our popular government; and all the world acknowledge, that it owed its chief influence and conſideration to the increaſe of commerce, which threw ſuch a balance of property into the hands of the Commons. How inconſiſtent then is it to blame ſo violently a refinement in the arts, and to repreſent it as the bane of liberty and public ſpirit!

To declaim againſt preſent times, and magnify the virtue of remote anceſtors, is a propenſity almoſt inherent in human nature: And as the ſentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are tranſmitted to poſterity, hence it is that we meet with ſo many ſevere judgments pronounced againſt luxury, and even ſcience; and hence it is that at preſent we give ſo ready an aſſent to them. But the fallacy is eaſily perceived from comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better ſet in oppoſition thoſe manners with which we

we are ſufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cuelty, the moſt pernicious and moſt odious of all vices, ſeem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined GREEKS and ROMANS were aſcribed to all the barbarous nations, which ſurrounded them. They might juſtly, therefore, have preſumed, that their own anceſtors, ſo highly celebrated, poſſeſſed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their poſterity in honour and humanity, as in taſte and ſcience. An antient FRANK or SAXON may be highly extolled: But I believe every man would think his life or fortune much leſs ſecure in the hands of a MOOR or TARTAR, than in thoſe of a FRENCH or ENGLISH gentleman, the rank of men the moſt civilized in the moſt civilized nations.

WE come now to the *ſecond* poſition which we propoſed to illuſtrate, *viz.* that as innocent luxury, or a refinement in the arts and conveniencies of life, is advantageous to the public; ſo where-ever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, tho', perhaps, not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

LET us conſider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however ſenſual, can of itſelf be eſteemed vicious. A gratification is only vicious, when it engroſſes all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for ſuch

ſuch acts of duty and generoſity as are required by his ſituation and fortune. Suppoſe, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expence in the education of his children, in the ſupport of his friends, and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice reſult to ſociety? On the contrary, the ſame conſumption would ariſe; and that labour, which, at preſent, is employed only in producing a ſlender gratification to one man, would relieve the neceſſitous, and beſtow ſatisfaction on hundreds. The ſame care and toil which raiſe a diſh of peas at CHRISTMAS, would give bread to a whole family during ſix months. To ſay, that, without a vicious luxury, the labour would not have been employed at all, is only to ſay, that there is ſome other defect in human nature, ſuch as indolence, ſelfiſhneſs, inattention to others, for which luxury in ſome meaſure provides a remedy; as one poiſon may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholſome food, is better than poiſons, however corrected.

SUPPOSE the ſame number of men that are at preſent in BRITAIN, with the ſame ſoil and climate; I aſk, is it not poſſible for them to be happier, by the moſt perfect way of life which can be imagined, and by the greateſt reformation which Omnipotence itſelf could work in their temper and diſpoſition? To aſſert, that they cannot, appears evidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its inhabitants,

habitants, they could never, in such an UTOPIAN state, feel any other ills than those which arise from bodily sickness; and these are not the half of human miseries. All other ills spring from some vice, either in ourselves or others; and even many of our diseases proceed from the same origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You must only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worse. By banishing *vicious* luxury, without curing sloth and an indifference to others, you only diminish industry in the state, and add nothing to mens charity or their generosity. Let us, therefore, rest contented with asserting, that two opposite vices in a state may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but let us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous. Is it not very inconsistent for an author to assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public *? And indeed it seems, upon any system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice which is in general beneficial to society.

I THOUGHT this reasoning necessary, in order to give some light to a philosophical question, which has been much disputed in BRITAIN. I call it a *philosophical* question, not a *political* one. For what-

* Fable of the bees.

ever

ever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at possibilities. He cannot cure every vice, by substituting a virtue in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer what is least pernicious to society. Luxury, when excessive, is the source of many ills; but is in general preferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more pernicious both to private persons and to the public. When sloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails amongst individuals, without society, without enjoyment. And if the sovereign, in such a situation, demands the service of his subjects, the labour of the state suffices only to furnish the necessaries of life to the labourers, and can afford nothing to those who are employed in the public service.

ESSAY III.

Of MONEY.

MONEY is not, properly ſpeaking, one of the ſubjects of commerce; but only the inſtrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. 'Tis none of the wheels of trade: 'Tis the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more ſmooth and eaſy. If we conſider any one kingdom by itſelf, 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs plenty of money is of no conſequence; ſince the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money, and a crown in HARRY VII.'s time ſerved the ſame purpoſe as a pound does at preſent. 'Tis only the *public* which draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negotiations with foreign ſtates. And this is the reaſon, why all rich and trading countries, from CARTHAGE to BRITAIN and HOLLAND, have employed mercenary troops, which they hired from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make uſe of their native ſubjects, they would find

find leſs advantage from their ſuperior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and ſilver; ſince the pay of all their ſervants muſt riſe in proportion to the public opulence. Our ſmall army in BRITAIN of 20,000 men are maintained at as great expence as a FRENCH army thrice as numerous. The ENGLISH fleet, during the late war, required as much money to ſupport it as all the ROMAN legions, which kept the whole world in ſubjection, during the time of the emperors *.

THE

* A private ſoldier in the ROMAN infantry had a denarius a-day, ſomewhat leſs than eight pence. The ROMAN emperors had commonly 25 legions in pay, which, allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000. TACIT. *Ann. lib.* 4. 'Tis true, there were alſo auxiliaries to the legions; but their numbers are uncertain, as well as their pay. To conſider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not exceed 1,600,000 pound. Now, the parliament in the laſt war commonly allowed for the fleet 2,500,000. We have therefore 900,000 over for the officers and other expences of the ROMAN legions. There ſeem to have been but few officers in the ROMAN armies, in compariſon of what are employed in all our modern troops, except ſome SWISS corps. And theſe officers had very ſmall pay: A centurion, for inſtance, only double a common ſoldier. And as the ſoldiers from their pay (TACIT. *Ann. lib.* 1.) bought their own cloaths, arms, tents, and baggage; this muſt alſo diminiſh conſiderably the other charges of the army. So little expenſive was that mighty government, and ſo eaſy was its yoke over the world. And, indeed, this is the more natural concluſion from the foregoing calculations. For money,

after

THE greater number of people and their greater induſtry are ſerviceable in all caſes; at home and abroad, in private, and in public. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its uſe, and may even ſometimes be a loſs to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

THERE ſeems to be a happy concurrence of cauſes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confined intirely to one people; as might naturally at firſt be dreaded from the advantages of an eſtabliſhed commerce. Where one nation has got the ſtart of another in trade, 'tis very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has loſt; becauſe of the ſuperior induſtry and ſkill of the former, and the greater ſtocks, of which its merchants are poſſeſſed, and which enable them to trade for ſo much ſmaller profits. But theſe advantages are compenſated, in ſome meaſure, by the low price of labour in every nation which has not an extenſive commerce, and does not very much abound in gold and ſilver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually ſhift their places, leaving thoſe countries and provinces which they have already inriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapneſs

after the conqueſt of EGYPT, ſeems to have been nearly in as great plenty at ROME, as it is at preſent in the richeſt of the EUROPEAN kingdoms.

of

of proviſions and labour; till they have inriched theſe alſo, and are again baniſhed by the ſame cauſes. And, in general, we may obſerve, that the dearneſs of every thing, from plenty of money, is a diſadvantage, which attends an eſtabliſhed commerce, and ſets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer ſtates to underſel the richer in all foreign markets.

THIS has made me entertain a great doubt concerning the benefit of *banks* and *paper-credit*, which are ſo generally eſteemed advantageous to every nation. That proviſions and labour ſhould become dear by the increaſe of trade and money, is, in many reſpects, an inconvenience; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and proſperity which are the end of all our wiſhes. 'Tis compenſated by the advantages which we reap, from the poſſeſſion of theſe precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reaſon for increaſing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept in any payment, and which any great diſorder in the ſtate will reduce to nothing. There are, 'tis true, many people in every rich ſtate, who, having large ſums of money, would prefer paper with good ſecurity; as being of more eaſy tranſport and more ſafe cuſtody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumſtance; as the goldſmiths formerly did

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in LONDON, or as the bankers do at preſent in DUBLIN: And therefore 'tis better, it may be thought, that a public company ſhould enjoy the benefit of that paper-credit, which always will have place in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to increaſe ſuch a credit, can never be the intereſt of any trading nation; but muſt lay them under diſadvantages, by increaſing money beyond its natural proportion to labour and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant and manufacturer. And in this view, it muſt be allowed, that no bank could be more advantageous than ſuch a one as locked up all the money it received *, and never augmented the circulating coin, as is uſual, by returning part of its treaſure into commerce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and money-jobbers; and tho' the ſtate bore the charge of ſalaries to the directors and tellers of this bank, (for, according to the preceding ſuppoſition, it would have no profit from its dealings), the national advantage, reſulting from the low price of labour and the deſtruction of paper-credit, would be a ſufficient compenſation. Not to mention, that ſo large a ſum, lying ready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public danger and diſtreſs; and what part of it was

* This is the caſe with the bank of AMSTERDAM.

uſed

uſed, might be replaced at leiſure, when peace and tranquillity were reſtored to the nation.

But of this ſubject of paper-credit we ſhall treat more largely hereafter. And I ſhall finiſh this eſſay on money, by propoſing and explaining two obſervations, which may, perhaps, ſerve to employ the thoughts of our ſpeculative politicians. For to theſe only I all along addreſs myſelf. 'Tis enough, that I ſubmit to the ridicule ſometimes, in this age, attached to the character of a philoſopher, without adding to it that which belongs to a projector.

It was a ſhrewd obſervation of Anacharsis † the Scythian, who had never ſeen money in his own country, that gold and ſilver ſeemed to him of no uſe to the Greeks, but to aſſiſt them in numeration and arithmetic. 'Tis indeed evident, that money is nothing but the repreſentation of labour and commodities, and ſerves only as a method of rating or eſtimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty; as a greater quantity of it is required to repreſent the ſame quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itſelf; no more than it would make any alteration on a merchant's books, if, inſtead of the Arabian method of notation, which requires few characters, he ſhould make uſe of

† Plut. *Quomodo quis ſuos profectus in virtute ſentire poſſit.*

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the ROMAN, which requires a great many. Nay, the greater quantity of money, like the ROMAN characters, is rather inconvenient, and requires greater trouble both to keep and tranſport it. But notwithſtanding this concluſion, which muſt be allowed juſt, 'tis certain, that, ſince the diſcovery of the mines in AMERICA, induſtry has increaſed in all the nations of EUROPE, except in the poſſeſſors of thoſe mines; and this may juſtly be aſcribed, amongſt other reaſons, to the increaſe of gold and ſilver. Accordingly we find, that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labour and induſtry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterpriſing, the manufacturer more diligent and ſkilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not eaſily to be accounted for, if we conſider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itſelf, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of theſe little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchaſes. And as to foreign trade, it appears, that great plenty of money is rather diſadvantageous, by raiſing the price of every kind of labour.

To account, then, for this phænomenon, we muſt conſider, that tho' the high price of commodities be a neceſſary conſequence of the increaſe of gold and

ſilver, yet it follows not immediately upon that increaſe; but ſome time is required before the money circulate thro' the whole ſtate, and make its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At firſt, no alteration is perceived; by degrees, the price riſes, firſt of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at laſt reaches a juſt proportion with the new quantity of ſpecie which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, 'tis only in this interval or intermediate ſituation, between the acquiſition of money and riſe of prices, that the increaſing quantity of gold and ſilver is favourable to induſtry. When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not at firſt diſperſed into many hands; but is confined to the coffers of a few perſons, who immediately ſeek to employ it to the beſt advantage. Here are a ſet of manufacturers or merchants, we ſhall ſuppoſe, who have received returns of gold and ſilver for goods which they ſent to CADIZ. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from ſuch good paymaſters. If workmen become ſcarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at firſt requires an increaſe of labour; and this is willingly ſubmitted to by the artiſan, who can now eat and drink better, to compenſate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the ſame price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the uſe of his family.

family. The farmer and gardener, finding, that all their commodities are taken off, apply themſelves with alacrity to the raiſing more; and at the ſame time can afford to take better and more cloths from their tradeſmen, whoſe price is the ſame as formerly, and their induſtry only whetted by ſo much new gain. 'Tis eaſy to trace the money in its progreſs thro' the whole commonwealth; where we ſhall find, that it muſt firſt quicken the diligence of every individual, before it increaſe the price of labour.

AND that the ſpecie may increaſe to a conſiderable pitch, before it have this latter effect, appears, amongſt other inſtances, from the frequent operations of the FRENCH king on the money; where it was always found, that the augmenting the numerary value did not produce a proportional riſe of the prices, at leaſt for ſome time. In the laſt year of LOUIS XIV. money was raiſed three ſevenths, but prices augmented only one. Corn in FRANCE is now ſold at the ſame price, or for the ſame number of livres it was in 1683; tho' ſilver was then at 30 livres the mark, and is now at 50 *. Not to mention the great addition

* Theſe facts I give upon the authority of Monſ. du TOT in his *Reflexions politiques*, an author of reputation. Tho' I muſt confeſs, that the facts which he advances on other occaſions, are often ſo ſuſpicious, as to make his authority leſs in this matter. However, the general obſervation, that the augmenting the

tion of gold and ſilver, which may have come into that kingdom ſince the former period.

FROM the whole of this reaſoning we may conclude, that 'tis of no manner of conſequence, with regard to the domeſtic happineſs of a ſtate, whether money be in a greater or leſs quantity. The good policy of the magiſtrate conſiſts only in keeping it, if poſſible, ſtill increaſing; becauſe, by that means, he keeps alive a ſpirit of induſtry in the nation, and increaſes the

money in FRANCE does not at firſt proportionably augment the prices, is certainly juſt.

By the by, this ſeems to be one of the beſt reaſons which can be given, for a gradual and univerſal augmentation of the money, tho' it has been intirely overlooked in all thoſe volumes which have been wrote on that queſtion by MELON, du TOT, and PARIS de VERNEY. Were all our money, for inſtance, recoined, and a penny's worth of ſilver taken from every ſhilling, the new ſhilling would probably purchaſe every thing that could have been bought by the old; the prices of every thing would thereby be inſenſibly diminiſhed; foreign trade enlivened; and domeſtic induſtry, by the circulation of a greater number of pounds and ſhillings, would receive ſome increaſe and encouragement. In executing ſuch a project, 'twould be better to make the new ſhilling paſs for 24 half-pence, in order to preſerve the illuſion, and make it be taken for the ſame. And as a recoinage of our ſilver begins to be requiſite, by the continual wearing of our ſhillings and ſixpences, it may be doubtful, whether we ought to imitate the example in King WILLIAM's reign, when the clipt money was raiſed to the old ſtandard.

ſtock

ſtock of labour, in which conſiſts all real power and riches. A nation whoſe money decreaſes, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miſerable than another nation, who poſſeſſes no more money, but is on the increaſing hand. This will be eaſily accounted for, if we conſider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on the one ſide or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjuſted to their new ſituation; and this interval is as pernicious to induſtry when gold and ſilver are diminiſhing, as it is advantageous when theſe metals are increaſing. The workman has not the ſame employment from the manufacturer and merchant; tho' he pays the ſame price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot diſpoſe of his corn and cattle; tho' he muſt pay the ſame rent to his landlord. The poverty, and beggary, and ſloth, which muſt enſue, are eaſily foreſeen.

II. The ſecond obſervation which I propoſed to make with regard to money, may be explained after the following manner. There are ſome kingdoms, and many provinces in Europe, (and all of them were once in the ſame condition) where money is ſo ſcarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is obliged to take his rent in kind, and either to conſume it himſelf, or tranſport it to places

where he may find a market. In thoſe countries, the prince can levy few or no taxes, but in the ſame manner: And as he will receive very ſmall benefit from impoſitions ſo paid, 'tis evident that ſuch a kingdom has very little force even at home; and can not maintain fleets and armies to the ſame extent; as if every part of it abounded in gold and ſilver. There is ſurely a greater diſproportion betwixt the force of GERMANY at preſent and what it was three centuries ago †, than there is in its induſtry, people, and manufactures. The AUSTRIAN dominions in the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent; but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of EUROPE; proceeding, as is commonly ſuppoſed, from the ſcarcity of money. How do all theſe facts agree with that principle of reaſon, that the quantity of gold and ſilver is in itſelf altogether indifferent? According to that principle, where ever a ſovereign has numbers of ſubjects, and theſe have plenty of commodities, he ſhould of courſe be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or leſſer abundance of the precious metals. Theſe admit of diviſions and ſubdiviſions to a great extent; and where they would be-

† The ITALIANS gave to the emperor MAXIMILIAN, the nick-name of POCCI-DANARI. None of the enterpriſes of that prince ever ſucceeded, for want of money.

come

come ſo ſmall as to be in danger of being loſt, 'tis eaſy to mix them with a baſer metal, as is practiſed in ſome countries of EUROPE; and by that means raiſe them to a bulk more ſenſible and convenient. They ſtill ſerve the ſame purpoſes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or whatever colour they may be ſuppoſed to have.

To theſe difficulties I anſwer, that the effect here ſuppoſed to flow from ſcarcity of money, really ariſes from the manners and cuſtoms of the inhabitants; and that we miſtake, as is too uſual, a collateral effect for a cauſe. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires ſome thought and reflection to diſcover the principles by which we can reconcile *reaſon* to *experience*.

IT ſeems a maxim almoſt ſelf-evident, that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion between commodities and money, and that any conſiderable alteration on either of theſe has the ſame effect, either of heightening or lowering the prices. Increaſe the commodities, they become cheaper; increaſe the money, they riſe in their value. As, on the other hand, a diminution of the former, and that of the latter, have contrary tendencies.

'TIS alſo evident, that the prices do not ſo much depend on the abſolute quantity of commodities and

that of money, which are in a nation, as on that of the commodities, which come or may come to market, and of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in chefts, 'tis the ſame thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated: If the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in theſe caſes, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning the price of proviſions, the corn which the farmer muſt reſerve for the maintenance of himſelf and family ought never to enter into the eſtimation. 'Tis only the overplus, compared to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply theſe principles, we muſt conſider, that in the firſt and more uncultivated ages of any ſtate ere fancy has confounded her wants with thoſe of nature, men, contented with the productions of their own fields, or with thoſe rude preparations which they themſelves can work upon them, have little occaſion for exchange, or at leaſt for money, which, by agreement, is the common meaſure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, ſpun in his own family, and wrought by a neighbouring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, ſuffices for furniture and cloathing. The carpenter, the ſmith, the maſon, the tailor, are retained by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himſelf, dwelling in the neighbour-

neighbourhood, is contented to receive his rent in the commodities raiſed by the farmer. The greateſt part of theſe he conſumes at home, in ruſtic hoſpitality: The reſt, perhaps, he diſpoſes of for money to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the few materials of his expence and luxury.

BUT after men begin to refine on all theſe enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are contented with what can be raiſed in their neighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange. The tradeſmen will not be paid in corn; becauſe they want ſomething more than barely to eat. The farmer goes beyond his own pariſh for the commodities he purchaſes, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant who ſupplies him. The landlord lives in the capital, or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and ſilver, which can eaſily be tranſported to him. Great undertakers, and manufacturers, and merchants, ariſe in every commodity; and theſe can conveniently deal in nothing but in ſpecie. And conſequently, in this ſituation of ſociety, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employed than in the former.

THE neceſſary effect is, that, provided the money does not increaſe in the nation, every thing muſt be-

come much cheaper in times of industry and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. 'Tis the proportion between the circulating money, and the commodities in the market, which determines the prices. Goods that are consumed at home, or exchanged with other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they affect not in the least the current specie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and consequently this method of using them sinks the proportion on the side of the commodities, and increases the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and sales, and is every where the measure of exchange, the same national cash has a much greater task to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the sphere of circulation is enlarged; 'tis the same case as if that individual sum were to serve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here lessened on the side of the money, every thing must become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

By the most exact computations that have been formed all over EUROPE, after making allowance for the alteration in the numerary value or the denomination, 'tis found, that the prices of all things have only risen three, or at most, four times, since the discovery of the WEST INDIES. But will any one assert, that there is not four times the coin in EUROPE, that was in the fifteenth century, and the centuries preceding it? The SPANIARDS and PORTUGUESE from

from their mines, the ENGLISH, FRENCH, and DUTCH, by their AFRICAN trade, and by their interlopers in the WEST INDIES, bring home about six millions a-year, of which not above a third part goes to the EAST INDIES. This sum alone in ten years would probably double the antient stock of money in EUROPE. And no other satisfactory reason can be given, why all prices have not risen to a much more exorbitant height, except that derived from a change of customs and manners. Besides that more commodities are produced by additional industry, the same commodities come more to market, after men depart from their antient simplicity of manners. And tho' this increase has not been equal to that of money, it has, however, been considerable, and has preserved the proportion between coin and commodities nearer the antient standard.

WERE the question proposed, Which of these methods of living in the people, the simple or the refined, is the most advantageous to the state or public? I should, without much scruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at least; and should produce this as an additional reason for the encouragement of trade and manufactures.

WHEN men live in the antient simple manner, and supply all their necessaries from domestic industry or from the neighbourhood, the sovereign can levy no

taxes in money from a conſiderable part of his ſubjects; and if he will impoſe on them any burdens, he muſt take his payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with ſuch great and obvious inconveniencies, that they need not here be inſiſted on. All the money he can pretend to raiſe, muſt be from his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and theſe, 'tis evident, cannot afford him ſo much as the whole ſtate could, did gold and ſilver circulate thro' the whole. But beſides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is alſo another cauſe of the poverty of the public in ſuch a ſituation. Not only the ſovereign receives leſs money, but the ſame money goes not ſo far as in times of induſtry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and ſilver are ſuppoſed equal; and that becauſe fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchaſed by it; whence alone the prices of every thing are fixed and determined.

HERE then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with in hiſtorians, and even in common converſation, that any particular ſtate is weak, tho' fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely becauſe it wants money. It appears, that the want of money can never injure any ſtate within itſelf: For men and commodities are the real ſtrength of any community. 'Tis the ſimple manner of living which here

here hurts the public, by confining the gold and ſilver to few hands, and preventing its univerſal diffuſion and circulation. On the contrary, induſtry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole ſtate, however ſmall its quantity may be: They digeſt it into every vein, ſo to ſpeak; and make it enter into every tranſaction and contract. No hand is intirely empty of it. And as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the ſovereign has a double advantage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the ſtate; and what he receives, goes farther in every purchaſe and payment.

WE may infer, from a compariſon of prices, that money is not more plentiful in CHINA, than it was in EUROPE three centuries ago: But what immenſe power is that empire poſſeſſed of, if we may judge by the civil and military liſt maintained by it? POLYBIUS * tells us, that proviſions were ſo cheap in ITALY during his time, that in ſome places the ſtated club in the inns was a *ſemis* a-head, little more than a farthing? Yet the ROMAN power had even then ſubdued the whole known world. About a century before that period, the CARTHAGINIAN ambaſſador ſaid, by way of raillery, that no people lived more ſociably amongſt themſelves than the ROMANS; for that in every entertainment, which, as foreign miniſters, they received, they ſtill obſerved the ſame plate

* Lib. 2. cap. 15.

at

at every table †. The abſolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumſtances of any importance, *viz.* their gradual increaſe, and their thorough concoction and circulation thro' the ſtate; and the influence of both theſe circumſtances has been here explained.

In the following Eſſay we ſhall ſee an inſtance of a like fallacy as that above-mentioned; where a collateral effect is taken for a cauſe, and where a conſequence is aſcribed to the plenty of money; tho' it be really owing to a change in the manners and cuſtoms of the people.

* PLIN. lib. 33. capit. 3.

ESSAY IV.

Of INTEREST.

NOTHING is eſteemed a more certain ſign of the flouriſhing condition of any nation than the lowneſs of intereſt: And with reaſon; tho' I believe the cauſe is ſomewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. The lowneſs of intereſt is generally aſcribed to the plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other effect, *if fixed*, than to raiſe the price of labour. Silver is more common than gold; and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the ſame commodities. But do you pay leſs intereſt for it? Intereſt in BATAVIA and JAMAICA is at 10 *per cent.* in PORTUGAL at 6; tho' theſe places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound much more in gold and ſilver than either LONDON or AMSTERDAM.

WERE all the gold in ENGLAND annihilated at once, and one and twenty ſhillings ſubſtituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful or intereſt

intereſt lower? No ſurely: We ſhould only uſe ſilver inſtead of gold. Were gold rendered as common as ſilver, and ſilver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? We may aſſuredly give the ſame anſwer. Our ſhillings would then be yellow, and our halfpence white; and we ſhould have no guineas. No other difference would ever be obſerved; no alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or intereſt; unleſs we imagine, that the colour of the metal is of any conſequence.

Now, what is ſo viſible in theſe greater variations of ſcarcity or abundance of the precious metals, muſt hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying gold and ſilver fifteen times makes no difference, much leſs can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labour and commodities; and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progreſs towards theſe changes, the augmentation may have ſome influence, by exciting induſtry; but after the prices are ſettled, ſuitable to the new abundance of gold and ſilver, it has no manner of influence.

An effect always holds proportion with its cauſe. Prices have riſen about four times ſince the diſcovery of the Indies; and 'tis probable gold and ſilver have multiplied much more: But intereſt has not fallen much above half. The rate of intereſt, therefore, is

is not derived from the quantity of the precious metals.

Money having merely a fictitious value, arising from the agreement and convention of men, the greater or less plenty of it is of no consequence, if we consider a nation within itself; and the quantity of specie, when once fixed, tho' never so large, has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of those shining bits of metal, for cloaths, furniture, or equipage, without increasing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money to build a house, he then carries home a greater load; because the stone, timber, lead, glass, &c. with the labour of the masons and carpenters, are represented by a greater quantity of gold and silver. But as these metals are considered merely as representations, there can no alteration arise, from their bulk or quantity, their weight or colour, either upon their real value or their interest. The same interest, in all cases, bears the same proportion to the sum. And if you lent me so much labour and so many commodities; by receiving five *per cent.* you receive always proportional labour and commodities, however represented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an ounce. 'Tis in vain, therefore, to look for the cause of the fall or rise of interest in the greater or less quantity of gold and silver, which is fixed in any nation.

High

HIGH intereſt ariſes from *three* circumſtances: A great demand for borrowing; little riches to ſupply that demand; and great profits ariſing from commerce. And theſe circumſtances are a clear proof of the ſmall advance of commerce and induſtry, not of the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver. Low intereſt, on the other hand, proceeds from the three oppoſite circumſtances: A ſmall demand for borrowing; great riches to ſupply that demand; and ſmall profits ariſing from commerce. And theſe circumſtances are all connected together, and proceed from the increaſe of induſtry and commerce, not of gold and ſilver. We ſhall endeavour to prove theſe points as fully and diſtinctly as poſſible; and ſhall begin with the cauſes and the effects of a great or ſmall demand for borrowing.

WHEN a people have emerged even ſo little from a ſavage ſtate, and their numbers have increaſed beyond the original multitude, there muſt immediately ariſe an inequality of property; and while ſome poſſeſs large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow limits, and ſome are entirely without any landed property. Thoſe who poſſeſs more land than they can labour, employ thoſe who poſſeſs none, and agree to receive a determinate part of the product. Thus the *landed* intereſt is immediately eſtabliſhed; nor is there any ſettled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this footing. Of theſe proprietors of land, ſome muſt preſently diſcover

cover themſelves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would willingly ſtore up the product of his land for futurity, another deſires to conſume at preſent what ſhould ſuffice for many years. But as the ſpending a ſettled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation; men have ſo much need of ſomewhat to fix and engage them, that pleaſures, ſuch as they are, will be the purſuit of the greateſt part of the landholders, and the prodigals amongſt them will always be more numerous than the miſers. In a ſtate, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed intereſt, as there is little frugality, the borrowers may be very numerous, and the rate of intereſt muſt hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand for borrowing is increaſed or diminiſhed. Were money ſo plentiful as to make an egg be ſold for ſixpence; ſo long as there are only landed gentry and peaſants in the ſtate, the borrowers muſt be numerous, and intereſt high. The rent for the ſame farm would be heavier and more bulky: But the ſame idleneſs of the landlord, with the higher prices of commodities, would diſſipate it in the ſame time, and produce the ſame neceſſity and demand for borrowing *.

Nor

* I have been informed by a very eminent lawyer, and a man of great knowlege and obſervation, that it appears from antient papers and records, that, about four centuries ago, money, in Scotland,

NOR is the caſe different with regard to the *ſecond* circumſtance which we propoſed to conſider, *viz.* the great or little riches to ſupply this demand. This effect alſo depends on the habits and ways of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and ſilver. In order to have, in any ſtate, a great number of lenders, 'tis not ſufficient nor requiſite that there be great abundance of precious metals. 'Tis only requiſite that the property or command of that quantity, which is in the ſtate, whether great or ſmall, ſhould be collected in particular hands, ſo as to form conſiderable ſums, or compoſe a great monied intereſt. This begets a number of lenders, and ſinks the rate of uſury; and this, I ſhall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity of ſpecie, but on particular manners and cuſtoms, which make the ſpecie gather into ſeparate ſums or maſſes of conſiderable value.

SCOTLAND, and probably in other parts of EUROPE, was only at five *per cent.* and afterwards roſe to ten before the diſcovery of the WEST-INDIES. This fact is curious; but might eaſily be reconciled to the foregoing reaſoning. Men, in that age, lived ſo much at home, and in ſo very ſimple and frugal a manner, that they had no occaſion for money; and tho' the lenders were then few, the borrowers were ſtill fewer. The high rate of intereſt among the early ROMANS is accounted for by hiſtorians from the frequent loſſes ſuſtained by the inroads of the enemy.

FOR

For ſuppoſe, that, by miracle, every man in Britain ſhould have five pounds ſlipt into his pocket in one night; this would much more than double the whole money that is at preſent in the kingdom; and yet there would not next day, nor for ſome time, be any more lenders, nor any variation on the intereſt. And were there nothing but landlords and peaſants in the ſtate, this money, however abundant, could never gather into ſums; and would only ſerve to increaſe the prices of every thing, without any farther conſequence. The prodigal landlord diſſipates it, as faſt as he receives it; and the beggarly peaſant has no means, nor view, nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing ſtill the ſame, there will follow no reduction of intereſt. That depends upon another principle; and muſt proceed from an increaſe of induſtry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

Every thing uſeful to the life of man ariſes from the ground; but few things ariſe in that condition which is requiſite to render them uſeful. There muſt, therefore, beſide the peaſants, and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former, the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own uſe and ſubſiſtence. In the infancy of ſociety, theſe contracts betwixt the artiſans and the peaſants, and betwixt one ſpecies of artiſans and another, are commonly entered into

into immediately by the perſons themſelves, who, being neighbours, are eaſily acquainted with each other's neceſſities, and can lend their mutual aſſiſtance to ſupply them. But when men's induſtry increaſes, and their views enlarge, 'tis found, that the moſt remote parts of the ſtate can aſſiſt each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourſe of good offices may be carried on to the greateſt extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, the moſt uſeful race of men in the whole ſociety, who ſerve as agents between thoſe parts of the ſtate, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's neceſſities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in ſilk and linen, and a thouſand cuſtomers; and theſe two ranks of men, ſo neceſſary to each other, can never rightly meet, till one man erects a ſhop, to which all the workmen and all the cuſtomers repair. In this province, graſs riſes in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheeſe, and butter, and cattle; but want bread and corn, which, in a neighbouring province, are in too great abundance for the uſe of the inhabitants. One man diſcovers this. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and ſupplying the wants of both, he is, ſo far, a common benefactor. As the people increaſe in numbers and induſtry, the difficulty of their intercourſe increaſes; The buſineſs of the agency or merchandize becomes more intricate; and divides, ſubdivides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all theſe tranſac-

tions,

tions, his neceſſary, and reaſonable, that a conſiderable part of the commodities and labour ſhould belong to the merchant, to whom, in a great meaſure, they are owing. And theſe commodities he will ſometimes preſerve in kind, or more commonly convert into money, which is their common repreſentation. If gold and ſilver have increaſed in the ſtate together with the induſtry, it will require a great quantity of theſe metals to repreſent a great quantity of commodities and labour. If induſtry alone has increaſed, the prices of every thing muſt ſink, and a very ſmall quantity of ſpecie will ſerve as a repreſentation.

THERE is no craving or demand of the human mind more conſtant and inſatiable than that for exerciſe and employment; and this deſire ſeems the foundation of moſt of our paſſions and purſuits. Deprive a man of all buſineſs and ſerious occupation, he runs reſtleſs from one amuſement to another; and the weight and oppreſſion which he feels from idleneſs, is ſo great, that he forgets the ruin which muſt follow from his immoderate expences. Give him a more harmleſs way of employing his mind or body, he is ſatisfied, and feels no longer that inſatiable thirſt after pleaſure. But if the employment you give him be profitable, eſpecially if the profit be attached to every particular exertion of induſtry, he has gain ſo often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a paſſion for it, and knows no ſuch pleaſure as that of

ſeeing

ſeeing the daily increaſe of his fortune. And this is the reaſon why trade increaſes frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the ſame overplus of miſers above prodigals, as, among the poſſeſſors of land, there is the contrary.

COMMERCE increaſes induſtry, by conveying it readily from one member of the ſtate to another, and allowing none of it to periſh or become uſeleſs. It increaſes frugality, by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which ſoon engage their affection, and remove all reliſh for pleaſure and expence. 'Tis an infallible conſequence of all induſtrious profeſſions, to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleaſure. Among lawyers and phyſicians who have any practice, there are many more who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and phyſicians beget no induſtry; and 'tis even at the expence of others they acquire their riches; ſo that they are ſure to diminiſh the poſſeſſions of ſome of their fellow-citizens as faſt as they increaſe their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget induſtry, by ſerving as canals to convey it thro' every corner of the ſtate; and at the ſame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that induſtry, and collect a large property in the labour and commodities, which they are the chief inſtruments in producing. There is no other profeſſion, therefore, except merchandize,

chandize, which can make the monied intereſt conſiderable, or, in other words, can increaſe induſtry, and, by alſo increaſing frugality, give a great command of that induſtry to particular members of the ſociety. Without commerce, the ſtate muſt conſiſt chiefly of landed gentry, whoſe prodigality and expence make a continual demand for borrowing; and of peaſants, who have no ſums to ſupply that demand. The money never gathers into large ſtocks or ſums, which can be lent at intereſt. It is diſperſed into numberleſs hands, who either ſquander it in idle ſhow and magnificence, or employ it in the purchaſe of the common neceſſaries of life. Commerce alone aſſembles it into conſiderable ſums; and this effect it has merely from the induſtry which it begets, and the frugality which it inſpires, independent of that particular quantity of precious metal which may circulate in the ſtate.

Thus an increaſe of commerce, by a neceſſary conſequence, raiſes a great number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowneſs of intereſt. We muſt now conſider how far this increaſe of commerce diminiſhes the profits ariſing from that profeſſion, and gives riſe to the *third* circumſtance requiſite to produce a lowneſs of intereſt.

It may be proper to obſerve on this head, that low intereſt and low profits of merchandize are two

events, that mutually forward each other, and are both originally derived from that extenſive commerce, which produces opulent merchants, and renders the monied intereſt conſiderable. Where merchants poſſeſs great ſtocks, whether repreſented by few or many pieces of metal, it muſt frequently happen, that when they either become tired of buſineſs, or have heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great deal of theſe riches naturally ſeeks an annual and ſecure revenue. The plenty diminiſhes the price, and makes the lenders accept of a low intereſt. This conſideration obliges many to keep their ſtocks in trade, and rather be content with low profit than diſpoſe of their money at an under value. On the other hand, when commerce has become very extenſive, and employs very large ſtocks, there muſt ariſe rivalſhips among the merchants, which diminiſh the profits of trade, at the ſame time that they increaſe the trade itſelf. The low profits of merchandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low intereſt, when they leave off buſineſs, and begin to indulge themſelves in eaſe and indolence. It is needleſs, therefore, to enquire which of theſe circumſtances, *viz. low intereſts or low profits*, is the cauſe, and which the effect? They both ariſe from an extenſive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high intereſt; and no man will accept of low intereſt, where he can have high profits. An extenſive commerce, by producing large ſtocks, diminiſhes both intereſt and profit; and is always

ways aſſiſted, in its diminution of the one, by the proportional ſinking of the other. I may add, that as low profits ariſe from the increaſe of commerce and induſtry, they ſerve in their turn to the farther increaſe of commerce, by rendering the commodities cheaper, encouraging the conſumption, and heightening the induſtry. And thus, if we conſider the whole connection of cauſes and effects, intereſt is the true barometer of the ſtate, and its lowneſs is a ſign almoſt infallible of the flouriſhing of a people. It proves the increaſe of induſtry, and its prompt circulation thro' the whole ſtate, little inferior to a demonſtration. And tho', perhaps, it may not be impoſſible but a ſudden and a great check to commerce may have a momentary effect of the ſame kind, by throwing ſo many ſtocks out of trade; it muſt be attended with ſuch miſery and want of employment in the poor, that, beſides its ſhort duration, it will not be poſſible to miſtake the one caſe for the other.

Those who have aſſerted, that the plenty of money was the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeem to have taken a collateral effect for a cauſe; ſince the ſame induſtry which ſinks the intereſt, does commonly acquire great abundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures, with vigilant enterpriſing merchants, will ſoon draw money to a ſtate, if it be any where to be found in the world. The ſame cauſe, by multiplying the conveniencies of life, and increaſing in-

duſtry, collects great riches into the hands of perſons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowneſs of intereſt. But tho' both theſe effects, plenty of money and low intereſt, naturally ariſe from commerce and induſtry, they are altogether independent of each other. For ſuppoſe a nation removed into the *Pacific* ocean, without any foreign commerce, or any knowledge of navigation: Suppoſe, that this nation poſſeſſes always the ſame ſtock of coin, but is continually increaſing in its numbers and induſtry: 'Tis evident, that the price of every commodity muſt gradually diminiſh in that kingdom; ſince 'tis the proportion between money and any ſpecies of goods, which fixes their mutual value; and, upon the preſent ſuppoſition, the conveniencies of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration on the current ſpecie. A leſs quantity of money, therefore, amongſt this people, will make a rich man, during the times of induſtry, than would ſerve to that purpoſe, in ignorant and ſlothful ages. Leſs money will build a houſe, portion a daughter, buy an eſtate, ſupport a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. Theſe are the uſes for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or leſs quantity of it in a ſtate has no influence on the intereſt. But 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs ſtock of labour and commodities muſt have a great influence; ſince we really and in effect borrow theſe, when we take money upon intereſt. 'Tis true, when commerce is extended

tended all over the globe, the moſt induſtrious nations always abound moſt with the precious metals: So that low intereſt and plenty of money are in fact almoſt inſeparable. But ſtill 'tis of conſequence to know the principle whence any phænomenon ariſes, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt a cauſe and a concomitant effect. Beſides that the ſpeculation is curious, it may frequently be of uſe in the conduct of public affairs. At leaſt, it muſt be owned, that nothing can be of more uſe than to improve, by practice, the method of reaſoning on theſe ſubjects, which of all others are the moſt important; tho' they are commonly treated in the looſeſt and moſt careleſs manner.

ANOTHER reaſon of this popular miſtake with regard to the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeems to be the inſtance of ſome nations; where, after a ſudden acquiſition of money, or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conqueſt, the intereſt has fallen, not only among them, but in all the neighbouring ſtates, as ſoon as that money was diſperſed, and had inſinuated itſelf into every corner. Thus, intereſt in SPAIN fell near a half immediately after the diſcovery of the WEST INDIES, as we are informed by GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA: And it has been ever ſince gradually ſinking in every kingdom of EUROPE. Intereſt in ROME, after the conqueſt of EGYPT, fell from 6 to 4 *per cent.* as we learn from DION *.

* Lib. 51.

THE cauſes of the ſinking of intereſt upon ſuch an event, ſeem different in the conquering country and in the neighbouring ſtates; but in neither of them can we juſtly aſcribe that effect merely to the increaſe of gold and ſilver.

IN the conquering country, 'tis natural to imagine, that this new acquiſition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gathered into large ſums, which ſeek a ſecure revenue, either by the purchaſe of land or by intereſt; and conſequently the ſame effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great acceſſion of induſtry and commerce. The increaſe of lenders above the borrowers ſinks the intereſt; and ſo much the faſter, if thoſe who have acquired thoſe large ſums, find no induſtry or commerce in the ſtate, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at intereſt. But after this new maſs of gold and ſilver has been digeſted, and has circulated thro' the whole ſtate, affairs will ſoon return to their former ſituation: while the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, ſquander above their income; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter incroach on their ſtock till its final extinction. The whole money may ſtill be in the ſtate, and make itſelf felt by the increaſe of prices: But not being now collected into any large maſſes or ſtocks, the diſproportion between the borrowers and lenders is the ſame as formerly, and conſequently the high intereſt returns.

ACCOR-

ACCORDINGLY we find, in ROME, that ſo early as TIBERIUS's time, intereſt had again mounted to 6 *per cent.* * tho' no accident had happened to drain the empire of money. In TRAJAN's time, money lent on mortgages in ITALY, bore 6 *per cent* †; on common ſecurities in BITHYNIA, 12 ‡. And if intereſt in SPAIN has not riſen to its old pitch; this can be aſcribed to nothing but the continuance of the ſame cauſe that ſunk it, *viz.* the large fortunes continually made in the INDIES, which come over to SPAIN from time to time, and ſupply the demand of the borrowers. By this accidental and extraneous cauſe, more money is to be lent in SPAIN, that is, more money is collected into large ſums, than would otherwiſe be found in a ſtate, where there are ſo little commerce and induſtry.

AS to the reduction of intereſt, which has followed in ENGLAND, FRANCE, and other kingdoms of EUROPE, that have no mines, it has been gradual; and has not proceeded from the increaſe of money, conſidered merely in itſelf; but from the increaſe of induſtry, which is the natural effect of the former increaſe, in that interval, before it raiſes the price of labour and proviſions. For to return to the foregoing ſuppoſition; if the induſtry of ENGLAND had riſen

* COLUMELLA, lib. 3. cap. 3.

† PLINII epiſt. lib. 7. ep. 18.

‡ Id. lib. 10. ep. 62.

as much from other cauſes, (and that riſe might eaſily have happened, tho' the ſtock of money had remained the ſame) muſt not all the ſame conſequences have followed, which we obſerve at preſent? The ſame people would, in that caſe, be found in the kingdom; the ſame commodities, the ſame induſtry, manufactures, and commerce; and conſequently the ſame merchants, with the ſame ſtocks, that is, with the ſame command over labour and commodities, only repreſented by a ſmaller number of white or yellow pieces; which being a circumſtance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, induſtry, frugality, flouriſhing equally as at preſent, 'tis evident that intereſt muſt alſo have been as low; ſince that is the neceſſary reſult of all theſe circumſtances; ſo far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion between the borrowers and lenders in any ſtate.

ESSAY

ESSAY V.

Of the BALANCE of TRADE.

'TIS very uſual, in nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preſerve among themſelves whatever they think valuable and uſeful. They conſider not, that, in this prohibition, they act directly contrary to their intention; and that the more is exported of any commodity, the more will be raiſed at home, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

'TIS well known to the learned, that the antient laws of ATHENS rendered the exportation of figs criminal; that being ſuppoſed a ſpecies of fruit ſo excellent in ATTICA, that the ATHENIANS eſteemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were ſo much in earneſt, that reformers were thence called *ſycophants* among them, from two GREEK words, which ſignify

fgs and *discoverer* *. There are proofs in many old acts of the SCOTCH parliament of the same ignorance in the nature of commerce. And to this day, in FRANCE, the exportation of corn is almoſt always prohibited; in order, as they ſay, to prevent famines; tho' 'tis evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which ſo much diſtreſs that fertile country.

THE ſame jealous fear, with regard to money, has alſo prevailed among ſeveral nations; and it required both reaſon and experience to convince any people, that theſe prohibitions ſerve to no other purpoſe than to raiſe the exchange againſt them, and produce a ſtill greater exportation.

THESE errors, one may ſay, are groſs and palpable: But there ſtill prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a ſtrong jealouſy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and ſilver may be leaving them. This ſeems to me, almoſt in every caſe, a very groundleſs apprehenſion; and I ſhould as ſoon dread, that all our ſprings and rivers ſhould be exhauſted, as that money ſhould abandon a kingdom where there are people and induſtry. Let us carefully preſerve theſe latter advantages; and we need never be apprehenſive of loſing the former.

* PLUT. *De curioſitate.*

'TIS

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and ſuppoſitions. The cuſtomhouſe-books are owned to be an inſufficient ground of reaſoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better; unleſs we conſider it with all nations, and know alſo the proportions of the ſeveral ſums remitted; which one may ſafely pronounce impoſſible. Every man who has ever reaſoned on this ſubject, has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities ſent to all foreign kingdoms.

THE writings of Mr. GEE ſtruck the nation with an univerſal panic, when they ſaw it plainly demonſtrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was againſt them for ſo conſiderable a ſum as muſt leave them without a ſingle ſhilling in five or ſix years. But, luckily, twenty years have ſince elapſed, with an expenſive foreign war; and yet it is commonly ſuppoſed, that money is ſtill more plentiful among us than in any former period.

NOTHING can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. SWIFT; an author ſo quick in diſcerning the miſtakes or abſurdities of others. He ſays, in his *ſhort view of the ſtate of* IRELAND, that the whole caſh of that kingdom amounted but to 500,000*l.*; that out of this they remitted every year a neat mil-

lion to ENGLAND, and had ſcarce any other ſource from which they could compenſate themſelves, and little other foreign trade but the importation of FRENCH wines, for which they paid ready money. The conſequence of this ſituation, which muſt be owned diſadvantageous, was, that in a courſe of three years, the current money of IRELAND, from 500,000*l.* was reduced to leſs than two. And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of near 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing. Yet I know not how, that opinion of the advance of riches in IRELAND, which gave the Doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground with every body.

IN ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, where-ever one is out of humour with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, which may prove the impoſſibility of that event, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

SUPPOSE four fifths of all the money in BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the ſame condition, with regard to ſpecie, as in the reigns of the HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labour and

and commodities sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in those ages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion.

AGAIN, suppose, that all the money in BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became so cheap in comparison, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such disadvantages?

NOW, 'tis evident, that the same causes which would correct these exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of nature, and must for ever

ever in all the neighbouring nations, preſerve money nearly proportionable to the art and induſtry of each nation. All water, where-ever it communicates, remains always at a level. Aſk naturaliſts the reaſon; they tell you, that were it to be raiſed in any one place, the ſuperior gravity of that part not being balanced, muſt depreſs it, till it meets a counterpoiſe; and that the ſame cauſe which redreſſes the inequality when it happens, muſt for ever prevent it, without ſome violent external operation *.

CAN one imagine, that it had ever been poſſible, by any laws, or even by any art or induſtry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought from the INDIES? or that all commodities could be ſold in FRANCE for a tenth of the price which they would yield on the other ſide of the PYRENEES, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immenſe treaſure? What other reaſon, indeed, is there, why all nations, at preſent, gain in

* There is another cauſe, tho' more limited in its operation, which checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation to which the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the exchange turns againſt us, and this becomes a new encouragement to export; as much as the charge of carriage and inſurance of the money which becomes due would amount to. For the exchange can never riſe higher than that ſum.

their

their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL; but because it is impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level. The sovereigns of these countries have shown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and silver to themselves, had it been in any degree practicable.

BUT as any body of water may be raised above the level of the surrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter; so in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or physical impediment, (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may, in such a case, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immense distance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in EUROPE the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes above-mentioned is still evident. The skill and ingenuity of EUROPE in general surpasses perhaps that of CHINA, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from AMERICA, money would very soon sink in EUROPE, and rise in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reasonable man doubt, but

but that industrious nation, were they as near us as POLAND or BARBARY, would drain us of the overplus of our specie, and draw to themselves a larger share of the WEST-INDIAN treasures. We need have no recourse to a physical attraction, to explain the necessity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, arising from the interests and passions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themselves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impossible for money to lose its level, and either to rise or sink beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which is in each province? Did not long experience make people easy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy YORKSHIREMAN, while he computed and magnified the sums drawn to LONDON by taxes, absentees, commodities, and found on comparison the opposite articles so much inferior? And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* subsisted in ENGLAND, the legislature of each state had been continually alarmed by the fear of a wrong balance; and as 'tis probable that the mutual hatred of these states would have been extremely violent on account of their close neighbourhood, they would have loaded and oppressed all commerce, by a jealous and superfluous caution. Since the union has removed the barriers between SCOTLAND and ENGLAND, which

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of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has received any increaſe of riches, can it be reaſonably accounted for by any thing but the increaſe of its art and induſtry? It was a common apprehenſion in ENGLAND, before the union, as we learn from L'ABBE DU BOS *, that SCOTLAND would ſoon drain them of their treaſure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other ſide the TWEED a contrary apprehenſion prevailed: With what juſtice in both, time has ſhown.

WHAT happens in ſmall portions of mankind, muſt take place in greater. The provinces of the ROMAN empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with ITALY, independant of the legiſlature; as much as the ſeveral counties of BRITAIN, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county. And any man who travels over EUROPE at this day, may ſee by the prices of commodities, that money, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often between different provinces of the ſame kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more induſtry, more commodities, and conſequently more

* *Les interets d'*ANGLETERRE *mal-entendus.*

money;

money; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerved *.

OUR jealouſy and our hatred of FRANCE, are without bounds; and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowledged very reaſonable and well-grounded. Theſe paſſions have occaſioned innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accuſed of being commonly the aggreſſors. But what have we gained by the bargain? We loſt the FRENCH market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to SPAIN and PORTUGAL, where we buy much worſe liquor at a higher price. There are few ENGLISHMEN who would not think

* It muſt carefully be remarked, that, thro'out this diſcourſe, where-ever I ſpeak of the level of money, I mean always its proportional level to the commodities, labour, induſtry, and ſkill, which is in the ſeveral ſtates. And I aſſert, that where theſe advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring ſtates, the money infallibly will alſo be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumſtance that can obſtruct the exactneſs of theſe proportions, is the expence of tranſporting the commodities from one place to another; and this expence is ſometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheeſe, butter, of DERBYSHIRE, cannot draw the money of LONDON, ſo much as the manufactures of LONDON draw the money of DERBYSHIRE. But this objection is only a ſeeming one: For ſo far as the tranſport of commodities is expenſive, ſo far is the communication between the place obſtructed and imperfect.

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their country abſolutely ruined, were FRENCH wines ſold in ENGLAND ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale, and home-brewed liquors: But would we lay aſide prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in FRANCE, in order to ſupply ENGLAND with wine, would make it requiſite for the FRENCH to take the product of an ENGLISH acre, ſown in wheat or barley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and 'tis evident, that we have thereby got command of the better commodity.

THERE are many edicts of the FRENCH King, prohibiting the planting of new vineyards, and ordering all thoſe already planted to be grubbed up: So ſenſible are they in that country, of the ſuperior value of corn, above every other product.

MARESCHAL VAUBAN complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties which load the entry of thoſe wines of LANGUEDOC, GUIENNE, and other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into BRITANY and NORMANDY. He entertained no doubt but theſe latter provinces could preſerve their balance, notwithſtanding the open commerce which he recommends. And 'tis evident, that a few leagues more navigation to ENGLAND would make no difference; or

or if it did, that it muſt operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

THERE is indeed one expedient by which it is poſſible to ſink, and another by which we may raiſe, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom; but theſe caſes, when examined, will be found to reſolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I SCARCE know any method of ſinking money below its level, but thoſe inſtitutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit, with which we are in this kingdom ſo much infatuated. Theſe render paper equivalent to money, circulate it thro' the whole ſtate, make it ſupply the place of gold and ſilver, raiſe proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and by that means either baniſh a great part of thoſe precious metals, or prevent their farther increaſe. What can be more ſhortſighted than our reaſonings on this head? We fancy, becauſe an individual would be much richer, were his ſtock of money doubled, that the ſame good effect would follow were the money of every one increaſed; not conſidering, that this would raiſe as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the ſame condition as before. 'Tis only in our public negotiations and tranſactions with foreigners, that a greater ſtock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there abſolutely

inſignifi-

insignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects arising from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages *.

SUPPOSE that there are 12 millions of paper, which circulate in the kingdom as money, (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are employed in that shape), and suppose the real cash of the kingdom to be 18 millions: Here is a state which is found by experience able to hold a stock of 30 millions. I say, if it be able to hold it, it must of necessity have acquired it in gold and silver, had we not obstructed the entrance of these metals by this new invention of paper. *Whence would it have acquired that sum?* From all the kingdoms of the world. *But why?* Because, if you remove these 12 millions, money in this state is below its level, compared with our neighbours; and we must immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and saturate, so to speak, and can hold no more. By our wise politics, we are careful to stuff

* We observed in Essay III. that money, when increasing, gives encouragement to industry, during the interval between the increase of money and rise of the prices. A good effect of this nature may follow too from paper credit; but 'tis dangerous to precipitate matters, at the risk of losing all by the falling of that credit, as must happen upon any violent shock in public affairs.

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the nation with this fine commodity of bank-bills and chequer notes, as if we were afraid of being overburthened with the precious metals.

'Tis not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in FRANCE is, in a great measure, owing to the want of paper-credit. The FRENCH have no banks: Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us: Usury or lending on interest is not directly permitted; so that many have large sums in their coffers: Great quantities of plate are used in private houses; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, provisions and labour still remain much cheaper among them, than in nations that are not half so rich in gold and silver. The advantages of this situation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be disputed.

THE same fashion a few years ago prevailed in GENOA, which still has place in ENGLAND and HOLLAND, of using services of CHINA ware instead of plate; but the senate, wisely foreseeing the consequence, prohibited the use of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the use of silver plate was left unlimited. And I suppose, in their late distresses, they felt the good effect of this ordinance. Our tax on plate is, perhaps, in this view, somewhat impolitic.

BEFORE the introduction of paper-money into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt inconveniency that has followed is the total baniſhment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money?

WHAT pity LYCURGUS did not think of paper-credit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from SPARTA! It would have ſerved his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and would alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.

BUT as our darling projects of paper-credit are pernicious, being almoſt the only expedient by which we can ſink money below its level; ſo, in my opinion, the only expedient by which we can raiſe money above its level, is a practice which we ſhould all exclaim againſt as deſtructive, *viz.* the gathering large ſums into a public treaſure, locking them up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by ſuch an artifice, be raiſed to what height we pleaſe.

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To prove this, we need only return to our firſt ſuppoſition, of the annihilating the half or any part of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate conſequence of ſuch an event would be the attraction of an equal ſum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A ſmall city, like GENEVA, continuing this policy for ages, might ingroſs nine tenths of the money of EUROPE. There ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches. A weak ſtate, with an enormous treaſure, would ſoon become a prey to ſome of its poorer, but more powerful neighbours. A great ſtate would diſſipate its wealth on dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably deſtroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid in this caſe, raiſed to too great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel that contains it; and mixing itſelf with the ſurrounding element, ſoon falls to its proper level.

So little are we commonly acquainted with this principle, that tho' all hiſtorians agree in relating uniformly ſo recent an event, as the immenſe treaſure amaſſed by HARRY VII. (which they make amount to 1,700,000 pounds,) we rather reject their concurring teſtimony, than admit of a fact which agrees ſo ill with

with our inveterate prejudices. 'Tis indeed probable, that that ſum might be three fourths of all the money in ENGLAND. But where is the difficulty that ſuch a ſum might be amaſſed in twenty years, by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and almoſt arbitrary monarch? Nor is it probable, that the diminution of circulating money was ever ſenſibly felt by the people, or ever did them any prejudice. The ſinking of the prices of all commodities would immediately replace it, by giving ENGLAND the advantage in its commerce with all the neighbouring kingdoms.

HAVE we not an inſtance in the ſmall republic of ATHENS with its allies, who in about fifty years between the MEDIAN and PELOPONNESIAN wars, amaſſed a ſum greater than that of HARRY VII.*? For all the GREEK hiſtorians † and orators ‡ agree, that the ATHENIANS collected in the citadel more than 10,000 talents, which they afterwards diſſipated to their own ruin, in raſh and imprudent enterprizes. But when this money was ſet a-running, and began to communicate with the ſurrounding fluid; what was the conſequence? Did it remain in the ſtate? No. For we find by the memorable *cenſus* mentioned by

* There were about eight ounces of ſilver in a pound *Sterling* in HARRY VII.'s time.

† THUCYDIDES, lib. 2. and DIOD. SIC. lib. 12.

‡ *Vid.* ÆSCHINIS *et* DEMOSTHENIS *paſſim.*

DEMOSTHENES * and POLYBIUS †, that, in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the republic, comprehending lands, houſes, commodities, ſlaves, and money, was leſs than 6000 talents.

WHAT an ambitious high-ſpirited people was this, to collect and keep in their treaſury, with a view to conqueſts, a ſum, which it was every day in the power of the citizens, by a ſingle vote, to diſtribute among themſelves, and which would go near to triple the riches of every individual! For we muſt obſerve, that the numbers and private riches of the ATHENIANS are ſaid by ancient writers to have been no greater at the beginning of the PELOPONNESIAN war, than at the beginning of the MACEDONIAN.

MONEY was little more plentiful in GREECE during the age of PHILIP and PERSEUS, than in ENGLAND during that of HARRY VII.: Yet theſe two monarchs in thirty years ‡ collected from the ſmall kingdom of MACEDON, a much larger treaſure than that of the ENGLISH monarch. PAULUS ÆMILIUS brought to ROME about 1,700,000 pounds *Sterling* ||. PLINY ſays 2,400,000 ⸸. And that was but a

* Περὶ Συμμοριας.

† Lib. 2. cap. 62.

‡ TITI LIVII, lib. 45. cap. 40.

|| VEL. PATERC. lib. 1. cap. 9.

⸸ Lib. 33. cap. 3.

part

part of the MACEDONIAN treaſure. The reſt was diſſipated by the reſiſtance and flight of PERSEUS *.

WE may learn from STANYAN, that the canton of BERNE had 300,000 pounds lent at intereſt, and had above ſix times as much in their treaſury. Here then is a ſum hoarded of 1,800,000 pounds *Sterling*, which is at leaſt quadruple of what ſhould naturally circulate in ſuch a petty ſtate; and yet no one who travels into the PAIS DE VAUX, or any part of that canton, obſerves any want of money more than could be ſuppoſed in a country of that extent, ſoil, and ſituation. On the contrary, there are ſcarce any inland provinces in the continent of FRANCE or GERMANY, where the inhabitants are at this time ſo opulent, tho' that canton has vaſtly increaſed its treaſure ſince 1714, the time when STANYAN wrote his judicious account of SWITZERLAND †.

THE account given by APPIAN ‡ of the treaſure of the PTOLOMIES, is ſo prodigious, that one cannot admit of it; and ſo much the leſs, that the hiſtorian

* TITI LIVII, *ibid.*

† The poverty which STANYAN ſpeaks of is only to be ſeen in the moſt mountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money: And even there the people are not poorer than in the dioceſs of SALTZBURG on the one hand, or SAVOY on the other.

‡ *Præm.*

ſays, the other ſucceſſors of ALEXANDER were alſo frugal, and had many of them treaſures not much inferior. For this ſaving humour of the neighbouring princes muſt neceſſarily have checked the frugality of the ÆGYPTIAN monarchs, according to the foregoing theory. The ſum he mentions is 740,000 talents, or 191,166,666 pounds 13 ſhillings and 4 pence, according to Dr. ARBUTHNOT's computation. And yet APPIAN ſays, that he extracted his account from the public records; and he was himſelf a native of ALEXANDRIA.

FROM theſe principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of thoſe numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of EUROPE, and none more than ENGLAND, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill grounded apprehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink below it. Could any thing ſcatter our riches, it would be ſuch impolitic contrivances. But this general ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the author of the world has intended, by giving them ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo different from each other.

OUR

OUR modern politics embrace the only method of baniſhing money, the uſing paper-credit; they reject the only method of amaſſing it, the practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which ſerve to no purpoſe but to check induſtry, and rob ourſelves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.

ALL taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on the jealouſy abovementioned. A tax on GERMAN linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and induſtry. A tax on brandy increaſes the ſale of rum, and ſupports our ſouthern colonies. And as 'tis neceſſary impoſts ſhould be levied, for the ſupport of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port, and ſubjected to the impoſt. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. SWIFT, That, in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not four, but often make only one. It can ſcarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to the government than at preſent: Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and more wholeſome liquor; and no prejudice would enſue to the balance of trade, of which we are ſo jealous. The manufacture of ale, beyond

the agriculture, is but inconſiderable, and gives employment to few hands. The tranſport of wine and corn would not be much inferior.

BUT are there not frequent inſtances, you will ſay, of ſtates and kingdoms, which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly? Has not the money left them, with which they formerly abounded? I anſwer, If they loſe their trade, induſtry, and people, they cannot expect to keep their gold and ſilver: For theſe precious metals will hold proportion to the former advantages. When LISBON and AMSTERDAM got the EAST-INDIA trade from VENICE and GENOA, they alſo got the profits and money which aroſe from it. Where the ſeat of government is transferred, where expenſive armies are maintained at a diſtance, where great funds are poſſeſſed by foreigners; there naturally follows from theſe cauſes a diminution of the ſpecie. But theſe, we may obſerve, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the tranſport of people and induſtry. But where theſe remain, and the drain is not continued, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion or ſuſpicion. What immenſe treaſures have been ſpent, by ſo many nations, in FLANDERS ſince the revolution, in the courſe of three long wars? More money perhaps than the half of what is at preſent in all EUROPE.

But

But what has now becóme of it? Is it in the narrow compaſs of the AUSTRIAN provinces? No, ſurely: It has moſt of it returned to the ſeveral countries whence it came, and has followed that art and induſtry by which at firſt it was acquired. For above a thouſand years, the money of EUROPE has been flowing to ROME, by an open and ſenſible current; but it has been emptied by many ſecret and inſenſible canals: And the want of induſtry and commerce renders at preſent the papal dominions the pooreſt territory in all ITALY.

IN ſhort, a government has great reaſon to preſerve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may ſafely truſt to the courſe of human affairs, without fear or jealouſy. Or if it ever give attention to this latter circumſtance, it ought only to be ſo far as it affects the former.



ESSAY VI.

Of the JEALOUSY of TRADE.

HAVING endeavoured to remove one ſpecies of ill-founded jealouſy, which is ſo prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiſs to mention another, which ſeems equally groundleſs. Nothing is more uſual, among ſtates which have made ſome advances in commerce, than to look on the progreſs of their neighbours with a ſuſpicious eye, to conſider all trading ſtates as their rivals, and to ſuppoſe that it is impoſſible for any of them to flouriſh, but at their expence. In oppoſition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to aſſert, that the increaſe of riches and commerce in any one nation, inſtead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a ſtate can ſcarcely carry its trade and induſtry very far, where all the ſurrounding ſtates are buried in ignorance, ſloth, and barbariſm.

IT is obvious, that the domeſtic induſtry of a people cannot be hurt by the greateſt proſperity of their neighbours; and as this branch of commerce is undoubtedly the moſt important in any extenſive kingdom, we are ſo far removed from all reaſon of jealouſy. But I go farther, and obſerve, that where an open communication is preſerved among nations, it is impoſſible but the domeſtic induſtry of every one muſt receive an increaſe from the improvements of the others. Compare the ſituation of GREAT BRITAIN at preſent, with what it was two centuries ago. All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect. Every improvement which we have ſince made, has ariſen from our imitation of foreigners; and we ought ſo far to eſteem it happy, that they had previouſly made advances in arts and ingenuity. But this intercourſe is ſtill upheld to our great advantage: Notwithſtanding the advanced ſtate of our manufactures, we daily adopt in every art, the inventions and improvements of our neighbours. The commodity is firſt imported from abroad, to our great diſcontent, while we imagine that it drains us of our money: Afterwards, the art itſelf is gradually imported, to our viſible advantage: Yet we continue ſtill to repine, that our neighbours ſhould poſſeſs any art, induſtry, and invention; forgetting that had they not firſt inſtructed us, we ſhould have been at preſent barbarians; and did they not ſtill continue their inſtructions, the arts muſt fall into a ſtate

of

of languor, and loſe that emulation and novelty which contribute ſo much to their advancement.

THE increaſe of domeſtic induſtry lays the foundation of foreign commerce. Where a great number of commodities are raiſed and perfected for the home-market, there will always be found ſome which can be exported with advantage. But if our neighbours have no art nor cultivation, they cannot take them; becauſe they will have nothing to give in exchange. In this reſpect, ſtates are in the ſame condition as individuals. A ſingle man can ſcarce be induſtrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle. The riches of the ſeveral members of a community contribute to increaſe my riches, whatever profeſſion I may follow. They conſume the product of my induſtry, and afford me the product of theirs in return.

NOR need any ſtate entertain apprehenſions, that their neighbours will improve to ſuch a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them. Nature, by giving a diverſity of geniuſes, climates, and ſoils to different nations, has ſecured their mutual intercourſe and commerce, as long as they all remain induſtrious and civilized. Nay, the more the arts increaſe in any ſtate, the more will be its demands from its induſtrious neighbours. The inhabitants having become opulent and ſkilful, deſire to have every commodity in the utmoſt perfection;

and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign nation. The industry of the nations from whom they import it, receives encouragement: Their own is also increased, by the sale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

But what if a nation has any staple commodity, such as the woollen manufacture is to England? Must not the interfering of their neighbours in that manufacture be a loss to them? I answer, that when any commodity is denominated the staple of a kingdom, it is supposed that that kingdom has some peculiar and natural advantages for raising the commodity; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, they lose such a manufactory, they ought to blame their own idleness, or bad government, not the industry of their neighbours. It ought also to be considered, that by the increase of industry among the neighbouring nations, the consumption of every particular species of commodity is also increased; and though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market, the demand for our product may still continue, or even increase. And even should it diminish, ought the consequence to be esteemed so fatal? If the spirit of industry be preserved, it may easily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufacturers of wool, for instance, be employed in linen, silks, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to

be a demand. We need not apprehend, that all the objects of induſtry will be exhauſted, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with thoſe of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment. The emulation among rival nations ſerves rather to keep induſtry alive in all of them: And any people is happier who poſſeſs a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one ſingle great manufactory, in which they are all employed. Their ſituation is leſs precarious, and they will feel leſs ſenſibly thoſe revolutions and uncertainties to which every particular ſpecies of commerce will always be expoſed.

THE only commercial ſtate which ought to dread the improvements and induſtry of their neighbours, is ſuch a one as Holland, which enjoying no extent of land, nor poſſeſſing any native commodity, flouriſh only by being the brokers, and factors, and carriers of others. Such a people may naturally apprehend, that as ſoon as the neighbouring ſtates come to know and purſue their intereſt, they will take into their own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their brokers of that profit, which they formerly reaped from it. But though this conſequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it takes place; and by art and induſtry it may be warded for many generations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of ſuperior ſtock and correſpondence is ſo great, that it is not eaſily overcome; and as all the tranſ-

tranſactions increaſe by the increaſe of induſtry in the neighbouring ſtates, even a people whoſe commerce ſtands on this precarious baſis, may at firſt reap a conſiderable profit from the flouriſhing condition of their neighbours. The Dutch, having mortgaged all their revenues, make not ſuch a figure in political tranſactions as formerly; but their commerce is ſurely equal to what it was in the middle of the laſt century, when they were reckoned among the great powers of Europe.

WERE our narrow and malignant politics to meet with ſucceſs, we ſhould reduce all our neighbouring nations to the ſame ſtate of ſloth and ignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coaſt of Barbary. But what would be the conſequence? They could ſend us no commodities: They could take none from us: Our domeſtic commerce itſelf would languiſh for want of emulation, example, and inſtruction: And we ourſelves ſhould ſoon fall into the ſame abject condition to which we had reduced them. I ſhall therefore venture to acknowledge, that not only as a man, but as a Britiſh ſubject, I pray for the flouriſhing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itſelf. I am at leaſt certain, that Great Britain, and all theſe nations, would flouriſh more, did their ſovereigns and miniſters adopt ſuch enlarged and benevolent ſentiments towards each other.

ESSAY VII.

Of the BALANCE of POWER.

IT is a queſtion, whether the *idea* of the balance of power be owing intirely to modern policy, or whether the *phraſe* only has been invented in theſe latter ages? 'Tis certain, that XENOPHON *, in his inſtitution of CYRUS, repreſents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have ariſen from a jealouſy of the increaſing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and tho' that elegant compoſition ſhould be ſuppoſed altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcribed by the author to the eaſtern princes, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times.

IN the whole politics of GREECE, the anxiety with regard to the balance of power, is moſt apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the antient hiſtorians. THUCYDIDES † repreſents the league which was formed againſt ATHENS, and which pro-

* Lib. 1. † Lib. 1.

duced

duced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as intirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) threw themselves always into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported THEBES against SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealousy of the conquerors *.

WHOEVER will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may see the utmost refinements on this principle, which ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN or ENGLISH speculatist. And upon the first rise of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, sounded the alarm thro' all GREECE, and at last assembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and decisive battle of CHAERONEA.

'TIS true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by historians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each state seems to have had more in view the honour of leading the rest, than any well-grounded

* XENOPH. Hist. GRAEC. lib. 5. & 7.

hopes

hopes of authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power was of itself sufficiently secured in GREECE, and needed not to be guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we ascribe the shifting sides in all the GRECIAN republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies.

THE same principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the *Ostracism* of ATHENS and *Petalism* of SYRACUSE, and expelled every citizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest; the same principle, I say, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised enemies to the leading state, however moderate in the exercise of its authority.

THE PERSIAN monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of safety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels, and to support the weaker side in every contest. This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES

BIADES to TISSAPHERNES *, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few instances in the history of mankind.

THE successors of ALEXANDER showed an infinite jealousy of the balance of power; a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preserved distinct for several ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS † threatened them anew with an universal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at IPSUS saved them. And in after times, we find, that as the Eastern princes considered the GREEKS and MACEDONIANS as the only real military force with whom they had any intercourse, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The PTOLEMIES, in particular, supported first ARATUS and the ACHAEANS, and then CLEOMENES king of SPARTA, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the MACEDONIAN monarchs. For this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the EGYPTIAN politics ‡.

* THUCYD. lib. 8. † DIOD. SIC. lib. 20. ‡ Lib. 2. cap. 51.

THE

THE reaſon why 'tis ſuppoſed, that the antients were intirely ignorant of the *balance of power*, ſeems to be drawn from the ROMAN hiſtory more than the GRECIAN; and as the tranſactions of the former are generally the moſt familiar to us, we have thence formed all our concluſions. It muſt be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any ſuch general combination or confederacy againſt them, as might naturally be expected from their rapid conqueſts and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to ſubdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous hiſtory of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNIBAL's invaſion of the ROMAN ſtate, a very remarkable criſi, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be obſerved at the time) * that this was a conteſt for univerſal empire; and yet no prince or ſtate ſeems to have been in the leaſt alarmed about the event or iſſue of the quarrel. PHILIP of MACEDON remained neuter, till he ſaw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then moſt imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ſtill more imprudent. He ſtipulated, that he was to aſſiſt the CARTHAGINIAN ſtate

* It was obſerved by ſome, as appears by the ſpeech of AGELAUS of NAUPACTUM, in a general congreſs of GREECE. See POLYB. lib. 5. cap. 104.

in

in their conqueſt of ITALY; after which they engaged to ſend over forces into GREECE, to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the GRECIAN commonwealths *.

THE RHODIAN and ACHAEAN republics are much celebrated by antient hiſtorians for their wiſdom and ſound policy; yet both of them aſſiſted the ROMANS in their wars againſt PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS. And what may be eſteemed ſtill a ſtronger proof, that this maxim was not familiarly known in thoſe ages; no antient author has ever remarked the imprudence of theſe meaſures, nor has even blamed that abſurd treaty above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the CARTHAGINIANS. Princes and ſtateſmen may in all ages be blinded in their reaſonings with regard to events beforehand: But 'tis ſomewhat extraordinary, that hiſtorians, afterwards, ſhould not form a ſounder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in ſatisfying their private paſſions, were, all of them, the inſtruments of the ROMAN greatneſs; and never ſeem to have ſuſpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conqueſts of their ally. A ſimple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the CARTHAGINIANS, ſo much required by mutual intereſt, barred the ROMANS from all en-

* TITI LIVII lib. 24. cap. 33.

trance

trance into AFRICA, and preſerved liberty to mankind.

THE only prince we meet with in the ROMAN hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood the balance of power, is HIERO king of SYRACUSE. Tho' the ally of ROME, he ſent aſſiſtance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries: "Eſteeming it requiſite," ſays POLYBIUS *, "both in "order to retain his dominions in SICILY, and to "preſerve the ROMAN friendſhip, that CARTHAGE "ſhould be ſafe; leſt by its fall the remaining power "ſhould be able, without contraſt or oppoſition, to "execute every purpoſe, and undertaking. And "here he acted with great wiſdom and prudence. "For that is never, on any account, to be overlooked; nor ought ſuch a force ever to be thrown into "one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring "ſtates from defending their rights againſt it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in expreſs terms.

IN ſhort, the maxim of preſerving the balance of power is founded ſo much on common ſenſe and obvious reaſoning, that 'tis impoſſible it could altogether have eſcaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, ſo many marks of deep penetration and diſcernment. If it was not ſo generally known and ac-

* Lib. 1. cap. 83.

knowledged as at preſent, it had, at leaſt an influence on all the wiſer and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at preſent, however generally known and acknowledged among ſpeculative reaſoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extenſive among thoſe who govern the world.

AFTER the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government eſtabliſhed by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great meaſure, from farther conqueſts, and long maintained each ſtate in its proper boundaries. But when vaſſalage and the feudal militia were aboliſhed, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of univerſal monarchy, from the union of ſo many kingdoms and principalities in the perſon of the emperor CHARLES. But the power of the houſe of AUSTRIA, founded on extenſive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raiſed againſt them. In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhattered, their opulence diſſipated, their ſplendour eclipſed. A new power ſucceeded, more formidable to the liberties of EUROPE, poſſeſſing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bigotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of

of AUSTRIA were ſo long, and ſtill are ſo much infatuated.

EUROPE has now, for above a century, remained on the defenſive againſt the greateſt force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And ſuch is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five laſt general wars, have been victorious in four *, and unſucceſsful only in one †, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total aſcendant over EUROPE. There remains rather room to hope, that, by maintaining the reſiſtance ſome time, the natural revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeſeen events and accidents, may guard us againſt univerſal monarchy, and preſerve the world from ſo great an evil.

IN the three laſt of theſe general wars, BRITAIN has ſtood foremoſt in the glorious ſtruggle; and ſhe ſtill maintains her ſtation, as guardian of the general liberties of EUROPE, and patron of mankind. Beſide her advantages of riches and ſituation, her people are animated with ſuch a national ſpirit, and are ſo fully ſenſible of the ineſtimable bleſſings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will lan-

* Thoſe concluded by the peace of the PYRENEES, NIMEGUEN, RYSWICK, and AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

† That concluded by the peace of UTRECHT.

guiſh

guiſh in ſo neceſſary and ſo juſt a cauſe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the paſt, their paſſionate ardour ſeems rather to require ſome moderation; and they have oftener erred from a laudable exceſs than from a blameable deficiency.

In the *firſt* place, we ſeem to have been more poſſeſſed with the antient GREEK ſpirit of jealous emulation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with FRANCE have been begun with juſtice, and even, perhaps from neceſſity; but have always been too far puſhed from obſtinacy and paſſion. The ſame peace which was afterwards made at RYSWICK in 1697, was offered ſo early as the ninety-two; that concluded at UTRECHT in 1712 might have been finiſhed on as good conditions at GERTRUYTENBERG in the eight; and we might have given at FRANCFORT, in 1743, the ſame terms, which we were glad to accept of at AIX LA-CHAPELLE in the forty-eight. Here then we ſee, that above half of our wars with FRANCE, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

In the *ſecond* place, we are ſo declared in our oppoſition to FRENCH power, and ſo alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuſe all reaſonable terms of accommodation.

dation. *Habent ſubjectos, tanquam ſuos; viles, ut alienos.* All the world knows, that the factious vote of the Houſe of Commons, in the beginning of the laſt parliament, with the profeſſed humour of the nation, made the queen of HUNGARY inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with PRUSSIA, which would immediately have reſtored the general tranquillity of EUROPE.

IN the *third* place, we are ſuch true combatants, that, when once engaged, we loſe all concern for ourſelves and our poſterity, and conſider only how we may beſt annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at ſo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceſſories, was ſurely the moſt fatal deluſion, that a nation, who had any pretenſion to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poiſon, ought, in all reaſon, to be reſerved to the laſt extremity; and no evil, but the greateſt and moſt urgent, ſhould ever induce us to embrace ſo dangerous an expedient.

THESE exceſſes, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become ſtill more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is uſual, the oppoſite extreme, and rendering us totally careleſs and ſupine with regard to the fate of EUROPE. The ATHENIANS, from the moſt buſtling, intriguing,

warlike people of GREECE, finding their error in thruſting themſelves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no conteſt ever took party on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, ſuch as EUROPE at preſent is threatened with, are, probably, deſtructive to human nature; in their progreſs, in their continuance *, and even in their downfal, which never can be very diſtant from their eſtabliſhment. The military genius which aggrandized the monarchy, ſoon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of ſuch a government; while the wars are carried on at a great diſtance, and intereſt ſo ſmall a part of the ſtate. The antient nobility, whoſe affections attach them to their ſovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diſtant both from their pleaſure and their fortune. The arms of the ſtate muſt, therefore, be truſted to mercenary ſtrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occaſion to turn them againſt the prince, and join each deſperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the neceſſary progreſs of human affairs: Thus human

* If the ROMAN empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very diſorderly, uncivilized condition, before its eſtabliſhment.

nature

nature checks itſelf in its airy elevations: Thus ambition blindly labours for the deſtruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The BOURBONS, truſting to the ſupport of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would puſh their advantage, without reſerve or limitation. Theſe, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would ſubmit to languiſh in the garriſons of HUNGARY or LITHUANIA, forgot at court, and ſacrificed to the intrigues of every minion or miſtreſs, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with CRAVATES and TARTARS, HUSSARS and COSSACS; intermingled, perhaps, with a few ſoldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the ROMAN emperors, from the ſame cauſe, is renewed over and over again, till the final diſſolution of the monarchy.

ESSAY VIII.

Of TAXES.

THERE is a maxim, that prevails among thoſe whom in this country we call *ways and means men*, and who are denominated *Financiers* and *Maltotiers* in FRANCE, *That every new tax creates a new ability in the ſubject to bear it, and that each increaſe of public burdens increaſes proportionably the induſtry of the people.* This maxim is of ſuch a nature as is moſt likely to be extremely abuſed; and is ſo much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it muſt be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have ſome foundation in reaſon and experience.

WHEN a tax is laid upon commodities, which are conſumed by the common people, the neceſſary conſequence may ſeem to be, that either the poor muſt retrench ſomething from their way of living, or raiſe their wages, ſo as to make the burden of the tax fall intirely upon the rich. But there is a third conſequence, which very often follows upon taxes, *viz.*

that the poor increaſe their induſtry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the neceſſaries of life, this conſequence naturally follows; and 'tis certain, that ſuch difficulties often ſerve to excite the induſtry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious, than others, who enjoy the greateſt advantages. For we may obſerve, as a parallel inſtance, that the moſt commercial nations have not always poſſeſſed the greateſt extent of fertile land; but, on the contrary, that they have laboured under many natural diſadvantage. TYRE, ATHENS, CARTHAGE, RHODES, GENOA, VENICE, HOLLAND, are ſtrong examples to this purpoſe. And in all hiſtory, we find only three inſtances of large and fertile countries, which have poſſeſſed much trade; the NETHERLANDS, ENGLAND, and FRANCE. The two former ſeem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime ſituation, and the neceſſity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refuſed them. And as to FRANCE, trade has come very late into that kingdom, and ſeems to have been the effect of reflection and obſervation in an ingenious and enterpriſing people, who remarked the immenſe riches acquired by ſuch of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.

THE

THE places mentioned by CICERO *, as poſſeſſed of the greateſt commerce in his time, are ALEXANDRIA, COLCHOS, TYRE, SIDON, ANDROS, CYPRUS, PAMPHYLIA, LYCIA, RHODES, CHIOS, BYZANTIUM, LESBOS, SMYRNA, MILETUM, COOS. All theſe, except ALEXANDRIA, were either ſmall iſlands, or narrow territories. And that city owed its trade intirely to the happineſs of its ſituation.

SINCE therefore ſome natural neceſſities or diſadvantages may be thought favourable to induſtry, why may not artificial burdens have the ſame effect? Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE †, we may obſerve, aſcribes the induſtry of the DUTCH intirely to neceſſity, proceeding from their natural diſadvantages; and illuſtrates his doctrine by a very ſtriking compariſon with IRELAND; "where," ſays he, "by the largeneſs and "plenty of the ſoil, and ſcarcity of people, all things "neceſſary to life are ſo cheap, that an induſtrious "man, by two days labour, may gain enough to "feed him the reſt of the week. Which I take to "be a very plain ground of the lazineſs attributed to "the people. For men naturally prefer eaſe before "labour, and will not take pains if they can live "idle; tho' when, by neceſſity, they have been in"ured to it, they cannot leave it, being grown a

* Epiſt. ad ATT. lib. 9. ep. 11.

† Account of the NETHERLANDS, Chap. 6.

" cuſtom neceſſary to their health, and to their very " entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder, " from conſtant eaſe to labour, than from conſtant " labour to eaſe." After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places where trade has moſt flouriſhed, in antient and modern times; and which are commonly obſerved to be ſuch narrow confined territories, as beget a neceſſity for induſtry.

'Tis always obſerved, in years of ſcarcity, if it be not extreme, that the poor labour more, and really live better, than in years of great plenty, when they indulge themſelves in fulneſs and riot. I have been told, by a conſiderable manufacturer, that in the year 1740, when bread and proviſions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not only made a ſhift to live, but paid debts, which they had contracted in former years, that were much more favourable and abundant †.

This doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes, may be admitted in ſome degree: But beware of the abuſe. Exorbitant taxes, like extreme neceſſity, deſtroy induſtry, by producing deſpair; and even before they reach this pitch, they raiſe the wages of the labourer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive diſintereſted legiſlature

† To this purpoſe ſee alſo Eſſay I. at the end.

will

will obſerve the point, when the emolument ceaſes, and the prejudice begins: But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be feared that taxes, all over EUROPE, are multiplying to ſuch a degree, as will intirely cruſh all art and induſtry; tho', perhaps, their firſt increaſe, together with other circumſtances, might have contributed to the growth of theſe advantages.

THE beſt taxes are ſuch as are levied upon conſumptions, eſpecially thoſe of luxury; becauſe ſuch taxes are leſs felt by the people. They ſeem, in ſome meaſure, voluntary; ſince a man may chuſe how far he will uſe the commodity which is taxed: They are paid gradually and inſenſibly: And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceived by the conſumers. Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.

TAXES upon poſſeſſions are levied without expence; but have every other diſadvantage. Moſt ſtates, however, are obliged to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the other.

BUT the moſt pernicious of all taxes are thoſe which are arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into puniſhments on induſtry; and alſo, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous than by the real burden which they impoſe.

'Tis surprising, therefore, to see them have place among any civilized people.

In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be esteemed dangerous: Because it is so easy for the sovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the sum demanded, that these taxes are apt to become altogether oppressive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itself; and a prince will soon find, that an increase of the impost is no increase of his revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by such taxes.

Historians inform us, that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state, was the alteration which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting an universal poll-tax, in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excises, which formerly composed the revenue of the *empire*. The people, in all the provinces, were so grinded and oppressed by the *publicans*, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans.

There is a prevailing opinion, that all taxes, however levied, fall upon the land at last. Such an opinion

opinion may be uſeful in BRITAIN, by checking the landed gentlemen, in whoſe hands our legiſlature is lodged, and making them preſerve great regard for trade and induſtry. But I muſt confeſs, that this principle, tho' firſt advanced by a celebrated writer, has ſo little appearance of reaſon, that, were it not for his authority, it had never been received by any body. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſhing off from himſelf the burden of any tax, which is impoſed, and laying it upon others: But as every man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the defenſive; no ſet of men can be ſuppoſed to prevail altogether in this conteſt. And why the landed gentleman ſhould be the victim of the whole, and ſhould not be able to defend himſelf, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: But this inclination they always have, tho' no taxes were levied; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards, and make them ſhare the burden with him.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inſtance of what frequently happens in political inſtitutions, that the conſequences of things are diametrically oppoſite to what we ſhould expect on the firſt appearance. 'Tis regarded as a fundamental maxim of the TURKISH

government, That the *Grand Signior*, tho' abſolute maſter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impoſe a new tax; and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made ſuch an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perſeverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or eſtabliſhed opinion were the firmeſt barrier in the world againſt oppreſſion; yet 'tis certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increaſing his revenue, muſt allow all the baſhaws and governors to oppreſs and abuſe the ſubjects: And theſe he ſqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impoſe a new tax, like our EUROPEAN princes, his intereſt would ſo far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of theſe diſorderly levies of money, and would find, that a pound, raiſed by general impoſition, would have leſs pernicious effects, than a ſhilling taken in ſo unequal and arbitrary a manner.

ESSAY IX.

Of PUBLIC CREDIT.

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make provision, in time of peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures before-hand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary impoſts, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion. Beſides the immenſe ſums above mentioned *, which were amaſſed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other ſucceſſors of ALEXANDER; we learn from PLATO †, that the frugal LACEDEMONIANS had alſo collected a great treaſure; and ARRIAN ‡ and PLUTARCH ‖ ſpecify the riches which

* Eſſay V. † ALCIB. 2. ‡ Lib. 3.

‖ PLUT. *in vita* ALEX. He makes theſe treaſures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions ſterl. QUINTUS CURTIUS (Lib. 5. Cap. 2.) ſays, that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.

ALEX

ALEXANDER got poſſeſſion on the conqueſt of SUSA and ECBATANA, and which were reſerved, ſome of them, from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane hiſtory does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of MACEDON. The antient republics of GAUL had commonly large ſums in reſerve †. Every one knows the treaſure ſeized in ROME by JULIUS CÆSAR, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c. always diſcovered the prudent foreſight, of ſaving great ſums againſt any public exigency.

ON the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to truſt that poſterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances contraſted during the preceding war: And they having before their eyes, ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on their poſterity; who, at laſt, from neceſſity more than choice, are obliged to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity. But not to waſte time in declaiming againſt a practice which appears ruinous, beyond the evidence of an hundred demonſtrations; it ſeems pretty apparent, that the antient

† STRABO, Lib. 4.

maxims

maxims are, in this reſpect, much more prudent than the modern; even though the latter had been confined within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurred by an expenſive war. For why ſhould the caſe be ſo very different between the public and an individual, as to make us eſtabliſh ſuch different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater, its neceſſary expences are proportionably larger; if its reſources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame ſhould be calculated for a much longer duration, than the date of a ſingle life, or even of a family, it ſhould embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, ſuitable to the ſuppoſed extent of its exiſtence. To truſt to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently reduces us to; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources, have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befal them.

If the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterprizes, or making it neglect military diſcipline, in confidance of its riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers.

Ac-

ACCORDING to modern policy, war is attended with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, increaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſipation of money, plunder by ſea and land. According to antient maxims, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and ſilver, ſerved as a temporary encouragement to induſtry, and atoned, in ſome degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

WHAT then ſhall we ſay to the new paradox, That public incumbrances are, of themſelves, advantageous, independent of the neceſſity of contracting them; and that any ſtate, even though it were not preſſed by a foreign enemy, could not poſſibly have embraced a wiſer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Diſcourſes, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſſed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not ſeen ſuch abſurd maxims patronized by great miniſters, and by a whole party among us. And theſe puzzling arguments, (for they deſerve not the name of ſpecious) though they could not be the foundation of Lord ORFORD's conduct, for he had more ſenſe; ſerved at leaſt to keep his partizans in countenance, and perplex the underſtanding of the nation.

LET-

LET us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our domeſtic management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry; and in our foreign tranſactions, by their effect on wars and negotiations.

THERE is a word, which is here in the mouth of every body, and which, I find, has alſo got abroad, and is much employed by foreign writers *, in imitation of the ENGLISH; and this is, CIRCULATION. This word ſerves as an account of every thing; and though I confeſs, that I have ſought for its meaning in the preſent ſubject, ever ſince I was a ſchool-boy, I have never yet been able to diſcover it. What poſſible advantage is there which the nation can reap by the eaſy transference of ſtock from hand to hand? Or is there any parallel to be drawn from the circulation of other commodities, to that of chequer-notes and INDIA bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick ſale of his goods to the merchant, the merchant to the ſhopkeeper, the ſhopkeeper to his cuſtomers; this enlivens induſtry, and gives new encouragement to the firſt dealer or the manufacturer, and all his tradeſmen, and makes them produce more and better commodities of the ſame ſpecies. A ſtagnation is here pernicious, wherever it happens; becauſe it operates backwards, and ſtops or benumbs the induſtrious hand in

* MELON, DU TOT, LAW, in the pamphlets publiſhed in FRANCE.

its

its production of what is useful to human life. But what production we owe to CHANGE-ALLEY, or even what consumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink, and paper, I have not yet learned; nor can one foresee the loss or decay of any one beneficial commerce or commodity, though that place and all its inhabitants were for ever buried in the ocean.

BUT though this term has never been explained by those who insist so much on the advantages that result from a circulation, there seems, however, to be some benefit of a similar kind, arising from our incumbrances: As, indeed, what human evil is there, which is not attended with some advantage? This we shall endeavour to explain, that we may estimate the weight which we ought to allow it.

PUBLIC securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the current price as gold or silver. Where-ever any profitable undertaking offers itself, however expensive, there are never wanting hands enough to embrace it; nor need a trader, who has sums in the public stocks, fear to launch out into the most extensive trade; since he is possessed of funds, which will answer the most sudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it necessary to keep by him any considerable cash. Bank-stock, or INDIA bonds, especially the latter, serve all the same purposes; because he can dispose of them, or pledge

pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the ſame time they are not idle, even when in his ſcritoire, but bring him in a conſtant revenue. In ſhort, our national debts furniſh merchants with a ſpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces ſure gain, beſides the profits of their commerce. This muſt enable them to trade upon leſs profit. The ſmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, cauſes a greater conſumption, quickens the labour of the common people, and helps to ſpread arts and induſtry through the whole ſociety.

There are alſo, we may obſerve, in England, and in all ſtates, which have both commerce and public debts, a ſet of men, who are half-merchants, half-ſtock-holders, and may be ſuppoſed willing to trade for ſmall profits; becauſe commerce is not their principal or ſole ſupport, and their revenues in the funds are a ſure reſource for themſelves and their families. Were there no funds, great merchants would have no expedient for realizing or ſecuring any part of their profit, but by making purchaſes of land; and land has many diſadvantages in compariſon of funds. Requiring more care and inſpection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident in trade, it is not ſo eaſily converted into money; and as it attracts too much, both by

by the many natural pleaſures it affords, and the authority it gives, it ſoon converts the citizen into the country gentleman. More men, therefore, with large ſtocks and incomes, may naturally be ſuppoſed to continue in trade, where there are public debts: and this, it muſt be owned, is of ſome advantage to commerce, by diminiſhing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging induſtry *.

BUT, in oppoſition to theſe two favourable circumſtances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many diſadvantages which attend our public debts, in the whole *interior* oeconomy of the ſtate: You will find no compariſon between the ill and the good which reſult from them.

Firſt, 'TIS certain, that national debts cauſe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital, by the great ſums which are levied in the provinces to pay the intereſt of thoſe debts; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the reſt of the kingdom. The queſtion is, Whether, in our

* On this head, I ſhall obſerve, without interrupting the thread of the argument, that the multiplicity of our public debts ſerves rather to ſink the intereſt, and that the more the government borrows, the cheaper may they expect to borrow; contrary to firſt appearance, and contrary to common opinion. The profits of trade have an influence on intereſt. See Eſſay IV.

caſe,

caſe, it be for the public intereſt, that ſo many privileges ſhould be conferred on LONDON, which has already arrived at ſuch an enormous ſize, and ſeems ſtill increaſing? Some men are apprehenſive of the conſequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking, that tho' the head is undoubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is ſo happily ſituated, that its exceſſive bulk cauſes leſs inconvenience than even a ſmaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference between the prices of all proviſions in PARIS and LANGUEDOC, than between thoſe in LONDON and YORKSHIRE.

Secondly, PUBLIC ſtocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the diſadvantages attending that ſpecies of money. They baniſh gold and ſilver from the moſt conſiderable commerce of the ſtate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all proviſions and labour dearer than otherwiſe they would be.

Thirdly, THE taxes which are levied to pay the intereſts of theſe debts, are a check upon induſtry, heighten the price of labour, and are an oppreſſion on the poorer ſort.

Fourthly, As foreigners poſſeſs a ſhare of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occaſion the tranſport of our people and our induſtry.

Fifthly,

Fifthly, The greateſt part of public ſtock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an uſeleſs and inactive life.

But tho' the injury which ariſes to commerce and induſtry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, very conſiderable, it is trivial, in compariſon of the prejudice which reſults to the ſtate conſidered as a body politic, which muſt ſupport itſelf in the ſociety of nations, and have various tranſactions with other ſtates, in wars and negotiations. The ill, there, is pure and unmixed, without any favourable circumſtance to atone for it: and 'tis an ill too of a nature the higheſt and moſt important.

We have, indeed, been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; ſince they are moſtly due among ourſelves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another. 'Tis like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the perſon neither richer nor poorer than before. Such looſe reaſonings and ſpecious compariſons will always paſs, where we judge not upon principles. I aſk, Is it poſſible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the ſovereign reſides among them? The very doubt ſeems extravagant; ſince 'tis requiſite in every commonwealth, that there be a certain proportion obſerved between the

the laborious and the idle part of it. But if all our preſent taxes be mortgaged, muſt we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and deſtructive?

In every nation, there are always ſome methods of levying money more eaſy than others, ſuitable to the way of living of the people, and the commodities they make uſe of. In Britain, the exciſes upon malt and beer afford a very large revenue; becauſe the operations of malting and brewing are very tedious, and are impoſſible to be concealed; and at the ſame time, theſe commodities are not ſo abſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing their price would very much affect the poorer ſort. Theſe taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!

Duties upon conſumptions are more equal and eaſy than thoſe upon poſſeſſions. What a loſs to the public, that the former are all exhauſted, and that we muſt have recourſe to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

Were all the proprietors of land only ſtewards to the public, muſt not neceſſity force them to practiſe all the arts of oppreſſion uſed by ſtewards, where the abſence or negligence of the proprietor render them ſecure againſt enquiry?

IT will ſcarce be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen ſhillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes. There is ſomething therefore in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500 years, the poſterity of thoſe now in the coaches, and of thoſe upon the boxes, will probably have changed places, without affecting the public by theſe revolutions.

I MUST confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupineneſs, from long cuſtom, crept into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future miniſtry will be poſſeſſed of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to make any conſiderable progreſs in the payment of our debts; or that the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leiſure and tranquility for ſuch an undertaking *. *What then*

* In times of peace and ſecurity, when alone it is poſſible to pay debt, the monied intereſt are averſe to receive partial payments, which they know not how to diſpoſe of to advantage; and the landed intereſt are averſe to continue the taxes requiſite for that purpoſe. Why therefore ſhould a miniſter perſevere in a meaſure ſo diſagreeable to all parties? For the ſake, I ſuppoſe, of

then is to become of us? Were we ever ſo good Chriſtians, and ever ſo reſigned to Providence; this, methinks, were a curious queſtion, even conſidered as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not be altogether impoſſible to form ſome conjectural ſolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues and factions. There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things, which may guide our reaſoning. As it would have required but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of miniſters, that things would neceſſarily be carried to the length we ſee; ſo now that they have at laſt happily reached it, it may not be difficult to gueſs at the conſequences. It muſt, indeed, be one of theſe two events; either the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation. 'Tis impoſſible they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in ſome other nations.

There was, indeed, a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, which was propoſed by an excellent citi-

of a poſterity, which he will never ſee, or of a few reaſonable reflecting people, whoſe united intereſt, perhaps, will not be able to ſecure him the ſmalleſt burrough in England. 'Tis not likely we ſhall ever find any miniſter ſo bad a politician. With regard to theſe narrow deſtructive maxims of politics, all miniſters are expert enough.

zen, Mr. HUTCHINSON, above thirty years ago, and which was much approved of by ſome men of ſenſe, but never was likely to take effect. He aſſerted, that there was a fallacy in imagining that the public owed this debt; for that really every individual owed a proportional ſhare of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional ſhare of the intereſt, beſide the expences of levying theſe taxes. Had we not better, then, ſays he, make a proportional diſtribution of the debt among us, and each of us contribute a ſum ſuitable to his property, and by that means diſcharge at once all our funds and public mortgages? He ſeems not to have conſidered, that the laborious poor pay a conſiderable part of the taxes by their annual conſumptions, tho' they could not advance, at once, a proportional part of the ſum required. Not to mention, that property in money and ſtock in trade might eaſily be concealed or diſguiſed; and that viſible property in lands and houſes would really at laſt anſwer for the whole: An inequality and oppreſſion which never would be ſubmitted to. But tho' this project is never likely to take place; 'tis not altogether improbable, that when the nation become heartily ſick of their debts, and are cruelly oppreſſed by them, ſome daring projector may ariſe with viſionary ſchemes for their diſcharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the leaſt touch will

deſtroy it, as happened in FRANCE; and in this manner it will *die of the doctor* *:

BUT 'tis more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts. I muſt confeſs, when I ſee princes and ſtates fighting and quarrelling, amidſt their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a *China* ſhop. How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties, which are uſeful to both? Let the time come (and

* Some neighbouring ſtates practiſe an eaſy expedient, by which they lighten their public debts. The FRENCH have a cuſtom (as the ROMANS formerly had) of augmenting their money; and this the nation has been ſo much familiarized to, that it hurts not public credit, tho' it be really cutting off at once, by an edict, ſo much of their debts. The DUTCH diminiſh the intereſt, without the conſent of their creditors; or, which is the ſame thing, they arbitrarily tax the funds as well as other property. Could we practiſe either of theſe methods, we need never be oppreſſed by the national debt; and 'tis not impoſſible but one of theſe, or ſome other method, may, at all adventures, be tried, on the augmentation of our incumbrances and difficulties. But people in this country are ſo good reaſoners upon whatever regards their intereſt, that ſuch a practice will deceive no body; and public credit will probably tumble at once by ſo dangerous a trial.

ſurely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcribed to, and raiſe not the money projected. Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto ſo ample, begins to fail us. Suppoſe, that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threatened with an invaſion, ; a rebellion is ſuſpected or broke out at home; a ſquadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign ſubſidy cannot be advanced. What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergence? The right of ſelf-preſervation is analienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our ſtateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe who firſt contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of thoſe who truſted, or continue to truſt this ſecurity, if theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds, created and mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: Neceſſity calls, fear urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be ſeized for the current ſervice, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is requiſite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buſ thouſands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be

be called the *natural death* of public credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its diſſolution and deſtruction †.

THESE

† So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithſtanding ſuch a violent ſhock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in ENGLAND would occaſion, it would not probably be long, ere credit would again revive in as flouriſhing a condition as before. The preſent king of FRANCE, during the late war, borrowed money at lower intereſt than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the BRITISH parliament, comparing the natural rate of intereſt in both kingdoms. And tho' men are commonly more governed by what they have ſeen, than by what they foreſee, with whatever certainty; yet promiſes, proteſtations, fair appearances, with the allurements of preſent intereſt, have ſuch powerful intereſt as few are able to reſiſt. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the ſame baits: The ſame tricks, played over and over again, ſtill trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotiſm are ſtill the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; ſtanding armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal intereſt of the clergy. The fear of an everlaſting deſtruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needleſs bugbear. A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a ſponge to their debts, as at preſent; as much as an opulent knave, even tho' one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honeſt bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on buſineſs, may find it his intereſt to diſcharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant: The latter has it not in his power. The reaſoning of TACITUS, *Hiſt. lib.* 3. as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our preſent caſe. *Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem*

THESE two events, ſuppoſed above, are calamitous, but not the moſt calamitous. Thouſands are hereby ſacrificed to the ſafety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be ſacrificed for ever to the temporary ſafety of thouſands *. Our popular

magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: Stultiſſimus quiſque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud ſapientes caſſa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, ſalva republica, poterant. The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have on it, is the intereſt of preſerving credit; an intereſt, which may eaſily be overbalanced by a very great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even ſuppoſing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention, that a preſent neceſſity often forces ſtates into meaſures which are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, againſt their intereſt.

* I have heard it has been computed, that the whole creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. Theſe make a figure at preſent on their income; but, in caſe of a public bankruptcy, would, in an inſtant, become the loweſt, as well as the moſt wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and would render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to aſſign to this event a very near period, ſuch as half a century, had not our fathers' prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the duration of our public credit, ſo much beyond all reaſonable expectation. When the aſtrologers in FRANCE were every year foretelling the death of HARRY IV. *Theſe fellows*, ſays he, *muſt be*

popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a miniſter to venture on ſo deſperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And tho' the houſe of Lords be altogether compoſed of the proprietors of lands, and the houſe of Commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſuppoſed to have great property in the funds: Yet the connections of the members may be ſo great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even juſtice, ſtrictly ſpeaking, requires. And perhaps, too, our foreign enemies, or rather enemy (for we have but one to dread) may be ſo politic as to diſcover, that our ſafety lies in deſpair, and may not, therefore, ſhow the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable. The balance of power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all juſtly eſteemed too unequal to be preſerved without our attention and aſſiſtance. But our children, weary with the ſtruggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may ſit down ſecure, and ſee their neighbours oppreſſed and conquered; till, at laſt, they themſelves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may properly enough be denominated the *violent death* of our public credit.

be right at laſt. We ſhall, therefore, be more cautious than to aſſign any preciſe date; and ſhall content ourſelves with pointing out the event in general.

THESE ſeem to be the events which are not very remote, and which reaſon foreſees as clearly almoſt as ſhe can do any thing that lies in the womb of time. And tho' the antients maintained that, in order to reach the gift of prophecy, a certain divine fury or madneſs was requiſite, one may ſafely affirm, that, in order to deliver ſuch prophecies as theſe, no more is neceſſary, than merely to be in one's ſenſes, free from the influence of popular madneſs and deluſion.

ESSAY

ESSAY X.

Of some Remarkable Customs.

I Shall obſerve three remarkable cuſtoms in three celebrated governments; and ſhall conclude from the whole, that all general maxims in politics ought to be eſtabliſhed with great reſerve; and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently diſcovered in the moral, as well as in the phyſical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from ſprings and principles, of which every one has, within himſelf, or from obvious obſervation, the ſtrongeſt aſſurance and conviction: But 'tis often fully as impoſſible for human prudence, beforehand, to foreſee and foretel them.

I. One would think it eſſential to every ſupreme council or aſſembly, which debates, that intire liberty of ſpeech ſhould be granted to every member, and that all motions or reaſonings ſhould be received, which can any way tend to illuſtrate the point under deliberation. One would conclude, with ſtill greater

aſſurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approved by that aſſembly in which the legiſlature is lodged, the member who made the motion muſt for ever be exempted from farther trial or inquiry. But no political maxim can, at firſt ſight, appear more undiſputable, than that he muſt, at leaſt, be ſecured from all inferior juriſdiction; and that nothing leſs than the ſame ſupreme legiſlative aſſembly, in their ſubſequent meetings, could render him accountable for thoſe motions and harangues which they had before approved of. But theſe axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all failed in the ATHENIAN government, from cauſes and principles too, which appear almoſt inevitable.

BY the γραφη παρανομων or *indictment of illegality*, (tho' it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators) any man was tried and puniſhed in a common court of judicature, for any law which had paſſed upon his motion, in the aſſembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuſt, or prejudicial to the public. Thus DEMOSTHENES, finding that ſhip-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the ſame burden as the rich in equipping the gallies, corrected this inequality by a very uſeful law, which proportioned the expence to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the aſſembly; he proved its advantages *; he

* His harangue for it is ſtill extant; περι Συμμοριας.

convinced

convinced the people, the only legiſlature in Athens; the law paſſed, and was carried into execution: And yet he was tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who reſented the alteration he had introduced into the finances *. He was indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the uſefulneſs of this law.

Ctesiphon moved in the aſſembly of the people, that particular honours ſhould be conferred on Demosthenes, as on a citizen affectionate and uſeful to the commonwealth: The people, convinced of this truth, voted thoſe honours: Yet was Ctesiphon tried by the γραφη παρανομων. It was aſſerted, among other topics, that Demosthenes was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and conſequently himſelf; which he executed by that ſublime piece of eloquence, that has ever ſince been the admiration of mankind.

After the battle of Chæronea, a law was paſſed, upon the motion of Hyperides, giving liberty to ſlaves, and inrolling them in the troops †. On

* Pro Ctesiphonte.

† Plutarchus *in vita decem oratorum.* Demosthenes gives a different account of this law. *Contra* Aristogiton, *orat.* II. He ſays, That its purport was, to render the ατιμοι

On account of this law, the orator was afterward tried by the indictment above mentioned, and defended himſelf, among other topics, by that ſtroke celebrated by PLUTARCH and LONGINUS. *It was not I*, ſaid he, *that moved for this law: It was the neceſſities of war; it was the battle of* CHÆRONEA. The orations of DEMOSTHENES abound with many inſtances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practiſed.

THE ATHENIAN Democracy was ſuch a tumultuary government, as we can ſcarce form a notion of in the preſent age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any diſtinction of rank, without controul from any magiſtracy or ſenate*; and conſequently without regard to order, juſtice, or prudence. The ATHENIANS ſoon became ſenſible of the miſchiefs attending this conſtitution: But being averſe to the checking themſelves by any rule or reſtriction, they reſolved, at leaſt, to check

τιμῶν, or to reſtore the privilege of bearing offices to thoſe who had been declared incapable. Perhaps theſe were both clauſes of the ſame law.

* The ſenate of the Bean was only a leſs numerous mob, choſen by lot from among the people; and their authority was not great.

their

their demagogues or counſellors, by the fear of future puniſhment and inquiry. They accordingly inſtituted this remarkable law; a law eſteemed ſo eſſential to their government, that Æschines inſiſts on it as a known truth, that, were it aboliſhed or neglected, it were impoſſible for the Democracy to ſubſiſt †.

The people feared not any ill conſequences to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; becauſe theſe were nothing but very numerous juries, choſen by lot from among the people. And they conſidered themſelves juſtly as in a ſtate of pupillage; where they had an authority, after they came to the uſe of reaſon, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determined, but to puniſh any guardian for meaſures which they had embraced by his perſuaſion. The ſame law had place in Thebes ‖; and for the ſame reaſon.

It appears to have been an uſual practice in Athens, on the eſtabliſhment of any law eſteemed

† *In* Ctesiphontem. 'Tis remarkable, that the firſt ſtep after the diſſolution of the Democracy by Critias and the Thirty, was to annul the γραφη παρανομων, as we learn from Demosthenes κατα Τιμοκ. The orator in this oration gives us the words of the law, eſtabliſhing the γραφη παρανομων, pag. 297. *ex edit.* Aldi. And he accounts for it, from the ſame principles that we here reaſon upon.

‖ Plut. *in vita* Pelop.

very

very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the support of shows and spectacles, made it criminal so much as to move for a repeal of this law †. Thus LEPTINES moved for a law, not only to recal all the immunities formerly granted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of granting any more ‡. Thus all bills of attainder ‖ were forbid, or laws that affect one ATHENIAN, without extending to the whole commonwealth. These absurd clauses, by which the legislature vainly attempted to bind itself for ever, proceeded from an universal sense of the levity and inconstancy of the people.

II. A WHEEL within a wheel, such as we observe in the GERMAN empire, is considered by Lord SHAFTESBURY * as an absurdity in politics: But what must we say to two equal wheels, which govern the same political machine, without any mutual check, controul, or subordination; and yet preserve the greatest harmony and concord? To establish two distinct legislatures, each of which possesses full and

† DEMOST. *Olynth.* 1. 2.

‡ DEMOST. *contra* LEPT.

‖ DEMOST. *contra* ARISTOCRATEM.

* Essay on the freedom of wit and humour, part 3. § 2.

absolute

abſolute authority within itſelf, and ſtands in no need of the other's aſſiſtance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear, beforehand, altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the paſſions of ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have been hitherto their chief governing principles. And ſhould I aſſert, that the ſtate I have in my eye was divided into two diſtinct factions, each of which predominated in a diſtinct legiſlature, and yet produced no claſhing in theſe independent powers; the ſuppoſition may appear almoſt incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I ſhould affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government, was the moſt active, triumphant, and illuſtrious commonwealth, that ever yet appeared on the ſtage of the world; I ſhould certainly be told, that ſuch a political chimera was as abſurd as any viſion of the poets. But there is no need for ſearching long, in order to prove the reality of the foregoing ſuppoſitions: For this was actually the caſe with the Roman republic.

The legiſlative power was there lodged both in the *comitia centuriata* and *comitia tributa*. In the former, 'tis well known, the people voted according to their *cenſus*; ſo that when the firſt claſs was unanimous, tho' it contained not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determined the whole; and, with the authority of the ſenate, eſtabliſhed a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as

the authority of the ſenate was not there requiſite, the lower people intirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole ſtate. In all party-diviſions, at firſt between the PATRICIANS and PLEBEIANS, afterwards between the nobles and the people, the intereſt of the Ariſtocracy was predominant in the firſt legiſlature; that of the Democracy in the ſecond: The one could always deſtroy what the other had eſtabliſhed: Nay, the one, by a ſudden and unforeſeen motion, might take the ſtart of the other, and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conſtitution, had the full authority of a law. But no ſuch conteſt or ſtruggle is obſerved in the hiſtory of ROME: No inſtance of a quarrel between theſe two legiſlatures; tho' many between the parties that governed in each. Whence aroſe this concord, which may ſeem ſo extraordinary?

THE legiſlature eſtabliſhed at ROME, by the authority of SERVIUS TULLIUS, was the *comitia centuriata*, which, after the expulſion of the kings, rendered the government, for ſome time, altogether ariſtocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their ſide, and being elated with frequent conqueſts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevailed when puſhed to extremities, and firſt extorted from the ſenate the magiſtracy of the tribunes, and then the legiſlative power of the *comitia tributa*. It then behoved the nobles to be more careful than ever

not

not to provoke the people. For beſide the force which the latter were always poſſeſſed of, they had now got poſſeſſion of legal authority, and could inſtantly break in pieces any order or inſtitution which directly oppoſed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the reſpect paid their character, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly ſet their *comitia centuriata* in oppoſition to the *tributa*, they had ſoon loſt the advantage of that inſtitution, together with their conſuls, prætors, ediles, and all the magiſtrates elected by it. But the *comitia tributa*, not having the ſame reaſon for reſpecting the *centuriata*, frequently repealed laws favourable to the Ariſtocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppreſſion, and controlled the actions of the ſenate and magiſtracy. The *centuriata* found it convenient always to ſubmit; and tho' equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durſt never directly give any ſhock to the other legiſlature, either by repealing its laws, or eſtabliſhing laws, which, it foreſaw, would ſoon be repealed by it.

No inſtance is found of any oppoſition or ſtruggle between theſe *comitia*; except one ſlight attempt of this kind, mentioned by Appian in the third book of his civil wars. Mark Anthony, reſolving to deprive Decimus Brutus of the government of

Cisal-

CISALPINE GAUL, railed in the *Forum*, and called one of the *comitia*, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the ſenate. But affairs were then fallen into ſuch confuſion, and the ROMAN conſtitution was ſo near its final diſſolution, that no inference can be drawn from ſuch an expedient. This conteſt, beſides, was founded more on form than party. It was the ſenate who ordered the *comitia tributa*, that they might obſtruct the meeting of the *centuriata*, which, by the conſtitution, or at leaſt forms of the government, could alone diſpoſe of provinces.

CICERO was recalled by the *comitia centuriata*, tho' baniſhed by the *tributa*, that is, by a *plebiſcitum*. But his baniſhment, we may obſerve, never was conſidered as a legal deed, ariſing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always aſcribed to the violence alone of CLODIUS, and the diſorders introduced by him into the government.

III. THE *third* cuſtom which we propoſed to obſerve, regards ENGLAND; and tho' it be not ſo important as thoſe which we have pointed out in ATHENS and ROME, it is no leſs ſingular and remarkable. 'Tis a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undiſputed and univerſal, That a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magiſtrate, is not ſo dangerous to liberty, as an authority,

thority, however inconsiderable, which he acquires from violence and usurpation. For, besides that the law always limits every power which it bestows, the very receiving it as a concession establishes the authority whence it is derived, and preserves the harmony of the constitution. By the same right that one prerogative is assumed without law, another may also be claimed, and another, with still greater facility; while the first usurpations both serve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroism of Hampden, who sustained the whole violence of royal prosecution, rather than pay a tax of twenty shillings not imposed by parliament; hence the care of all English patriots to guard against the first encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the existence, at this day, of English liberty.

There is, however, one occasion, where the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *pressing of seamen*. The exercise of an illegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and tho' it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper restrictions to the sovereign, no safe expedient could ever be proposed for that purpose, and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from usurpation. While this power is exercised to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly

submit

ſubmit to it, from a ſenſe of its uſe and neceſſity; and the ſailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to ſupport them, in claiming the rights and privileges which the law grants, without diſtinction, to all ENGLISH ſubjects. But were this power, on any occaſion, made an inſtrument of faction or miniſterial tyranny, the oppoſite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and ſupport the injured party; the liberty of ENGLISHMEN would be aſſerted; juries would be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both againſt law and equity, would meet with the ſevereſt vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant ſuch an authority, they would probably fall into one of theſe two inconveniencies: They would either beſtow it under ſo many reſtrictions as would make it loſe its effects, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would render it ſo large and comprehenſive, as might give occaſion to great abuſes, for which we could, in that caſe, have no remedy. The very illegality of the power, at preſent, prevents its abuſes, by affording ſo eaſy a remedy againſt them.

I PRETEND not, by this reaſoning, to exclude all poſſibility of contriving a regiſter for ſeamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only obſerve, that no ſatisfactory ſcheme of that nature has yet been propoſed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice

practice seemingly the most absurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed against law. A continued and open usurpation in the crown is permitted, amidst the greatest jealousy and watchfulness in the people; nay proceeding from those very principles: Liberty, in a country of the highest liberty, is left intirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild state of nature is renewed, in one of the most civilized societies of mankind: And great violences and disorders among the people, the most humane and the best natured, are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the supreme magistrate, the other the sanction of fundamental laws.

ESSAY

ESSAY XI.

Of the POPULOUSNESS of ANTIENT NATIONS *.

THERE is very little ground, either from reaſon or experience, to conclude the univerſe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of

* An ingenious writer has honoured this diſcourſe with an anſwer, full of politeneſs, erudition, and good ſenſe. So learned a refutation would have made the author ſuſpect, that his reaſonings were entirely overthrown, had he not uſed the precaution, from the beginning, to keep himſelf on the ſceptical ſide; and having taken this advantage of the ground, he was enabled, tho' with much inferior forces, to preſerve himſelf from a total defeat. That Reverend gentleman will always find, where his antagoniſt is ſo entrenched, that it will be very difficult to force him. VARRO, in ſuch a ſituation, could defend himſelf againſt HANNIBAL, PHARNACES againſt CÆSAR. The author, however, very willingly acknowledges, that his antagoniſt has detected many miſtakes both in his authorities and reaſonings; and it was owing entirely to that gentleman's indulgence, that many more errors were not remarked. In this edition, advantage has been taken of his learned animadverſions, and the Eſſay has been rendered leſs imperfect than formerly.

mat-

matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an univerſal deluge, or general convulſion of the elements; all theſe prove ſtrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paſſage, by corruption or diſſolution, from one ſtate or order to another. It muſt, therefore, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, as well as each individual form which it contains; and 'tis probable, that, in all theſe variations, man, equally with every animal and vegetable, will partake. In the flouriſhing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human ſpecies ſhould poſſeſs greater vigour both of mind and body, more proſperous health, higher ſpirits, longer life, and a ſtronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general ſyſtem of things, and human ſociety of courſe, have any ſuch gradual revolutions, they are too ſlow to be diſcernible in that ſhort period which is comprehended by hiſtory and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, ſeem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the ſame. The arts and ſciences, indeed, have flouriſhed in one period, and have decayed in another: But we may obſerve, that at the time when they roſe to greateſt perfection among one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighbouring nations; and

and tho' they univerſally decayed in one age, yet in a ſucceeding generation they again revived, and diffuſed themſelves over the world. As far, therefore, as obſervation reaches, there is no univerſal difference diſcernible in the human ſpecies: And tho' it were allowed, that the univerſe, like an animal body, had a natural progreſs from infancy to old age; yet as it muſt ſtill be uncertain whether, at preſent, it be advancing to its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence preſuppoſe any decay in human nature *. To prove, therefore, or account for the greater populouſneſs of antiquity, by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world, will ſcarce be admitted by any juſt reaſoner. Theſe *general phyſical* cauſes ought entirely to be excluded from that queſtion.

THERE are indeed ſome more *particular phyſical* cauſes of great importance. Diſeaſes are mentioned

* COLUMELLA ſays, lib. 3. cap. 8. that in ÆGYPT and AFRICA the bearing of twins was frequent, and even cuſtomary; *gemini partus familiares, ac pæne ſolennes ſunt.* If this was true, there is a phyſical difference both in countries and ages. For travellers make no ſuch remarks of theſe countries at preſent. On the contrary, we are apt to ſuppoſe the northern nations more fertile. As theſe two countries were provinces of the Roman empire, 'tis difficult, tho' not altogether abſurd, to ſuppoſe that ſuch a man as COLUMELLA might be miſtaken with regard to them.

in antiquity, which are almoſt unknown to modern medicine; and new diſeaſes have ariſen, and propagated themſelves, of which there are no traces in antient hiſtory. And in this particular we may obſerve, upon compariſon, that the diſadvantage is very much on the ſide of the moderns. Not to mention ſome others of leſs importance; the ſmall pox commits ſuch ravages, as would almoſt alone account for the great ſuperiority aſcribed to antient times. The tenth or the twelfth part of mankind, deſtroyed every generation, ſhould make a vaſt difference, it may be thought, in the numbers of the people; and when joined to venereal diſtempers, a new plague diffuſed every where, this diſeaſe is perhaps equivalent, by its conſtant operation, to the three great ſcourges of mankind, war, peſtilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that antient times were more populous than the preſent, and could no moral cauſes be aſſigned for ſo great a change; theſe phyſical cauſes alone, in the opinion of many, would be ſufficient to give us ſatisfaction on that head.

But is it certain, that antiquity was ſo much more populous, as is pretended? The extravagancies of Vossius, with regard to his ſubject, are well known. But an author of much greater genius and diſcernment has ventured to affirm, that, according to the beſt computations which theſe ſubjects will admit of, there are not now, on the face of the earth, the fiftieth

tieth part of mankind, which exiſted in the time of JULIUS CÆSAR *. It may eaſily be obſerved, that the compariſons, in this caſe, muſt be very imperfect, even tho' we confine ourſelves to the ſcene of antient hiſtory; EUROPE, and the nations about the MEDITERRANEAN. We know not exactly the numbers of any EUROPEAN kingdom, or even city, at preſent: How can we pretend to calculate thoſe of antient cities and ſtates, where hiſtorians have left us ſuch imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me ſo uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together ſome reflections on that head, I ſhall intermingle the inquiry concerning *cauſes* with that concerning *facts*; which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be aſcertained with any tolerable aſſurance. We ſhall, *firſt*, conſider, whether it be probable, from what we know of the ſituation of ſociety in both periods, that antiquity muſt have been more populous; *ſecondly*, whether in reality it was ſo. If I can make it appear, that the concluſion is not ſo certain as is pretended, in favour of antiquity, 'tis all I aſpire to.

IN general, we may obſerve, that the queſtion with regard to the comparative populouſneſs of ages or kingdoms implies very important conſequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their

* *Lettres* PERSANES. See alſo *L'Eſprit des Loix*, liv. 23, cap. 17, 18, 19.

whole police, their manners, and the conſtitution of their government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a deſire and power of generation, more active than is ever univerſally exerted, the reſtraints which they lie under, muſt proceed from ſome difficulties in their ſituation, which it belongs to a wiſe legiſlature carefully to obſerve and remove. Almoſt every man who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human ſpecies, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How faſt do mankind multiply in every colony or new ſettlement; where it is an eaſy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no way ſtraitened or confined, as in long eſtabliſhed governments? Hiſtory tells us frequently of plagues, which have ſwept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the deſtruction was not perceived; and the ſociety had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houſes built, the commodities raiſed, the riches acquired, enabled the people who eſcaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which ſupplied the place of thoſe who had periſhed *. And for a like reaſon, every

* This too is a good reaſon why the ſmall-pox does not depopulate countries ſo much as may at firſt ſight be imagined. Where there is room for more people, they will always ariſe, even without the aſſiſtance of naturalization-bills. 'Tis remarked by Don Gero-

every wiſe, juſt, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects eaſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces only corn, and that more populous than one which is only fitted for paſturage. But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that where-ever there are moſt happineſs and virtue, and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

THE queſtion, therefore, concerning the populouſneſs of antient and modern times, being allowed of great importance, it will be requiſite, if we would bring it to ſome determination, to compare both the *domeſtic* and *political* ſituation of theſe two periods, in order to judge of the facts by their moral cauſes; which is the *firſt* view in which we propoſed to conſider them.

THE chief difference between the *domeſtic* oeconomy of the ancients and that of the moderns conſiſts in the practice of ſlavery, which prevailed among the former, and which has been aboliſhed for ſome cen-

GERONIMO DE USTARIZ, that the provinces of SPAIN which ſend moſt people to the INDIES, are moſt populous; which proceeds from their ſuperior riches.

turies thro'out the greateſt part of EUROPE. Some paſſionate admirers of the antients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty, (for theſe ſentiments, as they are both of them, in the main, extremely juſt, are found to be almoſt inſeparable) cannot forbear regretting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon with the harſh denomination of ſlavery, they would gladly reduce the greateſt part of mankind to real ſlavery and ſubjection. But to one who conſiders coolly on the ſubject, it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at preſent, in the moſt arbitrary government of EUROPE, than it ever did during the moſt flouriſhing period of antient times. As much as ſubmiſſion to a petty prince, whoſe dominions extend not beyond a ſingle city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; ſo much is domeſtic ſlavery more cruel and oppreſſive than any civil ſubjection whatſoever. The more the maſter is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the leſs are our actions inſpected and controled; and the fainter that cruel compariſon becomes between our own ſubjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another. The remains that are found of domeſtic ſlavery, in the AMERICAN colonies, and among ſome EUROPEAN nations, would never ſurely create a deſire of rendering it more univerſal. The little humanity commonly obſerved

obſerved in perſons accuſtomed, from their infancy, to exerciſe ſo great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were ſufficient alone to diſguſt us with that authority. Nor can a more probable reaſon be given for the ſevere, I might ſay, barbarous, manners of antient times, than the practice of domeſtic ſlavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidſt the flattery, ſubmiſſion, and low debaſement of his ſlaves.

ACCORDING to the antient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to reſtrain him to the duty of ſubmiſſion; none on the ſuperior, to engage him to the reciprocal duties of gentleneſs and humanity. In modern times, a bad ſervant finds not eaſily a good maſter, nor a bad maſter a good ſervant; and the checks are mutual, ſuitable to the inviolable and eternal laws of reaſon and equity.

THE cuſtom of expoſing old, uſeleſs, or ſick ſlaves in an iſland of the TYBER, there to ſtarve, ſeems to have been pretty common in ROME; and whoever recovered, after having been ſo expoſed, had his liberty given him, by an edict of the emperor CLAUDIUS; where it was likewiſe forbid to kill any ſlave merely for old age or ſickneſs *. But ſuppoſing that this

* SUETONIUS in vita CLAUDII.

edict was ſtrictly obeyed, would it better the domeſtic treatment of ſlaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practiſe, when it was the profeſſed maxim of the elder CATO, to ſell his ſuperannuated ſlaves for any price, rather than maintain what he eſteemed an uſeleſs burthen *.

THE *ergaſtula*, or dungeons, where ſlaves in chains were forced to work, were very common all over ITALY. COLUMELLA † adviſes, that they be always built under ground; and recommends ‡ it as the duty of a careful overſeer, to call over every day the names of theſe ſlaves, like the muſtering of a regiment or ſhip's company, in order to know preſently when any of them had deſerted. A proof of the frequency of theſe *ergaſtula*, and of the great number of ſlaves uſually confined in them.

A CHAINED ſlave for a porter was uſual in ROME, as appears from OVID ‖, and other authors ⊥. Had not theſe people ſhaken off all ſenſe of compaſſion towards that unhappy part of their ſpecies, would

* PLUT. in vita CATONIS.

† Lib. 1. cap. 6. ‡ Id. lib. 11. cap. 1.

‖ Amor. lib. 1. eleg. 6.

⊥ SUETON. *de claris rhetor.* So alſo the antient poet. *Janitoris tintinnire impedimenta audio.*

they

they have preſented all their friends, at the firſt entrance, with ſuch an image of the ſeverity of the maſter, and miſery of the ſlave?

NOTHING ſo common in all trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt exquiſite torments. DEMOSTHENES ſays *, that where it was poſſible to produce, for the ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves as witneſſes, the judges always preferred the torturing of ſlaves, as a more certain and infallible evidence †.

SENECA draws a picture of that diſorderly luxury, which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life. Among other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and times of bathing, he mentions, that regularly, about the third hour of the night, the neighbours of one who indulges this falſe refinement, hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes; and, upon inquiry, find that he is then taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline. This is not remarked as an inſtance of cruelty, but only of diſorder, which, even in actions the moſt

* In *Oiterem orat.* 1.

† The ſame practice was common in ROME; but CICERO ſeems not to think this evidence ſo certain as the teſtimony of free-citizens. *Pro Coelio.*

uſual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an eſtabliſhed cuſtom had aſſigned them *.

But our preſent buſineſs is only to conſider the influence of ſlavery on the populouſneſs of a ſtate. 'Tis pretended, that, in this particular, the antient practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief cauſe of that extreme populouſneſs which is ſuppoſed in thoſe times. At preſent, all maſters diſcourage the marrying of their male ſervants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then ſuppoſed altogether incapacitated for

* *Epiſt.* 122. The inhuman ſports exhibited at Rome, may juſtly be conſidered too as an effect of the people's contempt for ſlaves, and was alſo a great cauſe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is ſurprized, that the emperors ſhould treat their people in the ſame way the people treated their inferiors? One's humanity, on that occaſion, is apt to renew the barbarous wiſh of Caligula, that the people had but one neck. A man could almoſt be pleaſed, by a ſingle blow, to put an end to ſuch a race of monſters. You may thank God, ſays the author above cited, (*epiſt.* 7.) addreſſing himſelf to the Roman people, that you have a maſter, (*viz.* the mild and merciful Nero), who is incapable of learning cruelty from your example. This was ſpoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted them very well afterwards; and no doubt was conſiderably improved by the ſight of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accuſtomed.

their

their ſervice. But where the property of the ſervants is lodged in the maſter, their marriage and fertility form his riches, and bring him a ſucceſſion of ſlaves, that ſupply the place of thoſe whom age and infirmity have diſabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the ſame care; and educates them to ſome art or calling, which may render them more uſeful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, intereſted in the being at leaſt, tho' not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themſelves, by increaſing the number and induſtry of thoſe who are ſubjected to them. Each man, being a ſovereign in his own family, has the ſame intereſt with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the ſtate; and has not, like the prince, any oppoſite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little ſovereignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leiſure to inſpect the moſt minute detail of the marriage and education of his ſubjects *.

* We may here obſerve, that if domeſtic ſlavery really increaſed populouſneſs, it would be an exception to the general rule, that the happineſs of any ſociety and its populouſneſs are neceſſary attendants. A maſter, from humour or intereſt, may make his ſlaves very unhappy, and yet be careful, from intereſt, to increaſe their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, no more than any other action of their life.

SUCH are the conſequences of domeſtic ſlavery, according to the firſt aſpect and appearance of things: But if we enter more deeply into the ſubject, we ſhall perhaps find reaſon to retract our haſty determinations. The compariſon is ſhocking between the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely juſt, when applied to the preſent ſubject, it may be proper to trace the conſequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, induſtrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Proviſions, lodging, attendance, labour, are there dear; and men find better their account in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. Theſe are conſequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and by a parity of reaſon, for men too, when the latter are put on the ſame footing with the farmer. To rear a child in LONDON till he could be ſerviceable, would coſt much dearer, than to buy one of the ſame age from SCOTLAND or IRELAND; where he had been raiſed in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oatmeal or potatoes. Thoſe who had ſlaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, would diſcourage the pregnancy of the females, and either prevent or deſtroy the birth. The human ſpecies would periſh in thoſe places where it ought to increaſe the faſteſt; and a perpetual recruit be needed from all the poorer and more deſart provinces. Such a continued drain would tend mightily to depopulate the

ſtate,

ſtate, and render great cities ten times more deſtructive than with us; where every man is maſter of himſelf, and provides for his children from the powerful inſtinct of nature, not the calculations of ſordid intereſt. If LONDON, at preſent, without much increaſing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is commonly computed; what muſt it require, if the greateſt part of the tradeſmen and common people were ſlaves, and were hindered from breeding by their avaricious maſters?

ALL antient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of ſlaves to ITALY from the remoter provinces, particularly SYRIA, CILICIA *, CAPPADOCIA, the Leſſer ASIA, THRACE, and EGYPT: Yet the number of people increaſed not in ITALY; and writers complain of the continual decay of induſtry and agriculture †. Where then is that extreme fertility of the ROMAN ſlaves, which is commonly ſuppoſed? So far from multiplying, they could not, it ſeems, ſo much as keep up the ſtock, without im-

* Ten thouſand ſlaves in a day have been often ſold for the uſe of the ROMANS, at DELUS in CILICIA. STRABO, lib. 14.

† COLUMELLA, lib. 1. *proem.* et cap. 2. et 7. VARRO, lib. 3. cap. 1. HORAT. lib. 2. od. 15. TACIT. *annal.* lib. 3. cap. 54. SUETON. *in vita* AUG. cap. 72. PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 13.

menſe

menſe recruits. And tho' great numbers were continually manumitted, and converted into ROMAN citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not increaſe *, till the freedom of the city was communicated to foreign provinces.

THE term for a ſlave born and bred in the family, was *verna* †; and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have been intitled

* *Minore indies plebe ingenua*, ſays TACITUS, *ann.* lib. 14. cap. 7.

† As *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the latter were by far the leaſt numerous. 'Tis an univerſal obſervation which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which anſwer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation. If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs, and marks its diſtinction from the whole. Thus *man* and *woman*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, *father* and *ſon*, *prince* and *ſubject*, *ſtranger* and *citizen*, are correlative terms. But the words, *ſeaman*, *carpenter*, *ſmith*, *tailor*, &c. have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeamen, no carpenter, &c. Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences, concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations. The military government of the ROMAN emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanced all the other orders of the ſtate: Hence *miles* and *page-*

nus

titled by cuſtom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon why the maſters would not be fond of rearing many of that kind *. Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters, will acknowledge the juſtneſs of this obſervation †.

ATTICUS is much praiſed by his hiſtorian for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the

nus became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to antient, and ſtill ſo to modern languages. Modern ſuperſtition exalted the clergy ſo high, that they overbalanced the whole ſtate: Hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms oppoſed in all modern languages; and in theſe alone. And from the ſame principles I infer, that if the number of ſlaves bought by the ROMANS from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded thoſe bred at home, *verna* would have had a correlative, which would have expreſſed the former ſpecies of ſlaves. But theſe, it would ſeem, compoſed the main body of the antient ſlaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

* *Verna* is uſed by ROMAN writers as a word equivalent to *ſcurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of thoſe ſlaves. MART. lib. 1. ep. 42. HORACE alſo mentions the *vernae procaces*; and PETRONIUS, cap. 24. *vernula urbanitas*. SENECA, *de provid.* cap. 1. *vernularum licentia*.

† 'Tis computed in the WEST-INDIES, that a ſtock of ſlaves grow worſe five *per cent.* every year, unleſs new ſlaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their number, even in thoſe warm countries, where cloaths and proviſions are ſo eaſily got. How much more muſt this happen in EUROPEAN countries, and in or near great cities?

ſlaves

ſlaves born in it ‡: May we not thence infer, that that practice was not then very common?

THE names of ſlaves in the GREEK comedies, SYRUS, MYSUS, GETA, THRAX, DAVUS, LYDUS, PHRYX, &c. afford a preſumption, that at ATHENS, at leaſt, moſt of the ſlaves were imported from foreign nations. The ATHENIANS, ſays STRABO *, gave to their ſlaves, either the names of the nations whence they were bought, as LYDUS, SYRUS; or the names that were moſt common among thoſe nations, as MANES or MIDAS to a PHRYGIAN, TIBIAS to a PAPHLAGONIAN.

DEMOSTHENES, after having mentioned a law which forbid any man to ſtrike the ſlave of another, praiſes the humanity of this law; and adds, that if the barbarians from whom ſlaves were bought had information that their countrymen met with ſuch gentle treatment, they would entertain a great eſteem for the ATHENIANS †. ISOCRATES ‖ too inſinuates, that the ſlaves of the GREEKS were generally or very com-

‡ CORN. NEPOS in vita ATTICI. We may remark, that ATTICUS's eſtate lay chiefly in EPIRUS, which being a remote, deſolate place, would render it profitible for him to rear ſlaves there.

* Lib. 7.

† In MIDIAM, p. 221. ex edit. ALDI.

‖ Panegyr.

monſy

monly barbarians. ARISTOTLE in his Politics * plainly ſuppoſes, that a ſlave is always a foreigner. The antient comic writers repreſented the ſlaves, as ſpeaking a barbarous language †. This was an imitation of nature.

'TIS well known that DEMOSTHENES, in his nonage, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered, by a proſecution at law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occaſion, ſtill remain, and contain a very exact detail of the whole ſubſtance left by his father ‡, in money, merchandiſe, houſes, and ſlaves, together with the value of each particular. Among the reſt were 52 ſlaves, handicraftſmen, *viz.* 32 ſword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers ‖; all males; not a word of any wives, children, or family, which they certainly would have had, had it been a common cuſtom at ATHENS to breed from the ſlaves: And the value of the whole muſt have depended very much on that circumſtance. No female ſlaves are even ſo much as mentioned, except ſome houſe-maids, who belonged to his mo-

* Lib. 7. cap. 10. ſub. fin.

† ARISTOPH. Equites, l. 17. The antient ſcholiaſt remarks on this paſſage βαρβαριζει ως δουλος.

‡ In *Aphobum orat.* 1.

‖ κλινοποιοι, makers of thoſe beds which the antients lay upon at meals.

ther.

ther. This argument has great force, if it be not altogether deciſive.

CONSIDER this paſſage of PLUTARCH †, ſpeaking of the elder CATO. "He had a great number of "ſlaves, whom he took care to buy at the ſales of "priſoners of war; and he choſe them young, that "they might eaſily be accuſtomed to any diet or man-"ner of life, and be inſtructed in any buſineſs or la-"bour, as men teach any thing to young dogs or "horſes.——And eſteeming love the chief ſource of "all diſorders, he allowed the male ſlaves to have a "commerce with the female in his family, upon pay-"ing a certain ſum for this privilege: But he ſtrictly "forbad all intrigues out of his family." Are there any ſymptoms in this narration of that care which is ſuppoſed in the antients, of the marriage and propagation of their ſlaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general intereſt, it would ſurely have been embraced by CATO, who was a great oeconomiſt, and lived in times when the antient frugality and ſimplicity of manners were ſtill in credit and reputation.

IT is expreſsly remarked by the writers of the ROMAN law, that ſcarce any ever purchaſe ſlaves with a view of breeding from them *.

OUR

† In vita CATONIS.

* "Non temere ancillae ejus rei cauſa comparantur ut pari-"ant." *Digeſt.* lib. 5. tit. 3. *de hæred. petit. l.* 27. The following

OUR lackeys and houſe maids, I own, do not ſerve much to multiply their ſpecies: But the antients, beſides thoſe who attended on their perſon, had all their labour performed by ſlaves, who lived, many of them, in their family; and ſome great men poſſeſſed to the number of 10,000. If there be any ſuſpicion, therefore, that this inſtitution was unfavourable to propagation, (and the ſame reaſon, at leaſt in part, holds

following texts are to the ſame purpoſe. "Spadonem morbo-"ſum non eſſe, neque vitioſum, verius, mihi videtur; ſed ſanum "eſſe, ſicuti illum qui unum teſticulum habet, qui etiam gene-"rare poteſt." *Digeſt.* lib. 2. tit. 1. *de aedilitio edicto, lex* 6, § 2. "Sin autem quis ita ſpado ſit, ut tam neceſſaria pars cor-"poris penitus abſit, morboſus eſt." *Id. lex* 7. His impotence, it ſeems, was only regarded ſo far as his health or life might be affected by it. In other reſpects, he was full as valuable. The ſame reaſoning is employed with regard to female ſlaves. "Quae-"ritur de ea muliere quae ſemper mortuos parit, an morboſa "ſit? et ait Sabinus, ſi vulvae vitio hoc contingit, morboſam "eſſe." *Id. lex* 14. It has even been doubted, whether a woman pregnant was morbid or vitiated; and it is determined, that ſhe is ſound, not on account of the value of her offspring, but becauſe it is the natural part or office of women to bear children. "Si mulier praegnans venerit, inter omnes convenit ſanam eam "eſſe. Maximum enim ac praecipuum munus foeminarum ac-"cipere ac tueri conceptum. Puerperam quoque ſanam eſſe; ſi "modo nihil extrinſecus accedit, quod corpus ejus in aliquam "valetudinem immitteret. De ſterili Coelius diſtinguere Treba-"tium dicit, ut ſi natura ſterilis ſit, ſana ſit; ſi vitio corporis, "contra." *Id.*

with

with regard to antient ſlaves as well as modern ſervants) how deſtructive muſt ſlavery have proved?

HISTORY mentions a ROMAN nobleman, who had 400 ſlaves under the ſame roof with him: and having been aſſaſſinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigour, and all without exception were put to death *. Many other ROMAN noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this would ſcarce be practicable, were we to ſuppoſe all the ſlaves married, and the females to be breeders †.

So early as the poet HESIOD ‡, married ſlaves, whether male or female, were eſteemed very inconvenient. How much more, where families had increaſed to ſuch an enormous ſize, as in ROME, and the antient ſimplicity of manners was baniſhed from all ranks of people?

* TACIT. *ann.* lib. 14. cap. 43.

† The ſlaves in the great houſes, had little rooms aſſigned them, called *cellae*. Whence the name of cell was transferred to the monks room in a convent. See farther on this head, JUST. LIPSIUS, Saturn. 1. cap. 14. Theſe form ſtrong preſumptions againſt the marriage and propagation of the family-ſlaves.

‡ Opera et Dies, lib. 2. l. 24. alſo l. 220.

XENOPHON

XENOPHON in his Oeconomics, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict care and attention of laying the male and the female ſlaves at a diſtance from each other. He ſeems not to ſuppoſe that they are ever married. The only ſlaves among the GREEKS that appear to have continued their own breed, were the HELOTES, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals *.

THE ſame author † tells us, that NICIAS's overſeer, by agreement with his maſter, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each ſlave; beſides maintaining them, and keeping up the number. Had the antient ſlaves been all breeders, this laſt circumſtance of the contract had been ſuperfluous.

THE antients talk ſo frequently of a fixed, ſtated portion of proviſions aſſigned to each ſlave ‡, that we are naturally led to conclude, that ſlaves lived almoſt all ſingle, and received that portion as a kind of board-wages.

THE practice, indeed, of marrying the ſlaves ſeems not to have been very common, even among the

* STRABO, lib. 8.

† De ratione redituum.

‡ See CATO de re ruſtica, cap. 56. Donatus in Phormion. I. 1 9. SENECAE epiſt. &c.

country-

country-labourers, where it is more naturally to be expected. CATO *, enumerating the ſlaves requiſite to labour a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them amount to 15; the overſeer and his wife, *villicus* and *villica*, and 13 male ſlaves; for an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overſeer and his wife, and 11 male ſlaves; and ſo in proportion to a greater or leſs plantation or vineyard.

VARRO †, citing this paſſage of CATO, allows his computation to be juſt in every reſpect, except the laſt. For as it is requiſite, ſays he, to have an overſeer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or ſmall, this muſt alter the exactneſs of the proportion. Had CATO's computation been erroneous in any other reſpect, it had certainly been corrected by VARRO, who ſeems fond of diſcovering ſo trivial an error.

THE ſame author ‡, as well as COLUMELLA ‖, recommends it as requiſite to give a wife to the overſeer, in order to attach him the more ſtrongly to his maſter's ſervice. This was therefore a peculiar indul-

* De re ruſt. cap. 10, 11.

† Lib. 1. cap. 18.

‡ Lib. 1. cap. 17.

‖ Lib. 1. cap. 18.

gence

gence granted to a ſlave, in whom ſo great a confidence was repoſed.

IN the ſame place, VARRO mentions it as an uſeful precaution, not to buy too many ſlaves from the ſame nation, leſt they beget factions and ſeditions in the family: A preſumption that in ITALY the greateſt part, even of the country labouring ſlaves, (for he ſpeaks of no other) were bought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows, that the family-ſlaves in ROME, who were inſtruments of ſhow and luxury, were commonly imported from the eaſt. *Hæc profecere*, ſays PLINY, ſpeaking of the jealous care of maſters, *mancipiorum legiones, et in domo turba externa ac ſervorum quoque cauſa nomenclator adhibendus* *.

IT is indeed recommended by VARRO †, to propagate young ſhepherds in the family from the old ones. For as graſing farms were commonly in remote and cheap places, and each ſhepherd lived in a cottage apart, his marriage and increaſe were not liable to the ſame inconveniencies as in dearer places, and where many ſervants lived in a family; which was univerſally the caſe in ſuch of the ROMAN farms as produced wine or corn. If we conſider this exception

* Lib. 33. cap. 1. So likewiſe TACITUS, *annal.* lib. 14. cap. 44.

† Lib. 2. cap. 10.

with

with regard to the ſhepherds, and weigh the reaſon of it, it will ſerve for a ſtrong confirmation of all our foregoing ſuſpicions *.

COLUMELLA ‡, I own, adviſes the maſter to give a reward, and even liberty to a female ſlave, that had reared him above three children: A proof, that ſometimes the antients propagated from their ſlaves; which, indeed, cannot be denied. Were it otherwiſe, the practice of ſlavery, being ſo common in antiquity, muſt have been deſtructive to a degree which no expedient could repair. All I pretend to infer from theſe reaſonings, is, that ſlavery is in general diſadvantageous both to the happineſs and populouſneſs of mankind, and that its place is much better ſupplied by the practice of hired ſervants.

THE laws, or, as ſome writers call them, the ſeditions of the GRACCHI, were occaſioned by their obſerving the increaſe of ſlaves all over ITALY, and the diminution of free citizens. APPIAN ‖ aſcribes this increaſe to the propagation of the ſlaves; PLUTARCH † to the purchaſing of barbarians, who were

* Paſtoris duri eſt hic filius, ille bubulci. JUVEN. ſat. IX. 151.

‡ Lib. I. cap. 8.

‖ De bel. civ. lib. I.

† In vita TIB. & C. GRACCHI.

chained

chained and impriſoned, βαρβαρικα δεσμωτηρια ‡. 'Tis to be preſumed, that both cauſes concurred.

SICILY, ſays FLORUS *, was full of *ergaſtula*, and was cultivated by labourers in chains. EUNUS and ATHENIO excited the ſervile war, by breaking up theſe monſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves. The younger POMPEY augmented his army in SPAIN by the ſame expedient †. If the country-labourers, throughout the ROMAN empire, were ſo generally in this ſituation, and if it was difficult or impoſſible to find ſeparate lodgings for the families of the city-ſervants, how unfavourable to propagation,

‡ To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of the elder SENECA, ex controverſia 5. lib. 5. "Arata quondam populis rura, fingu-"lorum ergaſtulorum ſunt; latiuſque nunc villici, quam olim "rages, imperant. At nunc eadem," ſays PLINY, "vincti "pedes damnatae manus, inſcripti vultus exercent." lib. 18. cap. 3. So alſo MARTIAL.

"Et ſonet innumera compede Thuſcus ager."

lib. 9. ep. 23.

And LUCAN: "Tum longos jungere fines
Agrorum, et quondam duro ſulcata Camilli,
Vomere et antiquas Curiorum paſſa ligones,
Longa ſub ignotis extendere rura colonis. lib. 1.
Vincto foſſore coluntur
Heſperiae ſegetes, —— lib. 7.

* Lib. 3. cap. 19.

† Id. lib. 4. cap. 8.

as well as humanity, muſt the inſtitution of domeſtic ſlavery be eſteemed?

CONSTANTINOPLE, at preſent, requires the ſame recruits of ſlaves from all the provinces, which ROME did of old; and theſe provinces are of conſequence far from being populous.

EGYPT, according to Monſ. MAILLET, ſends continual colonies of black ſlaves to the other parts of the TURKISH empire; and receives annually an equal return of white: The one brought from the inland parts of AFRICA; the other from MINGRELLA, CIRCASSIA, and TARTARY.

OUR modern convents are, no doubt, very bad inſtitutions. But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that anciently every great family in ITALY, and probably in other parts of the world, was a ſpecies of convent. And tho' we have reaſon to deteſt all thoſe popiſh inſtitutions, as nurſeries of the moſt abject ſuperſtition, burthenſome to the public, and oppreſſive to the poor priſoners, male as well as female; yet may it be queſtioned whether they be ſo deſtructive to the populouſneſs of a ſtate as is commonly imagined. Were the land which belongs to a convent, beſtowed on a nobleman, he would ſpend its revenue on dogs, horſes, grooms, footmen, cooks, and houſe-maids; and his family

family would not furniſh many more citizens than the convent.

THE common reaſon why parents thruſt their daughters into nunneries, is, that they may not be overburthened with too numerous a family; but the antients had a method almoſt as innocent, and more effectual to that purpoſe, *viz.* the expoſing their children in the earlieſt infancy. This practice was very common; and is not mentioned by any author of thoſe times with the horror it deſerves, or ſcarce* even with diſapprobation. PLUTARCH, the humane, good natured PLUTARCH, † recommends it as a virtue in ATTALUS, king of PERGAMUS, that he murdered, or, if you will, expoſed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the ſon of his brother, EUMENES; ſignalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to EUMENES, who had left him his heir preferable to that ſon. It was SOLON, the moſt celebrated of the ſages of GREECE, who gave parents permiſſion by law to kill their children ‡.

SHALL we then allow theſe two circumſtances to compenſate each other, *viz.* monaſtic vows and the expoſing of children, and to be unfavourable, in

* TACITUS blames it, De morib. Germ.

† De fraterno amore. SENECA alſo approves of the expoſing of ſickly, infirm children. De ira, lib. 1. cap. 15.

‡ SEXT. EMP. lib. 3. cap. 24.

equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the ſide of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd connection of cauſes, the barbarous practice of the antients might rather render thoſe times more populous. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage many people in marriage; and ſuch is the force of natural affection, that very few, in compariſon, would have reſolution enough, when it came to the puſh, to carry into execution their former intentions.

CHINA, the only country where this cruel practice of expoſing children prevails at preſent, is the moſt populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could ſcarce be general, had not men the proſpect of ſo eaſy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that PLUTARCH * ſpeaks of it as a very univerſal maxim of the poor to expoſe their children; and as the rich were then averſe to marriage, on account of the courtſhip they met with from thoſe who expected legacies from them, the public muſt have been in a bad ſituation betwixt them †.

OF

* De amore prolis.

† The practice of leaving great ſums of money to friends, tho' one had near relations, was common in GREECE as well as ROME;

OF all ſciences there is none, where firſt appearances are more deceitful than in politics. Hoſpitals for foundlings ſeem favourable to the increaſe of numbers; and, perhaps, may be ſo, when kept under proper reſtrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without diſtinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the ſtate. 'Tis computed, that every ninth child born at PARIS, is ſent to the hoſpital; tho' it ſeems certain, according to the common courſe of human affairs, that 'tis not a hundredth part whoſe parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate them. The infinite difference, for health, induſtry, and morals, between an education in an hoſpital and that in a private family, ſhould induce us not to make the entrance into an hoſpital too eaſy and engaging. To kill one's own

ROME; as we may gather from LUCIAN. This practice prevails much leſs in modern times; and BEN. JOHNSON'S VOLPONE is therefore almoſt entirely extracted from antient authors, and ſuits better the manners of thoſe times.

It may juſtly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in ROME was another diſcouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from *humour*, but rather increaſes them; and occaſions alſo thoſe from *intereſt*, which are much more dangerous and deſtructive. See farther on this head, Eſſays moral, political, and literary, Part I. eſſay XXI. Perhaps too the unnatural luſts of the antients ought to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome moment.

child is ſhocking to nature, and muſt therefore be pretty unuſual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

HAVING conſidered the domeſtic life and manners of the antients, compared to thoſe of the moderns; where, in the main, we ſeem rather ſuperior, ſo far as the preſent queſtion is concerned; we ſhall now examine the *political* cuſtoms and inſtitutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

BEFORE the increaſe of the ROMAN power, or rather till its full eſtabliſhment, almoſt all the nations which are the ſcene of antient hiſtory, were divided into ſmall territories or petty commonwealths, where of courſe a great equality of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always very near its frontiers.

THIS was the ſituation of affairs not only in GREECE and ITALY, but alſo in SPAIN, GAUL, GERMANY, AFRIC, and a great part of the Leſſer ASIA. And it muſt be owned, that no inſtitution could be more favourable to the propagation of mankind. For tho' a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to conſume more than another, muſt ſhare it with thoſe who

who ſerve and attend him; yet their poſſeſſion being precarious, they have not the ſame encouragement to marriage, as if each had a ſmall fortune, ſecure and independent. Enormous cities are, beſides, deſtructive to ſociety, beget vice and diſorder of all kinds, ſtarve the remoter provinces, and even ſtarve themſelves, by the prices to which they raiſe all proviſions. Where each man had his little houſe and field to himſelf, and each county had its capital, free and independent; what a happy ſituation of mankind How favourable to induſtry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that reſtraint which poverty and neceſſity impoſes on it, would double the number every generation: And nothing ſurely can give it more liberty, than ſuch ſmall common-wealths, and ſuch an equality of fortune among the citizens. All ſmall ſtates naturally produce equality of fortune, becauſe they afford no opportunities of great increaſe; but ſmall commonwealths much more, by that diviſion of power and authority which is eſſential to them.

WHEN XENOPHON* returned after the famous expedition with CYRUS, he hired himſelf and 6000 of the GREEKS into the ſervice of SEUTHES, a prince of THRACE; and the articles of his agreement were,

* *De exp.* CYR. lib. 7.

that each ſoldier ſhould receive a *daric* a month, each captain two *darics*, and he himſelf, as general, four: A regulation of pay which would not a little ſurpriſe our modern officers.

DEMOSTHENES and ÆSCHINES, with eight more, were ſent ambaſſadors to PHILIP of MACEDON, and their appointments for above four months were a thouſand *drachmas*, which is leſs than a *drachma* a day for each ambaſſador †. But a *drachma* a day, nay ſometimes two ‡, was the pay of a common foot-ſoldier.

A CENTURION among the Romans had only double pay to a private man, in POLYBIUS's time ‖, and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion §. But MARK ANTHONY and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other ⊣. So much had the increaſe of the commonwealth increaſed the inequality among the citizens *.

† DEMOST. *de falſa leg.* He calls it a conſiderable ſum.

‡ THUCYD. lib. 3.

‖ Lib. 6. cap. 37.

§ TIT. LIV. lib. 41. cap. 7. 13. *& alibi paſſim.*

⊣ APPIAN. *De bell. civ.* lib. 4.

* CÆSAR gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common ſoldiers, *De bell. Gallico*, lib. 8. In the RHODIAN cartel, mentioned afterwards, no diſtinction in the ranſom was made on account of ranks in the army.

IT

IT muſt be owned, that the ſituation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near ſo favourable, either to the propagation or happineſs of mankind. EUROPE is ſhared out moſtly into great monarchies; and ſuch parts of it as are divided into ſmall territories, are commonly governed by abſolute princes, who ruin their people by a ridiculous mimickry of the greater monarchs, in the ſplendor of their court and number of their forces. SWISSERLAND alone and HOLLAND reſemble the antient republics; and tho' the former is far from poſſeſſing any advantage either of ſoil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people, with which it abounds, notwithſtanding their inliſting themſelves into every ſervice in EUROPE, prove ſufficiently the advantages of their political inſtitutions.

THE antient republics derived their chief or only ſecurity from the numbers of their citizens. The TRACHINIANS having loſt great numbers of their people, the remainder, inſtead of inriching themſelves by the inheritance of their fellow-citizens, applied to SPARTA, their metropolis, for a new ſtock of inhabitants. The SPARTANS immediately collected ten thouſand men: among whom the old citizens divided the lands of which the former proprietors had periſhed *.

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 12. THUCYD. lib. 3.

AFTER TIMOLEON had banished DIONYSIUS from SYRACUSE, and had ſettled the affairs of SICILY, finding the cities of SYRACUSE and SELLINUNTIUM extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from GREECE ſome new inhabitants to repeople them *. Immediately forty thouſand men (PLUTARCH † ſays ſixty thouſand) offered themſelves; and he diſtributed ſo many lots of land among them, to the great ſatisfaction of the antient inhabitants: A proof at once of the maxims of antient policy, which affected populouſneſs more than riches; and of the good effects of theſe maxims, in the extreme populouſneſs of that ſmall country, GREECE, which could at once ſupply ſo large a colony. The caſe was not much different with the ROMANS in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, ſaid M. CURIUS, who cannot be contented with ſeven acres ‡. Such ideas of equality could not fail of producing great numbers of people.

WE

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 16.

† *In vita* TIMOL.

‡ PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 3. The ſame author, in cap. 6. ſays, *Verumque fatentibus latifundia perdidere* ITALIAM; *jam vero et provincias. Sex domi ſemiſſem* AFRICÆ *poſſidebant, cum interfecit eos* NERO *princeps.* In this view, the barbarous butchery committed by the firſt ROMAN emperors, was not, perhaps, ſo deſtructive to the public as we may imagine. Theſe never ceaſed till they had extinguiſhed all the illuſtrious families, which had

WE muſt now conſider what diſadvantages the antients lay under with regard to populouſneſs, and what checks they received from their political maxims and inſtitutions. There are commonly compenſations in every human condition; and tho' theſe compenſations be not always perfectly equal, yet they ſerve, at leaſt, to reſtrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and eſtimate their influence, is indeed very difficult, even where they take place in the ſame age, and in neighbouring countries: But where ſeveral ages have intervened, and only ſcattered lights are afforded us by antient authors; what can we do but amuſe ourſelves by talking, *pro* and *con*, on an intereſting ſubject, and thereby correcting all haſty and violent determinations?

Firſt, WE may obſerve, that the antient republics were almoſt in perpetual war; a natural effect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in a cloſe neighbourhood. Now, war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe all the inhabitants, in the former caſe, muſt ſerve in the armies; and becauſe the ſtate is all frontier, and all expoſed to the inroads of the enemy.

had enjoyed the plunder of the world, during the latter ages of the republic. The new nobles who roſe in their place, were leſs ſplendid, as we learn from TACIT. *ann.* lib. 3. cap. 55.

THE maxims of antient war were much more deſtructive than thoſe of modern; chiefly by the diſtribution of plunder, in which the ſoldiers were indulged. The private men in our armies are ſuch a low raſcally ſet of people, that we find any abundance beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſorder, and a total diſſolution of diſcipline. The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe who fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries which they invade: One inſtance, among many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appearances in all political reaſonings *.

ANTIENT battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons employed in them. The antients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſometimes 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and it was not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marſhalled, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided betwixt the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the

* The antient ſoldiers, being free citizens, above the loweſt rank, were all married. Our modern ſoldiers are either forced to live unmarried, or their marriages turn to ſmall account towards the increaſe of mankind. A circumſtance which ought, perhaps, to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome conſequence in favour of the antients.

difficulties

difficulties which oppoſed them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engaged, and each man cloſely buckled to his antagoniſt, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great ſlaughter was made on both ſides, but eſpecially on the vanquiſhed. The long thin lines required by fire-arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greateſt part of his army, ſound and intire. Could FOLARD's project of the column take place (which ſeems impracticable ‡) it would render modern battles as deſtructive as the antient.

THE battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and their reſemblance of ſingle combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter, but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners. In civil wars, as we learn from TACITUS *, the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

‡ What is the advantage of the column after it has broke the enemy's line? only, that it then takes them in flank, and diſſipates whatever ſtands near it by a fire from all ſides. But till it has broke them, does it not preſent a flank to the enemy, and that expoſed to their muſquetry, and, what is much worſe, to their cannon?

* Hiſt. lib. 2. cap. 44.

WHAT

WHAT a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſhed expected ſo hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

INSTANCES are very frequent, in antient hiſtory, of cities beſieged, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, and ruſhed themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweetened perhaps with a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy. GREEKS †, as well as BARBARIANS, have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the ſame determined ſpirit and cruelty muſt, in many other inſtances, leſs remarkable, have been extremely deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths, which lived in a cloſe neighbourhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.

SOMETIMES the wars in GREECE, ſays PLUTARCH ‡, were carried on intirely by inroads, and robberies, and piracies. Such a method of war muſt be more deſtructive, in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

BY the laws of the twelve tables, poſſeſſion for two years formed a preſcription for land; one year for

† As ABYDUS, mentioned by LIVY, lib. 31. cap. 17, 18. and POLYB. lib. 16. As alſo the XANTHIANS, APPIAN. *de bell. civil.* lib. 4.

‡ *In vita* ARATI.

move-

moveables*: An indication, that there was not in ITALY, during that period, much more order, tranquillity, and ſettled police, than there is at preſent among the TARTARS.

THE only cartel I remember in antient hiſtory, is that between DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES and the RHODIANS; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhould be reſtored for 1000 *drachmas*, a ſlave bearing arms for 500 †.

BUT, *ſecondly*, it appears that antient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, not only in times of war, but alſo in thoſe of peace; and that too in every reſpect, except the love of civil liberty and equality, which is, I own, of conſiderable importance. To exclude faction from a free government, is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but ſuch inveterate rage between the factions, and ſuch bloody maxims, are found, in modern times, amongſt religious parties alone, where bigotted prieſts are the accuſers, judges, and executioners. In antient hiſtory, we may always obſerve, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can ob-

* INST. lib. 2. cap. 6. 'Tis true, the ſame law ſeems to have been continued till the time of JUSTINIAN. But abuſes introduced by barbariſm, are not always corrected by civility.

† DIOD. SICUL. lib. 20.

ſerve

ſerve no difference in this reſpect ‖) that they immediately butchered all of the oppoſite party who fell into their hands, and baniſhed ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury. No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city, were ſlaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fellow-citizens; till Fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as theſe were very frequent in ſuch violent governments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

THERE are only two revolutions I can recollect in antient hiſtory, which paſſed without great ſeverity, and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and aſſaſſinations, *viz.* the reſtoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy by THRASYBULUS, and the ſubduing the ROMAN republic by CÆSAR. We learn from antient hiſtory, that THRASYBULUS paſſed a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduced that word, as well as practice, into GREECE *. It ap-

‖ LYSIAS, who was himſelf of the popular faction, and very narrowly eſcaped from the thirty tyrants, ſays, that the Democracy was as violent a government as the Oligarchy. *Orat.* 24. *de ſtatu popul.*

* CICERO, PHILIP. I.

pears,

pears, however, from many orations of LYSIAS †, that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and capitally puniſhed. This is a difficulty not cleared up, and even not obſerved by antiquarians and hiſtorians. And as to CÆSAR's clemency, tho' much celebrated, it would not gain great applauſe in the preſent age. He butchered, for inſtance, all CATO's ſenate, when he became maſter of UTICA ‡; and theſe, we may readily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party. All thoſe who had borne arms againſt that uſurper, were forfeited; and, by HIRTIUS's law, declared incapable of all public offices.

THESE people were extremely fond of liberty; but ſeem not to have underſtood it very well. When the thirty tyrants firſt eſtabliſhed their dominion at ATHENS, they began with ſeizing all the ſycophants and informers, who had been ſo troubleſome during the Democracy, and putting them to death by an arbitrary ſentence and execution. *Every man*, ſays SALLUST *

† As *orat.* 11. *contra* ERATOST. *orat.* 12. *contra* AGORAT. *orat.* 15. *pro* MANTITH.

‡ APPIAN. *de bell. civ.* lib. 2.

* See CÆSAR's ſpeech, *de bell. Catil.*

and

and LYSIAS †, *was rejoiced at theſe puniſhments*; not conſidering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

THE utmoſt energy of the nervous ſtyle of THUCYDIDES, and the copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the GREEK language, ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders which aroſe from faction thro'out all the GREEK commonwealths. You would imagine, that he ſtill labours with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once very refined and very ſolid. "In theſe conteſts," ſays he, "thoſe who were dull-"eſt and moſt ſtupid, and had the leaſt foreſight, "commonly prevailed. For being conſcious of this "weakneſs, and dreading to be over-reached by "thoſe of greater penetration, they went to work "haſtily, without premeditation, by the ſword and "poniard, and thereby prevented their antagoniſts, "who were forming fine ſchemes and projects for "their deſtruction ‡."

NOT

† *Orat.* 24. And in *orat.* 29. he mentions the factious ſpirit of the popular aſſemblies as the only cauſe why theſe illegal puniſhments ſhould diſpleaſe.

‡ Lib. 3. The country in EUROPE in which I have obſerved the factions to be moſt violent, and party-hatred the ſtrongeſt, is IRELAND. This goes ſo far as to cut off even the moſt common intercourſe

NOT to mention DIONYSIUS ‖ the elder, who is computed to have butchered in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; nor AGATHOCLES *, NABIS †, and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and deſtructive. At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and baniſhed above the half of the citizens that remained ‡. In ARGOS, near the ſame time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, becauſe they had refuſed to carry their proſecutions farther ⸸. The people alſo in CORCYRA

intercourſe of civilities between the Proteſtants and Catholics. Their cruel inſurrections, and the ſevere revenges which they have taken of each other, are the cauſes of this mutual ill will, which is the chief ſource of the diſorder, poverty, and depopulation of that country. The GREEK factions I imagine to have been inflamed ſtill to a higher degree of rage; the revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims of aſſaſſination much more avowed and acknowledged.

‖ PLUT. *de virt. & fort.* ALEX.

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18, 19.

† TIT. LIV. lib. 31, 33, 34.

‡ DIOD. SIC. lib. 14. ISOCRATES ſays there were only 5000 baniſhed. He makes the number of thoſe killed amount to 1500. ARROP. ÆSCHINES *contra* CTESIPH. aſſigns preciſely the ſame number. SENECA *(de tranq. anim.* cap. 5.) ſays 1300.

⸸ DIOD. SIC. lib. 15.

killed

killed 1500 of the nobles, and baniſhed a thouſand *. Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurpriſing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of theſe ſtates. But all antient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances †.

WHEN

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 13.

† We ſhall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few, which paſſed in the courſe of ſixty years during the moſt ſhining age of GREECE. There were baniſhed from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their partiſans; lib. 12. p. 77. *ex edit.* RHODOMANNI. Of CHIANS, 600 citizens baniſhed; lib. 13. p. 189. At EPHESUS, 340 killed, 1000 baniſhed; lib. 13. p. 223. Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the reſt baniſhed; lib. 14. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, baniſhed 500; lib. 14. p. 304. PHÆBIDAS the SPARTAN baniſhed 300 BÆOTIANS; lib. 15. p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, Democracies were reſtored in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK manner. But matters did not end there. For the baniſhed nobles, returning in many places, butchered their adverſaries at PHIALÆ, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in PHLIASIA. In this laſt place they killed 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and baniſhed the reſt; lib. 15. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 baniſhed, beſides many killed. The baniſhed retired to SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM: The latter delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed, lib. 15. p. 373. Of the baniſhed from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 500 in the SPARTAN army; *id.* p. 374. Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of AGATHOCLES's cruelties from the ſame author. The people before his uſurpation had baniſhed 600 nobles; lib. 19. p. 655. Afterwards, that tyrant, in con-

currence

WHEN ALEXANDER ordered all the exiles to be reſtored thro' all the cities; it was found, that the whole amounted to 20,000 men *; the remains probably of ſtill greater ſlaughters and maſſacres. What an aſtoniſhing multitude in ſo narrow a country as antient GREECE! And what domeſtic confuſion, jealouſy, partiality, revenge, heart-burnings, muſt tear thoſe cities, where factions were wrought up to ſuch a degree of fury and deſpair!

IT would be eaſier, ſays ISOCRATES to PHILIP, to raiſe an army in GREECE at preſent from the vagabonds than from the cities.

EVEN where affairs came not to ſuch extremities (which they failed not to do almoſt in every city twice or thrice every century) property was rendered very precarious by the maxims of antient government.

currence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and baniſhed 6000; *id.* p. 647. He killed 4000 people at GELA; *id.* p. 741. By AGATHOCLES's brother 8000 baniſhed from SYRACUSE; lib. 20. p. 757. The inhabitants of ÆGESTA, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child; and with tortures, for the ſake of their money; *id.* p. 802. All their relations, *viz.* father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, killed; *id.* p. 103. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; *id.* p. 816. 'Tis to be remarked, that AGATHOCLES was a man of great ſenſe and courage.

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

XENO-

XENOPHON, in the banquet of SOCRATES, gives us a very natural unaffected deſcription of the tyranny of the ATHENIAN people. "In my poverty," ſays CHARMIDES, "I am much more happy than ever I "was while poſſeſt of riches; as much as it is happier "to be in ſecurity than in terrors, free than a ſlave, to "receive than to pay court, to be truſted than ſuſ-"pected. Formerly I was obliged to careſs every in-"former; ſome impoſition was continually laid upon "me; and it was never allowed me to travel, or be "abſent from the city. At preſent, when I am poor, "I look big, and threaten others. The rich are "afraid of me, and ſhow me every kind of civility "and reſpect; and I am become a kind of tyrant in "the city †."

IN one of the pleadings of LYSIAS ‖, the orator very coolly ſpeaks of it, by the by, as a maxim of the ATHENIAN people, That whenever they wanted money, they put to death ſome of the rich citizens as well as ſtrangers, for the ſake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he ſeems to have no intention of blaming them; ſtill leſs of provoking them who were his audience and judges.

WHETHER a man was a citizen or a ſtranger among that people, it ſeems indeed requiſite, either

† Pag. 885. *ex edit.* LEUNCLAV.

‖ *Orat.* 29. *in* NICOM.

that

that he ſhould impoveriſh himſelf, or the people would impoveriſh him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator laſt mentioned gives a pleaſant account of an eſtate laid out in the public ſervice *;

* In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, he enumerates all the ſums he had expended. When χωρηγος, 30 minas: Upon a chorus of men 40 minas; τετραπυρριχιςαις 8 minas; ανδρασι χορηγων 50 minas; κυκλικω χορω 3 minas; Seven times trierarch, where he ſpent 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 minas; another time 40; γυμνασιαρχων, 12 minas; χορηγων παιδικω χορω, 15 minas; κωμωδοις χορηγων, 18 minas; πυρριχισταις αγωνιοις, 7 minas; τριηρει αμιλλωμενω, 15 minas; αρχιθεωρω, 30 minas: In the whole ten talents 38 minas. An immenſe ſum for an ATHENIAN fortune, and what alone would be eſteemed great riches, *Orat.* 20. 'Tis true, he ſays, the law did not oblige him abſolutely to be at ſo much expence, not above a fourth. But without the favour of the people, no body was ſo much as ſafe; and this was the only way to gain it. See farther, *orat.* 24. *de pop. ſtatu.* In another place, he introduces a ſpeaker, who ſays that he had ſpent his whole fortune, and an immenſe one, eighty talents, for the people. *Orat.* 25. *de prob.* EVANDRI. The μετοικοι, or ſtrangers, find, ſays he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, that they have reaſon to repent. *Orat.* 30. *contra* PHIL. You may ſee with what care DEMOSTHENES diſplays his expences of this nature, when he pleads for himſelf *de corona*; and how he exaggerates MIDIAS's ſtingineſs in this particular, in his accuſation of that criminal. All this, by the by, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature: And yet the ATHENIANS valued themſelves on having the moſt legal and regular adminiſtration of any people in GREECE.

that

that is, above the third of it in rareeſhows and figured dances.

I NEED not inſiſt on the GREEK tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixed monarchies, by which moſt of the antient ſtates of GREECE were governed, before the introduction of republics, were very unſettled. Scarce any city, but ATHENS, ſays ISOCRATES, could ſhow a ſucceſſion of kings for four or five generations *.

BESIDES many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of ancient monarchies, the equal diviſion of property among the brothers in private families, muſt, by a neceſſary conſequence, contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate. The univerſal preference given to the elder by modern laws, tho' it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea of public ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

THE new ſettled colony of HERACLEA, falling immediately into factions, applied to SPARTA, who ſent HERIPIDAS with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions. This man, not provoked by any oppoſition, not inflamed by party rage, knew no better expedient than immediately putting to death about 500

* Panath.

of

of the citizens †. A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe violent maxims of government were thro'out all GREECE.

IF ſuch was the diſpoſition of mens minds among that refined people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherwiſe did the Greeks ſo much value themſelves on their humanity, gentleneſs and moderation, above all other nations? This reaſoning ſeems very natural. But unluckily the hiſtory of the ROMAN commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, ſtands againſt us. No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at ROME, till the murder of the GRACCHI. DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS ‖, obſerving the ſingular humanity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes uſe of it as an argument that they were originally of GRECIAN extraction: Whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were more violent than even thoſe of GREECE above-mentioned.

IF the ROMANS were ſo late in coming to blows, they made ample compenſation after they had once entered upon the bloody ſcene; and APPIAN's hiſtory of their civil wars contains the moſt frightful picture of maſſacres, proſcriptions, and forfeitures, that ever

† DIOD. SIC. lib. 14. ‖ Lib. 2.

was preſented to the world. What pleaſes moſt, in that hiſtorian, is, that he ſeems to feel a proper reſentment of theſe barbarous proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolneſs and indifference, which cuſtom had produced in many of the GREEK hiſtorians *.

THE maxims of antient politics contain, in general, ſo little humanity and moderation, that it ſeems ſu-

* The authorities cited above, are all hiſtorians, orators, and philoſophers, whoſe teſtimony is unqueſtioned. 'Tis dangerous to rely upon writers who deal in ridicule and ſatyr. What will poſterity, for inſtance, infer from this paſſage of Dr. SWIFT? "I told him, that in the kingdom of TRINNIA (BRITAIN) "by the natives called LANGDON (LONDON) where I had "ſojourned ſome time in my travels, the bulk of the people "conſiſt, in a manner, wholly of diſcoverers, witneſſes, inform-"ers, accuſers, proſecutors, evidences, ſwearers, together with "their ſeveral ſubſervient and ſubaltern inſtruments, all under "the colours, the conduct, and pay of miniſters of ſtate and "their deputies. The plots in that kingdom are uſually the "workmanſhip of thoſe perſons," &c. GULLIVER's *travels*. Such a repreſentation might ſuit the government of ATHENS; but not that of ENGLAND, which is a prodigy even in modern times, for humanity, juſtice, and liberty. Yet the Doctor's ſatyr, tho' carried to extremes, as is uſual with him, even beyond other ſatyrical writers, did not altogether want an object. The Biſhop of ROCHESTER, who was his friend, and of the ſame party, had been baniſhed a little before by a bill of attainder, with great juſtice, but without ſuch a proof as was legal, or according to the ſtrict forms of common law.

perfluous

perfluous to give any particular reaſon for the violences committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear obſerving, that the laws, in the latter ages of the ROMAN commonwealth, were ſo abſurdly contrived, that they obliged the heads of parties to have recourſe to theſe extremities. All capital puniſhments were aboliſhed: However criminal, or, what is more, however dangerous any citizen might be, he could not regularly be puniſhed otherwiſe than by baniſhment: And it became neceſſary, in the revolutions of party, to draw the ſword of private vengeance; nor was it eaſy, when laws were once violated, to ſet bounds to theſe ſanguinary proceedings. Had BRUTUS himſelf prevailed over the *triumviriate*, could he, in common prudence, have allowed OCTAVIUS and ANTHONY to live, and have contented himſelf with baniſhing them to RHODES or MARSEILLES, where they might ſtill have plotted new commotions and rebellions. His executing C. ANTONIUS, brother to the *triumvir*, ſhows evidently his ſenſe of the matter. Did not CICERO, with the approbation of all the wiſe and virtuous of ROME, arbitrarily put to death CATILINE's aſſociates, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of proceſs? And if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper, or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched ſecurity in a government which pretends to laws and liberty!

THUS, one extreme produces another. In the ſame manner as exceſſive ſeverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; ſo their exceſſive lenity naturally produces cruelty and barbarity. 'Tis dangerous to force us, in any caſe, to paſs their ſacred boundaries.

ONE general cauſe of the diſorders ſo frequent in all antient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any Ariſtocracy in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſlature and from public offices. The very quality of *freeman* gave ſuch a rank, being oppoſed to that of ſlave, that it ſeemed to intitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth. SOLON's * laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confined ſome magiſtracies to a particular *cenſus*; yet were the people never ſatisfied till thoſe laws were repealed. By the treaty with ANTIPATER †, no ATHENIAN had a vote whoſe *cenſus* was leſs than 2000 *drachmas* (about 60 *l. Sterling*) And tho' ſuch a government would to us appear ſufficiently democratical, it was ſo diſagreeable to that people, that above two thirds immediately left their country ‖. CASSANDER reduced that *cenſus*

* PLUTARCHUS *in vita* SOLON. † DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

‖ Id. ibid.

to

to the half *; yet ſtill the government was conſidered as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

SERVIUS TULLIUS's † laws ſeem very equal and reaſonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property: Yet the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly to ſubmit to them.

IN thoſe days there was no medium between a ſevere, jealous Ariſtocracy, ruling over diſcontented ſubjects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy.

BUT, *thirdly*, there are many other circumſtances, in which antient nations ſeem inferior to the modern, both for the happineſs and increaſe of mankind. Trade, manufactures, induſtry, were no where, in former ages, ſo flouriſhing as they are at preſent in EUROPE. The only garb of the antients, both for males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or grey, and which they ſcoured as often as it grew dirty. TYRE, which carried on, after CARTHAGE, the greateſt commerce of any city in the MEDITERRANEAN, before it was deſtroyed by ALEXANDER, was no mighty city, if we credit ARRIAN's account of

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

† TIT. LIV. lib. 1. cap. 43.

its inhabitants †. ATHENS is commonly ſuppoſed to have been a trading city: But it was as populous before the MEDIAN war as at any time after it, according to HERODOTUS *; and yet its commerce, at that time, was ſo inconſiderable, that, as the ſame hiſtorian obſerves ‡, even the neighbouring coaſts of ASIA were as little frequented by the GREEKS as the pillars of HERCULES: For beyond theſe he conceived nothing.

GREAT intereſt of money, and great profits of trade, are an infallible indication, that induſtry and commerce are but in their infancy. We read in LYSIAS ‖ of 100 *per cent.* profit made of a cargo of two talents, ſent to no greater diſtance than from ATHENS to the ADRIATIC: Nor is this mentioned as an inſtance of exorbitant profit. ANTIDORUS, ſays DEMOSTHENES †, paid three talents and a half for

† Lib. 2. There were 8000 killed during the ſiege; and the whole captives amounted to 30,000. DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. 17. ſays only 13,000: But he accounts for this ſmall number, by ſaying that the TYRIANS had ſent away beforehand part of their wives and children to CARTHAGE.

* Lib. 5. he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.

‡ Ib. 5. ‖ *Orat.* 33. *adverſ.* DIARIT. † *Contra* APHOB. p. 25. *ex edit.* ALDI.

a houſe,

a houſe, which he let at a talent a-year: And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, ſays he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the ſlaves left by his father, he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit of their labour at 12*. The moſt moderate intereſt at ATHENS, (for there was higher † often paid) was 12 *per cent.* ‡, and that paid monthly. Not to inſiſt upon the exorbitant intereſt of 34 *per cent.* to which the vaſt ſums diſtributed in elections had raiſed money ‖ at ROME, we find, that VERRES, before that factious period, ſtated 24 *per cent.* for money, which he left in the publicans hands. And tho' CICERO declaims againſt this article, it is not on account of the extravagant uſury; but becauſe it had never been cuſtomary to ſtate any intereſt on ſuch occaſions §. Intereſt, indeed, ſunk at ROME, after the ſettlement of the empire: But it never remained any conſiderable time ſo low, as in the commercial ſtates of modern ages ⊥.

* *Contra* APHOB. p. 19. *ex edit.* ALDI.

† Id. ibid.

‡ Id. ibid. and ÆSCHINES *contra* CTESIPH.

‖ *Epiſt. ad* ATTIC. lib. 5. epiſt. 21.

§ *Contra* VERR. *orat.* 3.

⊥ See Eſſay IV.

AMONG the other inconveniencies which the ATHENIANS felt from the fortifying DECELIA by the LACEDEMONIANS, it is repreſented by THUCYDIDES †, as one of the moſt conſiderable, that they could not bring over their corn from EUBEA by land, paſſing by OROPUS; but were obliged to imbark it, and to ſail about the promontory of SUNIUM. A ſurpriſing inſtance of the imperfection of antient navigation: For the water-carriage is not here above double the land.

I DO not remember any paſſage in any antient author, where the growth of any city is aſcribed to the eſtabliſhment of a manufacture. The commerce which is ſaid to flouriſh, is chiefly the exchange of thoſe commodities for which different ſoils and climates were ſuited. The ſale of wine and oil into AFRICA, according to DIODORUS SICULUS ‡, was the foundation of the riches of AGRIGENTUM. The ſituation of the city of SYBARIS, according to the ſame author *, was the cauſe of its immenſe populouſneſs; being built near the two rivers CRATHYS and SYBARIS. But theſe two rivers, we may obſerve, are not navigable; and could only produce ſome fertile valleys, for agriculture and huſbandry; an advantage ſo inconſiderable, that a modern writer would ſcarcely have taken notice of it.

† Lib. 7. ‡ Lib. 13. * Lib. 12.

THE

THE barbarity of the antient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, which animated thoſe ages, muſt have baniſhed every merchant and manufacturer; and have quite depopulated the ſtate, had it ſubſiſted upon induſtry and commerce. While the cruel and ſuſpicious DIONYSIUS was carrying on his butcheries, who, that was not detained by his landed property, and could have carried with him any art or ſkill to procure a ſubſiſtence in other countries, would have remained expoſed to ſuch implacable barbarity? The perſecutions of PHILIP II. and LEWIS XIV. filled all EUROPE with the manufacturers of FLANDERS and of FRANCE.

I GRANT, that agriculture is the ſpecies of induſtry which is chiefly requiſite to the ſubſiſtence of multitudes; and it is poſſible, that this induſtry may flouriſh, even where manufactures and other arts are unknown or neglected. SWISSERLAND is at preſent a very remarkable inſtance; where we find, at once, the moſt ſkilful huſbandmen and the moſt bungling tradeſmen, that are to be met with in all EUROPE. That agriculture flouriſhed mightily in GREECE and ITALY, at leaſt in ſome parts of them, and at ſome periods, we have reaſon to preſume: And whether the mechanical arts had reached the ſame degree of perfection, may not be eſteemed ſo material; eſpecially, if we conſider the great equality in the antient republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate,

with the greatest care and industry, its own little field, in order to its subsistence.

But is it just reasoning, because agriculture may, in some instances, flourish without trade or manufactures, to conclude, that, in any great extent of country, and for any great train of time, it would subsist alone? The most natural way, surely, of encouraging husbandry, is, first, to excite other kinds of industry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of such goods as may contribute to his pleasure and enjoyment. This method is infallible and universal; and as it prevails more in modern government than in the ancient, it affords a presumption of the superior populousness of the former.

Every man, says Xenophon *, may be a farmer. No art or skill is requisite: All consists in the industry, and attention to the execution. A strong proof, as Columella hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of Xenophon.

All our latter improvements and refinements, have they operated nothing towards the easy subsistence of men, and consequently towards their propagation and increase? Our superior skill in mechanics, the discovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been so much enlarged, the establishment of posts, and

* Oecon.

the

the uſe of bills of exchange. Theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encouragement of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs. Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check ſhould we give to every kind of buſineſs and labour, and what multitudes of families would immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we could ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

HAVE we reaſon to think, that the police of antient ſtates was any way comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home, or in their journies by land or water? I queſtion not, but every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this particular *.

THUS, upon comparing the whole, it ſeems impoſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhould have been more populous in antient than in modern times. The equality of property, among the antients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſions of their ſtates, were indeed favourable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and deſtructive, their governments more factious and unſettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languiſhing, and the general police more looſe and irregular. Theſe latter diſadvantages ſeem to form a ſufficient

* See Part I. Eſſay XV.

counterbalance to the former advantages; and rather favour the oppoſite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this ſubject.

BUT there is no reaſoning, it may be ſaid, againſt matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at preſent, we may be aſſured, that our conjectures are falſe, and that we have overlooked ſome material circumſtance in the compariſon. This I readily own: All our preceding reaſonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at leaſt, ſmall ſkirmiſhes and frivolous rencounters, which decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be rendered much more deciſive. The facts delivered by antient authors, are either ſo uncertain or ſo imperfect as to afford us nothing poſitive in this matter. How indeed could it be otherwiſe? The very facts which we muſt oppoſe to them, in computing the greatneſs of modern ſtates, are far from being either certain or compleat. Many grounds of calculation, proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than thoſe of the Emperor HELIOGABALUS, who formed an eſtimate of the immenſe greatneſs of ROME, from ten thouſand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found in that city *.

* ÆLII LAMPRID. *in vita* HELIOGAB. cap. 36.

'TIS

'TIS to be remarked, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in antient manuſcripts, and have been ſubject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for a very obvious reaſon. Any alteration, in other places, commonly affects the ſenſe or grammar, and is more readily perceived by the reader and tranſcriber.

FEW enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any antient author of good authority, ſo as to afford us a large enough view for compariſon.

'TIS probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the number of citizens aſſigned to any free city; becauſe they entered for a ſhare of the government, and there were exact regiſters kept of them. But as the number of ſlaves is ſeldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with regard to the populouſneſs even of ſingle cities.

THE firſt page of THUCYDIDES is, in my opinion, the commencement of real hiſtory. All preceding narrations are ſo intermixed with fable, that philoſophers ought to abandon them, in a great meaſure, to the embelliſhment of poets and orators *.

WITH

* In general, there is more candour and ſincerity in antient hiſtorians, but leſs exactneſs and care, than in the moderns. Our

WITH regard to remote times, the numbers of people aſſigned are often ridiculous, and loſe all credit and authority. The free citizens of SYBARIS, able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountred at SIAGRA with 100,000 citizens of CROTONA, another GREEK city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is DIODORUS SICULUS's * account; and is very ſeriouſly inſiſted on by that hiſtorian. STRABO † alſo mentions the ſame number of SYBARITES.

DIODORUS SICULUS ‡, enumerating the inhabitants of AGRIGENTUM, when it was deſtroyed by the CARTHAGINIANS, ſays, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens, 200,000 ſtrangers, beſides ſlaves, who, in ſo opulent a city as he repreſents it, would

Our ſpeculative factions, eſpecially thoſe of religion, throw ſuch an illuſion over our minds, that men ſeem to regard impartiality to their adverſaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakneſs: But the commonneſs of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern hiſtorians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. DIODORUS SICULUS is a good writer; but 'tis with pain I ſee his narration contradict, in ſo many particulars, the two moſt authentic pieces of all GREEK hiſtory, viz. XENOPHON's expedition, and DEMOSTHENES's orations. PLUTARCH and APPIAN ſeem ſcarce ever to have read CICERO's epiſtles.

* Lib. 12. † Lib. 6. ‡ Lib. 13.

probably

probably be, at least, as numerous. We must remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, the city must have contained near two millions of inhabitants ‖. And what was the reason of so immense an increase? They were very industrious in cultivating the neighbouring fields, not exceeding a small ENGLISH county; and they traded with their wine and oil to AFRICA, which, at that time, had none of these commodities.

PTOLEMY, says THEOCRITUS *, commands 33,339 cities. I suppose the singularity of the number was the reason of assigning it. DIODORUS SICULUS † assigns three millions of inhabitants to ÆGYPT, a very small number: But then he makes the number of their cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.

He says ‡, the people were formerly seven millions. Thus remote times are always most envied and admired.

THAT XERXES's army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of

‖ DIOGENES LAERTIUS (*in vita* EMPEDOCLIS) says, that AGRIGENTUM contained only 800,000 inhabitants.

* Idyll. 17. † Lib. 1. ‡ Id. ibid.

his empire, and from the foolish practice of the Eastern nations, of encumbering their camp with a superfluous multitude: But will any reasonable man cite HERODOTUS's wonderful narrations as an authority? There is something very rational, I own, in LYSIAS's* argument upon this subject. Had not XERXES's army been incredibly numerous, says he, he had never made a bridge over the HELLESPONT: It had been much easier to have transported his men over so short a passage, with the numerous shipping of which he was master.

POLYBIUS † says, that the ROMANS, between the first and second PUNIC wars, being threatened with an invasion from the GAULS, mustered all their own forces, and those of their allies, and found them amount to seven hundred thousand men able to bear arms. A great number surely, and which, when joined to the slaves, is probably not less, if not rather more than that extent of country affords at present ‡. The enumeration too seems to have been made with some exactness; and POLYBIUS gives us the detail of

* *Orat funebris.* † Lib. 2.

‡ The country that supplied this number, was not above a third of ITALY, *viz.* the Pope's dominions, TUSCANY, and a part of the kingdom of NAPLES! But perhaps in those early times there were very few slaves, except in ROME or the great cities.

the

the particulars. But might not the number be magnified, in order to encourage the people?

DIODORUS SICULUS *, makes the ſame enumeration amount to near a million. Theſe variations are ſuſpicious. He plainly too ſuppoſes, that ITALY in his time was not ſo populous: Another very ſuſpicious circumſtance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminiſhed from the time of the firſt PUNIC war to that of the *triumvirates*?

JULIUS CÆSAR, according to APPIAN †, encountered four millions of GAULS, killed one million, and took another million priſoners ‡. Suppoſing the numbers of the enemy's army and of the killed could be exactly aſſigned, which never is poſſible; how could it be known how often the ſame man returned into the armies, or how diſtinguiſh the new from the old levied ſoldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to ſuch looſe, exaggerated calculations; eſpecially where the author tells us not the mediums upon which the calculations were formed.

PATERCULUS ‖ makes the number killed by CÆSAR amount only to 400,000: A much more pro-

* Lib. 1. † CELTICA.

‡ PLUTARCH (*in vita* CÆS.) makes the number that CÆSAR fought with amount only to three millions; JULIAN. (*in* CÆSARIBUS) to two.

‖ Lib. 2. cap. 47.

bable

bable account, and more eaſily reconciled to the hiſtory of theſe wars given by that conqueror himſelf in his Commentaries.

ONE would imagine, that every circumſtance of the life and actions of DIONYSIUS the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous exaggeration; both becauſe he lived at a time when letters flouriſhed moſt in GREECE, and becauſe his chief hiſtorian was PHILISTUS, a man allowed to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and miniſter of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a ſtanding army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horſe, and a fleet of 400 gallies *? Theſe, we may obſerve, were mercenary forces, and ſubſiſted upon their pay, like our armies in EUROPE. For the citizens were all diſarmed; and when DION afterwards invaded SICILY, and called on his countrymen to vindicate their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him, which he diſtributed among thoſe who joined him †. In a ſtate where agriculture alone flouriſhes, there may be many inhabitants; and if theſe be all armed and diſciplined, a great force may be called out upon occaſion: But great numbers of mercenary troops can never be maintained, without either trade and

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 2.

† PLUTARCH. *in vita* DIONIS.

manufac-

manufactures, or very extenſive dominions. The United Provinces never were maſters of ſuch a force by ſea and land, as that which is ſaid to belong to DIONYSIUS; yet they poſſeſs as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have infinitely more reſources from their commerce and induſtry. DIODORUS SICULUS allows, that, even in his time, the army of DIONYSIUS appeared incredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and the opinion aroſe from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himſelf.

'TIS a very uſual fallacy, to conſider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contained in the great cities mentioned by antient authors, as if theſe cities had been all cotemporary. The GREEK colonies flouriſhed extremely in SICILY during the age of ALEXANDER: But in AUGUSTUS's time they were ſo decayed, that almoſt all the product of that fertile iſland was conſumed in ITALY *.

LET us now examine the numbers of inhabitants aſſigned to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of NINEVEH, BABYLON, and the

* STRABO, lib. 6.

EGYPTIAN

EGYPTIAN THEBES, let us confine ourſelves to the ſphere of real hiſtory, to the GRECIAN and ROMAN ſtates. I muſt own, the more I conſider this ſubject, the more am I inclined to ſcepticiſm, with regard to the great populouſneſs aſcribed to antient times.

ATHENS is ſaid by PLATO † to be a very great city; and it was ſurely the greateſt of all the GREEK * cities, except SYRACUSE, which was nearly about the ſame ſize in THUCYDIDES's ‡ time, and afterwards increaſed beyond it. For CICERO ‖ mentions it as the greateſt of all the GREEK cities in his time; not comprehending, I ſuppoſe, either ANTIOCH or ALEXANDRIA under that denomination. ATHENÆUS § ſays, that, by the enumeration of DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, there were in ATHENS 21,000 citizens, 10,000 ſtrangers, and 400,000 ſlaves. This

† *Apolog.* SOCR.

* ARGOS ſeems alſo to have been a great city: For LYSIAS contents himſelf with ſaying that it did not exceed ATHENS. Orat. 34.

‡ Lib. 6. See alſo PLUTARCH *in vita* NICIAE.

‖ *Orat. contra* VERREM, lib. 4. cap. 52. STRABO, lib. 6. ſays it was twenty-two miles in compaſs. But then we are to conſider, that it contained two harbours within it; one of which was a very large one, and might be regarded as a kind of bay.

§ Lib. 6. cap. 20.

number

number is very much inſiſted on by thoſe whoſe opinion I call in queſtion, and is eſteemed a fundamental fact to their purpoſe: But, in my opinion, there is no point of criticiſm more certain, than that ATHENAEUS, and CTESICLES, whom he cites, are here miſtaken, and that the number of ſlaves is augmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

Firſt, WHEN the number of citizens is ſaid to be 21,000 by ATHENAEUS *, men of full age are only underſtood. For, (1.) HERODOTUS ſays †, that ARISTAGORAS, ambaſſador from the IONIANS, found it harder to deceive one SPARTAN than 30,000 ATHENIANS; meaning, in a looſe way, the whole ſtate, ſuppoſed to be met in one popular aſſembly, excluding the women and children. (2.) THUCYDIDES ‡ ſays, that, making allowance for all the abſentees in the fleet, army, garriſons, and for people employed in their private affairs, the ATHENIAN aſſembly never roſe to five thouſand. (3.) The forces enumerated by the ſame hiſtorian ‖, being all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry, prove the ſame method of calculation; as alſo the whole

* DEMOSTHENES aſſigns 20,000; *contra* ARISTOG.

† Lib. 5. ‡ Lib. 8.

‖ Lib. 2. DIODORUS SICULUS's account perfectly agrees, lib. 12.

tenor

tenor of the GREEK hiſtorians, who always underſtand men of full age, when they aſſign the number of citizens in any republic. Now, theſe being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free ATHENIANS were by this account 84,000; the ſtrangers 40,000; and the ſlaves, calculating by the ſmaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated at the ſame rate with freemen, were 160,000; and the whole inhabitants 284,000: A large enough number ſurely. The other number, 1,120,000, makes ATHENS larger than LONDON and PARIS united.

Secondly, THERE were but 10,000 houſes in ATHENS *.

Thirdly, THO' the extent of the walls, as given us by THUCYDIDES †, be great, (*viz.* eighteen miles, beſide the ſea-coaſt); yet XENOPHON ‡ ſays, there was much waſte ground within the walls. They ſeemed indeed to have joined four diſtinct and ſeparate cities ‖.

Fourthly,

* XENOPHON. *Mem.* lib. 2.

† Lib. 2.

‡ *De republ. ned.*

‖ We are to obſerve, that when DIONYSIUS HALYCARNASSÆUS ſays, that if we regard the antient walls of ROME, the extent of the city will not appear greater than that of ATHENS; he muſt mean the ACROPOLIS, and high town, only.

Fourthly, No inſurrection of the ſlaves, nor ſuſpicion of inſurrection, are ever mentioned by hiſtorians; except one commotion of the miners *.

Fifthly, THE ATHENIANS treatment of their ſlaves is ſaid by XENOPHON †, and DEMOSTHENES ‡, and PLAUTUS ‖, to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: Which could never have been the caſe, had the diſproportion been twenty to one. The diſproportion is not ſo great in any of our colonies; and yet we are obliged to exerciſe a very rigorous military government over the negroes.

Sixthly, No man is ever eſteemed rich for poſſeſſing what may be reckoned an equal diſtribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus every perſon in ENGLAND is computed by ſome to ſpend ſix-pence a-day: Yet is he eſteemed

only. No antient author ever ſpeaks of the PYRÆUM, PHALERUS, and MUNYSICHIA, as the ſame with ATHENS. Much leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that DIONYSIUS would conſider the matter in that light, after the walls of CIMON and PERICLES were deſtroyed, and ATHENS was entirely ſeparated from theſe other towns. This obſervation deſtroys all VOSSIUS's reaſonings, and introduces common ſenſe into theſe calculations.

* ATHEN. lib. 6.

† *De rep.* ATHEN.

‡ PHILIP. 3.

‖ STICHO.

but

but poor who has five times that ſum. Now, TIMARCHUS is ſaid by ÆSCHINES § to have been left in eaſy circumſtances; but he was maſter only of ten ſlaves employed in manufactures. LYSIAS and his brother, two ſtrangers, were proſcribed by the thirty for their great riches; tho' they had but ſixty apiece ‡. DEMOSTHENES was left very rich by his father; yet he had no more than fifty two ſlaves *. His workhouſe, of twenty cabinet-makers, is ſaid to be a very conſiderable manufactory †.

Seventhly, DURING the DECELIAN war, as the GREEK hiſtorians call it, 20,000 ſlaves deſerted, and brought the ATHENIANS to great diſtreſs, as we learn from THUCYDIDES ‡. This could not have happened, had they been only the twentieth part. The beſt ſlaves would not deſert.

Eighthly, XENOPHON ‖ propoſes a ſcheme for entertaining by the public 10,000 ſlaves: And that ſo great a number may poſſibly be ſupported, any one will be convinced, ſays he, who conſiders the num-

§ *Contra* TIMARCH.

‡ *Orat.* 12.

* *Contra* APHOB.

† Ibid.

‡ Lib. 7.

‖ *De rat. red.*

bers

bers we poſſeſſed before the DECELIAN war. A way of ſpeaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of ATHENÆUS.

Ninthly, THE whole *cenſus* of the ſtate of ATHENS was leſs than 6000 talents. And tho' numbers in antient manuſcripts be often ſuſpected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both becauſe DEMOSTHENES *, who gives it, gives alſo the detail, which checks him; and becauſe POLYBIUS † aſſigns the ſame number and reaſons upon it. Now, the moſt vulgar ſlave could yield by his labour an *obolus* a-day, over and above his maintenance, as we learn from XENOPHON ‡, who ſays, that NICIAS's overſeer paid his maſter ſo much for ſlaves, whom he employed in digging of mines. If you will take the pains to eſtimate an *obolus* a-day, and the ſlaves at 400,000, computing only at four years purchaſe, you will find the ſum above 12,000 talents; even tho' allowance be made for the great number of holidays in ATHENS. Beſides, many of the ſlaves would have a much greater value from their art. The loweſt that DEMOSTHENES || eſtimates any of his father's ſlaves, is two minas a-head. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is a little dif-

* *De claſſibus.*

† Lib. 2. cap. 62.

‡ *De rat. red.*

|| *Contra* APHOBUM.

ficult, I confeſs, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 ſlaves with the *cenſus* of 6000 talents.

Tenthly, CHIOS is ſaid by THUCYDIDES *, to contain more ſlaves than any GREEK city, except SPARTA. SPARTA then had more than ATHENS, in proportion to the number of citizens. The SPARTANS were 9000 in the town, 30,000 in the country †. The male ſlaves, therefore, of full age, muſt have been more than 780,000; the whole more than 3,120,000. A number impoſſible to be maintained in a narrow barren country, ſuch as LACONIA, which had no trade. Had the HELOTES been ſo very numerous, the murder of 2000 mentioned by THUCYDIDES ‡, would have irritated them, without weakening them.

BESIDES, we are to conſider, that the number aſſigned by ATHENÆUS ‖, whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of ATTICA, as well as thoſe of

* Lib. 8.

† PLUTARCH. *in vita* LICURG.

‡ Lib. 4.

‖ The ſame author affirms, that CORINTH had once 460,000 ſlaves, ÆGINA 470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold ſtronger againſt theſe facts: 'Tis however remarkable, that ATHENÆUS cites ſo great an authority as ARISTOTLE for this laſt fact: And the ſcholiaſt on PINDAR mentions the ſame number of ſlaves in ÆGINA.

ATHENS.

ATHENS. The ATHENIANS affected much a country life, as we learn from THUCYDIDES *; and when they were all chaſed into town, by the invaſion of their territory during the PELOPONNESIAN war, the city was not able to contain them; and they were obliged to lie in the porticoes, temples, and even ſtreets, for want of lodging †.

THE ſame remark is to be extended to all the other GREEK cities; and when the number of the citizens is aſſigned, we muſt always underſtand it of the inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet, even with this allowance, it muſt be confeſſed, that GREECE was a populous country, and exceeded what we could imagine of ſo narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no ſupplies of corn from other places. For excepting ATHENS, which traded to PONTUS for that commodity, the other cities ſeem to have ſubſiſted chiefly from their neighbouring territory ‡.

* Lib. 2.

† THUCYD. lib. 2.

‡ DEMOST. *contra* LEPT. The ATHENIANS brought yearly from PONTUS 400,000 medimni or buſhels of corn, as appeared from the cuſtom-houſe books. And this was the greateſt part of their importation. This by the by is a ſtrong proof that there is ſome great miſtake in the foregoing paſſage of ATHENÆUS.

RHODES is well known to have been a city of extenſive commerce, and of great fame and ſplendor; yet it contained only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when it was beſieged by DEMETRIUS *.

THEBES was always one of the capital cities of GREECE †: But the number of its citizens exceeded not thoſe of RHODES ‡. PHLIASIA is ſaid to be a ſmall

NÆUS. For ATTICA itſelf was ſo barren in corn, that it produced not enough even to maintain the peaſants. TIT. LIV. lib. 43. cap. 6. LUCIAN, in his *navigium ſive vota*, ſays, that a ſhip, which by the dimenſions he gives, ſeems to have been about the ſize of our third rates, carried as much corn as would maintain all ATTICA for a twelvemonth. But perhaps ATHENS was decayed at that time; and beſides, it is not ſafe to truſt ſuch looſe rhetorical calculations.

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 20.

† ISOCR. *paneg.*

‡ DIOD. SIC. lib. 17. When ALEXANDER attacked THEBES, we may ſafely conclude, that almoſt the whole inhabitants were preſent. Whoever is acquainted with the ſpirit of the GREEKS, eſpecially of the THEBANS, will never ſuſpect, that any of them would deſert their country, when it was reduced to ſuch extreme peril and diſtreſs. As ALEXANDER took the town by ſtorm, all thoſe who bore arms were put to the ſword without mercy; and they amounted only to 6000 men. Among theſe were ſome ſtrangers and manumitted ſlaves. The captives, conſiſting of old men, women, children, and ſlaves, were ſold, and they amounted to 30,000. We may therefore conclude that the free

ſmall city by XENOPHON *, yet we find, that it contained 6000 citizens †. I pretend not to reconcile theſe two facts. Perhaps, XENOPHON calls PHLIASIA a ſmall town, becauſe it made but a ſmall figure in GREECE, and maintained only a ſubordinate alliance with SPARTA; or perhaps the country belonging to it, was extenſive, and moſt of the citizens were employed in the cultivation of it, and dwelt in the neighbouring villages.

MANTINEA was equal to any city in ARCADIA ‡: Conſequently it was equal to MEGALOPOLIS, which was fifty ſtadia, or ſix miles and a quarter in circum-

free citizens in THEBES, of both ſexes and all ages, were near 24,000; the ſtrangers and ſlaves about 12,000. Theſe laſt, we may obſerve, were ſomewhat fewer in proportion than at ATHENS; as is reaſonable to imagine from this circumſtance, that ATHENS was a town of more trade to ſupport ſlaves, and of more entertainment to allure ſtrangers. It is alſo to be remarked, that thirty-ſix thouſand was the whole number of people, both in the city of THEBES, and the neighbouring territory: A very moderate number, it muſt be confeſſed; and this computation being founded in facts which appear undiſputable, muſt have great weight in the preſent controverſy. The above-mentioned number of RHODIANS too were the whole inhabitants of the iſland, who were free, and able to bear arms.

* Hiſt. GRÆC. lib. 7.

† Id. lib. 7.

‡ POLYB. lib. 2.

ference*. But MANTINÆA had only 3000 citizens†. The GREEK cities, therefore, contained often fields and gardens, together with the houſes; and we cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls. Athens contained no more than 10,000 houſes; yet its walls, with the ſea-coaſt, were above twenty miles in extent. SYRACUSE was twenty-two miles in circumference; yet was ſcarce ever ſpoke of by the antients as more populous than ATHENS. BABYLON was a ſquare of fifteen miles, or ſixty miles in circuit; but it contained large cultivated fields and incloſures, as we learn from PLINY. Tho' AURELIAN's wall was fifty miles in circumference‡; the circuit of all the thirteen diviſions of ROME, taken apart, according to PUBLIUS VICTOR, was only about forty-three miles. When an enemy invaded the country, the whole inhabitants retired within the walls of the antient cities, with their cattle and furniture, and inſtruments of huſbandry; and the great height to which the walls were raiſed, enabled a ſmall number to defend them with facility.

SPARTA, ſays XENOPHON||, is one of the cities of GREECE that has the feweſt inhabitants. Yet POLYBIUS

* POLYB. lib. 9. cap. 20.

† LYSIAS, orat. 34.

‡ VOPISCUS *in vita* AUREL.

|| *De rep.* LACED. This paſſage is not eaſily reconciled with that

BIUS ‡ ſays, that it was forty-eight ſtadia in circumference, and was round.

ALL the ÆTOLIANS able to bear arms in ANTIPATER's time, deducting ſome few garriſons, were but ten thouſand men *.

POLYBIUS † tells us. that the ACHÆAN league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 men: And this account ſeems very probable: For that league comprehended the greateſt part of PELOPONNESUS. Yet PAUSANIAS ||, ſpeaking of the ſame period, ſays, that all the ACHÆANS able to bear arms, even when ſeveral manumitted ſlaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen thouſand.

THE THESSALIANS, till their final conqueſt by the ROMANS, were, in all ages, turbulent, factious, ſeditious, diſorderly §. 'Tis not therefore natural to ſuppoſe, that that part of GREECE abounded much in people.

that of PLUTARCH above, who ſays, that SPARTA had 9000 citizens.

‡ POLYB. lib. 9. cap. 20.

* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

† LEGAT.

|| *In* ACHAICIS.

§ TIT. LIV. lib. 34. cap. 51. PLATO *in* CRITONE.

WE are told by THUCYDIDES †, that the part of PELOPONNESUS adjoining to PYLOS, was defart and uncultivated. HERODOTUS ſays *, that MACEDONIA was full of lions and wild bulls; animals which can only inhabit vaſt unpeopled foreſts. Theſe were the two extremities of GREECE.

THE whole inhabitants of EPIRUS, of all ages, ſexes and conditions, who were ſold by PAULUS ÆMILIUS, amounted only to 150,000 ‡. Yet EPIRUS might be double the extent of YORKSHIRE.

JUSTIN ‖ tells us, that when PHILIP of MACEDON was declared head of the GREEK confederacy, he called a congreſs of all the ſtates, except the LACEDEMONIANS, who refuſed to concur; and he found the force of the whole, upon computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry. This muſt be underſtood to be all the citizens capable of bearing arms. For as the GREEK republics maintained no mercenary forces, and had no militia diſtinct from the whole body of the citizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could be of computation. That

† Lib. 7.
* Lib. 7.
‡ TIT: LIV. lib. 45. cap. 34.
‖ Lib. 9. cap. 5.

ſuch

ſuch an army could ever by GREECE be brought into the field, and be maintained there, is contrary to all hiſtory. Upon this ſuppoſition, therefore, we may thus reaſon. The free GREEKS of all ages and ſexes were 860,000. The ſlaves, eſtimating them by the number of ATHENIAN ſlaves as above, who ſeldom married or had families, were double the male citizens of full age, *viz.* 430,000. And the whole inhabitants of antient GREECE, excepting LACONIA, were about one million two hundred and ninety thouſand: No mighty number, nor much exceeding what may be found at preſent in SCOTLAND, a country of not much greater extent, and very indifferently peopled.

WE may now conſider the numbers of people in ROME and ITALY, and collect all the lights afforded us by ſcattered paſſages in antient authors. We ſhall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reaſon to ſupport thoſe exaggerated calculations, ſo much inſiſted on by modern writers.

DIONYSIUS HALLICARNASSÆUS * ſays, that the antient walls of ROME were nearly of the ſame compaſs with thoſe of ATHENS, but that the ſuburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell,

* Lib. 4.

where the town ended or the country begun. In ſome places of ROME, it appears, from the ſame author *, from JUVENAL †, and from other antient writers ‡, that the houſes were high, and families lived in ſeparate ſtoreys, one above another: But it is probable that theſe were only the poorer citizens, and only in ſome few ſtreets. If we may judge from the younger PLINY's ‖ account of his houſe, and from BARTOLI's plans

* Lib. 10.

† Satyr 3. l. 263, 270.

‡ STRABO, lib. 5. ſays, that the emperor AUGUSTUS prohibited the raiſing houſes higher than ſeventy foot. In another paſſage, lib. 16, he ſpeaks of the houſes of ROME as remarkably high. See alſo to the ſame purpoſe VITRUVIUS, lib. 2. cap. 8. ARISTIDES the ſophiſt, in his oration εις Ρωμην, ſays, that ROME conſiſted of cities on the top of cities; and that if one were to ſpread it out, and unfold it, it would cover the whole ſurface of ITALY. Where an author indulges himſelf in ſuch extravagant declamations, and gives ſo much into the hyperbolical ſtyle, one knows not how far he muſt be reduced. But this reaſoning ſeems natural: If ROME was built in ſo ſcattered a manner as DIONYSIUS ſays, and ran ſo much into the country, there muſt have been very few ſtreets where the houſes were raiſed ſo high. 'Tis only for want of ground, that any body builds in that inconvenient manner.

‖ Lib. 2. epiſt. 16. lib. 5. epiſt. 6. 'Tis true, PLINY there deſcribes a country-houſe: But ſince that was the idea which the antients formed of a magnificent and convenient building, the great

plans of antient buildings, the men of quality had very ſpacious palaces; and their buildings were like the CHINESE houſes at this day, where each apartment is ſeparated from the reſt, and riſes no higher than a ſingle ſtorey. To which if we add, that the ROMAN nobility much affected very extenſive porticoes, and even woods † in town; we may perhaps allow VOSSIUS (tho' there is no manner of reaſon for it) to read the famous paſſage of the elder PLINY * his

great men would certainly build the ſame way in town. "In "laxitatem ruris excurrunt," ſays SENECA of the rich and voluptuous, epiſt. 114. VALERIUS MAXIMUS, lib. 4. cap. 4. ſpeaking of CINCINNATUS's field of four acres, ſays, "Auguſte "ſe habitare nunc putat, cujus domus tantum patet quantum "CINCINNATI rura patuerant." To the ſame purpoſe ſee lib. 36. cap. 15. alſo lib. 18. cap. 2.

† VITRUV. lib. 5. cap. 11. TACIT. annal. lib. 11. cap. 3. SUETON. *in vita* OCTAV. cap. 72, &c.

* "Moenia ejus (ROMAE) collegere ambitu imperatoribus, "cenſoribuſque VESPASIANIS, A. U. C. 828. paſſ. xiii. MCC. "complexa montes ſeptem, ipſa dividitur in regiones quatuorde"cim, compita earum 265. Ejuſdem ſpatii menſura, currente "a milliario in capite ROM. Fori ſtatuto, ad ſingulas portas, "quae ſunt hodie numero 37, ita ut duodecim portae ſemel nu"merentur, praetereanturque ex veteribus ſeptem, quae eſſe deſi"erunt, efficit paſſuum per directum 30,775. Ad extrema ve"ro tectorum cum caſtris praetoriis ab eodem Milliario, per

his own way without admitting the extravagant conſequences which he draws from it.

THE

" vicos omnium viarum, menſua collegit paulo amplius ſeptua-
" ginta millia paſſuum. Quo ſi quis altitudinem tectorum ad-
" dat, dignam profecto, aeſtimationem concipiat, fateaturque
" nullius urbis magnitudinem in toto orbe potuiſſe ei comparari."
PLIN. lib. 3. cap. 5.

All the beſt manuſcripts of PLINY read the paſſage as here cited, and fix the compaſs of the walls of Rome to be thirteen miles. The queſtion is, What PLINY means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed? The manner in which I conceive it, is this. ROME was a ſemicircular area of thirteen miles circumference. The Forum, and conſequently the Milliarium, we know, was ſituated on the banks of the TYBER, and near the center of the circle, or upon the diameter of the ſemicircular area. Tho' there were thirty-ſeven gates to ROME, yet only twelve of them had ſtraight ſtreets, leading from them to the Milliarium. PLINY, therefore, having aſſigned the circumference of ROME, and knowing that that alone was not ſufficient to give us a juſt notion of its ſurface, uſes this farther method. He ſuppoſes all the ſtreets, leading from the Milliarium to the twelve gates, to be laid together into one ſtraight line, and ſuppoſes we run along that line, ſo as to count each gate once: In which caſe, he ſays, that the whole line is 30,775 paces; Or, in other words, that each ſtreet or radius of the ſemicircular area is upon an average two miles and a half; and the whole length of ROME is five miles, and its breadth about half as much, beſides the ſcattered ſuburbs.

PERR.

THE number of citizens who received corn by the public diſtribution in AUGUSTUS's time, were two hundred

PERE HARDOUIN underſtands this paſſage in the ſame manner; with regard to the laying together the ſeveral ſtreets of ROME into one line, in order to compoſe 30,775 paces: But then he ſuppoſes, that ſtreets led from the Milliarium to every gate and that no ſtreet exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1.) a ſemicircular area, whoſe radius was only 800 paces, could never have a circumference near thirteen miles, the compaſs of ROME as aſſigned by PLINY. A radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that circumference. (2.) There is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing a city ſo built as to have ſtreets running to its center from every gate in its circumference. Theſe ſtreets muſt interfere as they approach. (3.) This diminiſhes too much from the greatneſs of antient ROME, and reduces that city below even BRISTOL or ROTTERDAM.

The ſenſe which VOSSIUS in his *Obſervationes variæ* puts on this paſſage of PLINY, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuſcript, of no authority, inſtead of thirteen miles, has aſſigned thirty miles for the compaſs of the walls of ROME. And VOSSIUS underſtands this only of the curvilinear part of the circumference; ſuppoſing, that as the TYBER formed the diameter, there were no walls built on that ſide. But (1.) this reading is allowed contrary to almoſt all the manuſcripts. (2.) Why ſhould PLINY, a conciſe writer, repeat the compaſs of the walls of ROME in two ſucceſſive ſentences? (3.) Why repeat it with ſo ſenſible a variation? (4.) What is the meaning of PLINY's mentioning twice the MILLIARIUM, if a line was meaſured that had no dependence on the MILLIARIUM? (5.)

AURELI-

hundred thouſand *. This one would eſteem a pretty certain ground of calculation: Yet it is attended with ſuch

AURELIAN's wall is ſaid by VOPISCUS to have been drawn *laxior cambitu*, and to have comprehended all the buildings and ſuburbs on the north ſide of the TYBER; yet its compaſs was only fifty miles; and even here critics ſuſpect ſome miſtake or corruption in the text. It is not probable, that ROME would diminiſh from AUGUSTUS to AURELIAN. It remained ſtill the capital of the ſame empire; and none of the civil wars in that long period, except the tumults on the death of MAXIMUS and BALBINUS ever affected the city. CARACALLA is ſaid by AURELIUS VICTOR to have increaſed ROME. (6.) There are no remains of antient buildings, which mark any ſuch greatneſs of ROME. VOSSIUS's reply to this objection ſeems abſurd, That the rubbiſh would ſink ſixty or ſeventy feet below ground. It appears from SPARTIAN *(in vita Severi)* that the five-mile ſtone *in via Lavicana* was out of the city. (7.) OLYMPIODORUS and PUBLIUS VICTOR fix the number of houſes in ROME to be betwixt forty and fifty thouſand. (8.) The very extravagance of the conſequences drawn by this critic, as well as LIPSIUS, if they be neceſſary, deſtroys the foundation on which they are grounded: That ROME contained fourteen millions of inhabitants; while the whole kingdom of FRANCE contains only five, according to his computation, &c.

The only objection to the ſenſe which we have affixed above to the paſſage of PLINY, ſeems to lie in this, That PLINY, after mentioning the thirty-ſeven gates of ROME, aſſigns only a reaſon for ſuppreſſing the ſeven old ones, and ſays nothing of the eighteen

* *Ex monument. Ancyr.*

ſuch circumſtances as throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.

DID the poorer citizens only receive the diſtribution? It was calculated, to be ſure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a paſſage of CICERO*, that the rich might alſo take their portion, and that it was eſteemed no reproach in them to apply for it.

To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman, and child? The portion every month was five *modii* to each †, (about $\frac{5}{6}$ of a buſhel.) This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. A very accurate antiquarian ‡, therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full years: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.

eighteen gates, the ſtreets leading from which terminated, according to my opinion, before they reached the Forum. But as PLINY was writing to the ROMANS, who perfectly knew the diſpoſition of the ſtreets, it is not ſtrange he ſhould take a circumſtance for granted, which was ſo familiar to every body. Perhaps, too, many of theſe gates led to wharfs upon the river.

* *Tuſc. quæſt.* lib. 3, cap. 48.

† *Livinius apud Salluſt. hiſt. frag.* lib. 3.

‡ *Nicolaus Hortenſius de re frumentaria Roman.*

WAS it ſtrictly inquired, whether the claimant lived within the precincts of ROME, or was it ſufficient that he preſented himſelf at the monthly diſtribution? This laſt ſeems more probable ‡.

WERE there no falſe claimants? We are told ‖, that CÆSAR ſtruck off at once 170,000, who had crept in without a juſt title; and it is very little probable, that he remedied all abuſes.

BUT, laſtly, what proportion of ſlaves muſt we aſſign to theſe citizens? This is the moſt material queſtion, and the moſt uncertain. 'Tis very doubtful, whether ATHENS can be eſtabliſhed as a rule for ROME. Perhaps the ATHENIANS had more ſlaves, becauſe they employed them in manufactures, for which a capital city, like ROME, ſeems not ſo proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the ROMANS had more ſlaves, on account of their ſuperior luxury and riches.

‡ Not to take the people too much from their buſineſs, AUGUSTUS ordained the diſtribution of corn to be made only thrice a-year: But the people finding the monthly diſtributions more convenient, (as preſerving, I ſuppoſe, a more regular œconomy in their family) deſired to have them reſtored: SUETON. AUGUST. cap. 40. Had not ſome of the people come from ſome diſtance for their corn, AUGUSTUS's precaution ſeems ſuperfluous.

‖ *Sueton. in Jul.* cap. 41.

THERE

THERE were exact bills of mortality kept in ROME; but no antient author has given us the number of burials, except SUETONIUS *, who tells us, that in one ſeaſon there were 30,000 names carried to the temple of LIBITINA: But this was during a plague; which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.

THE public corn, tho' diſtributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very conſiderably the whole agriculture of ITALY †: A fact no way reconcilable to ſome modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.

THE beſt ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatneſs of antient ROME, is this: We are told by HERODIAN ‡, that ANTIOCH and ALEXANDRIA were very little inferior to ROME. It appears from DIODORUS SICULUS ‖, that one ſtraight ſtreet of ALEXANDRIA, reaching from port to port, was five miles long; and as ALEXANDRIA was much more extended in length than breadth, it ſeems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of PARIS ⸸; and ROME might be about the ſize of LONDON.

THERE

* *In vita Neronis.* † *Sueton. Aug.* cap. 42.

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 5. ‖ Lib. 17.

⸸ QUINTUS CURTIUS ſays, its walls were only ten miles in circumference, when founded by ALEXANDER; lib. 4. cap. 8. STRABO,

THERE lived in ALEXANDRIA, in DIODORUS SICULUS's time *, 300,000 free people, comprehend-

STRABO, who had travelled to ALEXANDRIA, as well as DIODORUS SICULUS, says it was scarce four miles long, and in most places about a mile broad; lib. 17. PLINY says it resembled a MACEDONIAN cassock, stretching out in the corners; lib. 5. cap. 10. Notwithstanding this bulk of ALEXANDRIA, which seems but moderate, DIODORUS SICULUS, speaking of its circuit as drawn by ALEXANDER (which it never exceeded, as we learn from AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, lib. 22. cap. 16.) says it was μεγεθει διαφερουσα, *extremely great*, ibid. The reason which he assigns for its surpassing all cities of the world (for he excepts not ROME) is, that it contained 300,000 free inhabitants. He also mentions the revenues of the kings, viz. 6000 talents, as another circumstance to the same purpose: No such mighty sum in our eyes, even tho' we make allowances for the different value of money. What STRABO says of the neighbouring country, means only that it was well peopled, οικουμενα καλως. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of the river from GRAVESEND to WINDSOR are one city? This is even more than STRABO says of the banks of the lake MARIOTIS, and of the canal to CANOPUS. 'Tis a vulgar saying in ITALY, that the king of SARDINIA has but one town in PIEDMONT; for it is all a town. AGRIPPA in JOSEPHUS *de bello* JUDAIC. lib. 2. cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the excessive greatness of ALEXANDRIA, which he endeavours to magnify, describes only the compass of the city as drawn by ALEXANDER: A clear proof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, and that the neighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about all great towns, very well cultivated, and well peopled.

* Lib. 17.

ing,

ing, I ſuppoſe, women and children †. But what number of ſlaves? Had we any juſt ground to fix theſe at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it would favour the foregoing calculation.

THERE is a paſſage in HERODIAN, which is a little ſurpriſing. He ſays poſitively, that the palace of the Emperor was as large as all the reſt of the city ‡. This was NERO's golden houſe, which is indeed repreſented by SUETONIUS ‖ and PLINY as of an enormous extent ⸸; but no power of imagination

† He ſays πλεισθεροι, not πολιται, which laſt expreſſion muſt have been underſtood of citizens alone, and grown men.

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 1. ωασης πολιως. POLITIAN interprets it "ædibus majoribus etiam reliqua urbe."

‖ He ſays (in NERONE cap. 30.) that a portico or piazza of it was 3000 feet long; "tanta laxitas ut porticus triplices "milliarias haberet." He cannot mean three miles. For the whole extent of the houſe from the PALATINE to the ESQUILINE was not near ſo great. So when VOPISC. in AURELIANO mentions a portico in SALLUST's gardens, which he calls *porticus milliarenſis*, it muſt be underſtood of a thouſand feet. So alſo HORACE;

"Nulla decempedis
Metata privatis opacam
Porticus excipiebat Arcton." Lib. 2. ode 15.

So alſo in lib. 1. ſatyr. 8.

"Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum
Hic dabat."

⸸ PLINIUS, lib. 36. cap. 15. "Bis vidimus urbem totam "ſingi domibus principum, CAII ac NERONIS."

can

can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to ſuch a city as LONDON.

WE may obſerve, had the hiſtorian been relating NERO's extravagance, and had he made uſe of ſuch an expreſſion, it would have had much leſs weight; theſe rhetorical exaggerations being ſo apt to creep into an author's ſtyle, even when the moſt chaſte and correct. But 'tis mentioned by HERODIAN only by the by, in relating the quarrels between GETA and CARACALLA.

IT appears from the ſame hiſtorian *, that there was then much land uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe; and he aſcribes it as a great praiſe to PERTINAX, that he allowed every one to take ſuch land, either in ITALY or elſewhere, and cultivate it as he pleaſed, without paying any taxes. *Lands uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe!* This is not heard of in any part of CHRISTENDOM; except perhaps in ſome remote parts of HUNGARY, as I have been informed. And it ſurely correſponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populouſneſs of antiquity, ſo much inſiſted on.

WE learn from VOPISCUS †, that there was in ETRURIA much fertile land uncultivated, which the

* Lib. 2. cap. 15.

† In AURELIAN, cap. 48.

Emperor

Emperor AURELIAN intended to convert into vineyards, in order to furniſh the ROMAN people with a gratuitous diſtribution of wine: A very proper expedient to diſpeople ſtill farther that capital and all the neighbouring territories.

IT may not be amiſs to take notice of the account which POLYBIUS ‡ gives of the great herds of ſwine to be met with in TUSCANY and LOMBARDY, as well as in GREECE, and of the method of feeding them which was then practiſed. "There are great "herds of ſwine," ſays he, "thro'out all ITALY, "particularly, in former times, thro' ETRURIA and "CISALPINE GAUL. And a herd frequently con-"tains a thouſand or more ſwine. When one of "theſe herds in feeding meets with another, they "mix together; and the ſwine-herds have no other "expedient to ſeparate them than to go to different "quarters, where they ſound their horn; and theſe "animals, being accuſtomed to that ſignal, run im-"mediately each to the horn of his own keeper. "Whereas in GREECE, if the herds of ſwine hap-"pen to mix in the foreſts, he who has the greateſt "flock, takes cunningly the opportunity of driving "all away. And thieves are very apt to purloin the "ſtraggling hogs, which have wandered to a great "diſtance from their keeper in ſearch of food."

‡ Lib. 12. cap. 2.

MAY

MAY we not infer from this account, that the North of ITALY was then much leſs peopled, and worſe cultivated, than at preſent? How could theſe vaſt herds be fed in a country ſo thick of incloſures, ſo improved by agriculture, ſo divided by farms, ſo planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I muſt confeſs, that POLYBIUS's relation has more the air of that œconomy which is to be met with in our AMERICAN colonies, than the management of an EUROPEAN country.

WE meet with a reflection in ARISTOTLE's ‖ ethics, which ſeems to me unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, and by proving too much in favour of our preſent reaſoning, may be thought really to prove nothing. That philoſopher, treating of friendſhip, and obſerving, that that relation ought neither to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illuſtrates his opinion by the following argument. "In like manner," ſays he, "as a city "cannot ſubſiſt, if it either have ſo few inhabitants "as ten, or ſo many as a hundred thouſand; ſo is "there a mediocrity required in the number of "friends; and you deſtroy the eſſence of friendſhip "by running into either extreme." What! impoſſible that a city can contain a hundred thouſand inhabitants! Had ARISTOTLE never ſeen nor heard

‖ Lib. 9. cap. 10. His expreſſion is ανθρωπων, not πολιτης; inhabitant, not citizen.

of

of a city which was near ſo populous? This, I muſt own, paſſes my comprehenſion.

PLINY † tells us that SELEUCIA, the ſeat of the GREEK empire in the Eaſt, was reported to contain 600,000 people. CARTHAGE is ſaid by STRABO * to have contained 700,000. The inhabitants of PEKIN are not much more numerous. LONDON, PARIS, and CONSTANTINOPLE, may admit of nearly the ſame computation; at leaſt, the two latter cities do not exceed it. ROME, ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, we have already ſpoke of. From the experience of paſt and preſent ages, one might conjecture, that there is a kind of impoſſibility, that any city could ever riſe much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or on empire, there ſeem to be invincible obſtacles, which prevent its farther progreſs. The ſeats of vaſt monarchies, by introducing extravagant luxury, irregular expence, idleneſs, dependence, and falſe ideas of rank and ſuperiority, are improper for commerce. Extenſive commerce checks itſelf, by raiſing the price of all labour and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, poſſeſſed of overgrown fortunes, the middling gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a ſtate arrive at an enormous ſize, there neceſſarily

† Lib. 6. cap. 28. * Lib. 17.

ariſe

ariſe many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair, for education, fortune, and amuſement †. LONDON, by uniting extenſive commerce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arrived at a greatneſs, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

CHUSE DOVER or CALAIS for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You comprehend LONDON, PARIS, the NETHERLANDS, the UNITED PROVINCES, and ſome of the beſt cultivated counties of FRANCE and ENGLAND. It may ſafely, I think, be affirmed that no ſpot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, which contained near ſo many great and populous cities, and was ſo ſtocked with riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the ſtates, which poſſeſſed moſt art, knowledge, civility, and the beſt police, ſeems the trueſt method of compariſon.

'TIS an obſervation of L'ABBE DU BOS ‡, that ITALY is warmer at preſent than it was in antient times. "The annals of ROME tell us," ſays he,

† Such were ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, CARTHAGE, EPHESUS, LYONS, &c. in the ROMAN empire. Such are even BOURDEAUX, THOLOUSE, DIJON, RENNES, ROUEN, AIX, &c. in FRANCE; DUBLIN, EDINBURGH, YORK, in the BRITISH dominions.

‡ Vol. 2. §. 16.

"that

" that in the year 480 *ab U. C.* the winter was ſo " ſevere that it deſtroyed the trees. The TYBER " froze in ROME, and the ground was covered with " ſnow for forty days. When JUVENAL * deſcribes " a ſuperſtitious woman, he repreſents her as break- " ing the ice of the TYBER, that ſhe might perform " her ablutions.

" *Hybernum fracta glacie deſcendet in amnem,*
" *Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.*

" He ſpeaks of that river's freezing as a common " event. Many paſſages of HORACE ſuppoſe the " ſtreets of ROME full of ſnow and ice. We ſhould " have more certainty with regard to this point, had " the antients known the uſe of thermometers: But " their writers, without intending it, give us inform- " ation, ſufficient to convince us, that the winters are " now much more temperate at ROME than formerly. " At preſent, the TYBER no more freezes at ROME " than the NILE at CAIRO. The ROMANS eſteem " the winter very rigorous, if the ſnow lies two days, " and if one ſees for eight and forty hours a few ici- " cles hang from a fountain that has a north expo- " ſition."

THE obſervation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other EUROPEAN climates. Who could

* Sat. 6.

diſcover the mild climate of FRANCE in DIODORUS SICULUS's † deſcription of that of GAUL? "As it is "a northern climate," ſays he, "it is infeſted with "cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, in- "ſtead of rain, there fall great ſnows; and in clear "weather it there freezes ſo exceſſive hard, that the "rivers acquire bridges of their own ſubſtance, over "which, not only ſingle travellers may paſs, but "large armies, accompanied with all their baggage "and loaded waggons. And there being many "rivers in GAUL, the RHONE, the RHINE, &c. al- "moſt all of them are froze over; and 'tis uſual, in "order to prevent falling, to cover the ice with chaff "and ſtraw at the places where the road paſſes." *Colder than a* GALLIC *Winter*, is uſed by PETRONIUS, as a proverbial expreſſion.

NORTH of the CEVENNES, ſays STRABO ‡, GAUL produces not figs and olives: And the vines, which have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.

OVID poſitively maintains, with all the ſerious affirmation of proſe, that the EUXINE ſea was frozen over every winter in his time; and he appeals to ROMAN governours, whom he names, for the truth of his aſſertion ‖. This ſeldom or never happens at pre-

† Lib. 4. ‡ Lib. 4.

‖ *Triſt.* lib. 3. eleg. 9. *De Ponto*, lib. 4. eleg. 7, 9, 10.

ſent

ſent in the latitude of TOMI, whither OVID was baniſhed. All the complaints of the ſame poet ſeem to mark a rigour of the ſeaſons, which is ſcarce experienced at preſent in PETERSBURG or STOCKHOLM.

TOURNEFORT, a *Provencal*, who had travelled into the ſame countries, obſerves, that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he aſſerts, that nothing but OVID's melancholy could have given him ſuch diſmal ideas of it. But the facts mentioned by that poet, are too circumſtantial to bear any ſuch interpretation.

POLYBIUS * ſays, that the climate in ARCADIA was very cold, and the air moiſt.

"ITALY," ſays VARRO †, "is the moſt temperate climate in EUROPE. The inland parts" (GAUL, GERMANY, and PANNONIA, no doubt) "have almoſt perpetual winter."

THE northern parts of SPAIN, according to STRABO ‡, are but ill inhabited, becauſe of the great cold.

ALLOWING, therefore, this remark to be juſt, that EUROPE is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other method, but by ſuppoſing, that the land is at preſent much better cultivated, and that the woods are cleared,

* Lib. 4. cap. 21. † Lib. 1. cap. 2. ‡ Lib. 3.

which formerly threw a ſhade upon the earth, and kept the rays of the ſun from penetrating to it. Our northern colonies in AMERICA become more temperate, in proportion as the woods are felled *; but in general, every one may remark, that cold ſtill makes itſelf much more ſeverely felt, both in North and South AMERICA, than in places under the ſame latitude in EUROPE.

SASERNA, quoted by COLUMELLA †, affirmed, that the diſpoſition of the heavens was altered before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears hence, ſays he, that many places now abound with vineyards and olive-plantations, which formerly, by reaſon of the rigour of the climate, could raiſe none of theſe productions. Such a change, if real, will be allowed an evident ſign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries before the age of SASERNA ‡; and, if it be continued to

* The warm ſouthern colonies alſo become more healthful: And 'tis remarkable, that in the SPANISH hiſtories of the firſt diſcovery and conqueſt of theſe countries, they appear to have been very healthful; being then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the ſickneſs or decay of CORTES's or PIZZARRO's ſmall armies.

† Lib. 1. cap. 1.

‡ He ſeems to have lived about the time of the younger AFRICANUS; lib 1. cap. 1.

the

the preſent times, is a proof, that theſe advantages have been continually increaſing thro'out this part of the world.

LET us now caſt our eye over all the countries which were the ſcene of antient and modern hiſtory, and compare their paſt and preſent ſituation. We ſhall not, perhaps, find ſuch foundation for the complaint of the preſent emptineſs and deſolation of the world. ÆGYPT is repreſented by MAILLET, to whom we owe the beſt account of it, as extremely populous; tho' he eſteems the number of its inhabitants to be diminiſhed. SYRIA, and the Leſſer ASIA, as well as the coaſt of BARBARY, I can readily own, to be very deſart in compariſon of their antient condition. The depopulation of GREECE is alſo very obvious. But whether the country now called TURKY in EUROPE may not, in general, contain as many inhabitants as during the flouriſhing period of GREECE, may be a little doubtful. The THRACIANS ſeem then to have lived like the TARTARS at preſent, by paſturage and plunder *: The GETES were ſtill more uncivilized †: And the ILLYRIANS were no better ‡. Theſe occupy nine tenths of that country:

* *Xenoph. exp.* lib. 7. *Polyb.* lib. 4. cap. 45.

† *Ovid paſſim, &c. Strabo*, lib. 7.

‡ *Polyb.* lib. 2. cap. 12.

And tho' the government of the TURKS be not very favourable to induſtry and propagation; yet it preſerves at leaſt peace and order among the inhabitants; and is preferable to that barbarous, unſettled condition, in which they antiently lived.

POLAND and MUSCOVY in EUROPE are not populous; but are certainly much more ſo than the antient SARMATIA and SCYTHIA; where no huſbandry or agriculture was ever heard of, and paſturage was the ſole art by which the people were maintained. The like obſervation may be extended to DENMARK and SWEDEN. No one ought to eſteem the immenſe ſwarms of people, which formerly came from the North, and over ran all EUROPE, to be any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half of it remove their ſeat; 'tis eaſy to imagine, what a prodigious multitude they muſt form; with what deſperate valour they muſt make their attacks; and how the terror they ſtrike into the invaded nations will make theſe magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. SCOTLAND is neither extenſive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants to ſeek new ſeats, they would form a colony as large as the TEUTONS and CIMBRI; and would ſhake all EUROPE, ſuppoſing it in no better condition for defence than formerly.

GER-

GERMANY has ſurely at preſent twenty times more inhabitants than in antient times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued itſelf on the extenſive deſolation which it ſpread around; as we learn from CÆSAR ‡, and TACITUS ‖, and STRABO †. A proof, that the diviſion into ſmall repub. lics will not alone render a nation populous, unleſs attended with the ſpirit of peace, order, and induſtry.

THE barbarous condition of BRITAIN in former times is well known, and the thinneſs of its inhabitants may eaſily be conjectured, both from their barbarity, and from a circumſtance mentioned by HERODIAN *, that all BRITAIN was marſhy, even in SEVERUS's time, after the ROMANS had been fully ſettled in it above a whole century.

'TIS not eaſily imagined, that the GAULS were antiently much more advanced in the arts of life than their northern neighbours; ſince they travelled to this iſland for their education in the myſteries of the religion and philoſophy of the DRUIDS †. I

‡ *De bello Gallico*, lib. 6.

‖ *De moribus Germ.* † Lib. 7.

* Lib. 3. cap. 47.

† CÆSAR *de bello Gallico*; lib. 16. STRABO, lib. 7. ſays, the GAULS were not much more improved than the GERMANS.

cannot, therefore, think, that GAUL was then near ſo populous as FRANCE is at preſent.

WERE we to believe, indeed, and join together the teſtimony of APPIAN, and that of DIODORUS SICULUS, we muſt admit an incredible populouſneſs in GAUL. The former hiſtorian ‡ ſays, that there were 400 nations in that country; the latter ‖ affirms, that the largeſt of the GALLIC nations conſiſted of 200,000 men, beſides women and children, and the leaſt of 50,000. Calculating, therefore, at a medium, we muſt admit of near 200 millions of people, in a country, which we eſteem populous at preſent, tho' ſuppoſed to contain little more than twenty ⸸. Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance loſe all manner of authority. We may obſerve, that that equality of property, to which the populouſneſs of antiquity may be aſcribed, had no place among the GAULS *. Their inteſtine wars alſo, before CÆSAR's time, were almoſt perpetual †. And STRABO § obſerves, that tho' all GAUL was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any ſkill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them leſs to arts than arms, till their ſlavery to ROME produced peace among themſelves.

‡ Celt. pars 1. ‖ Lib. 5.

⸸ Antient GAUL was more extenſive than modern FRANCE.

* *Cæſar de bello Gallico*; lib. 6. † *Id. ibid.* § Lib. 4.

CÆSAR

CÆSAR ‖ enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied in BELGIUM to oppoſe his conqueſts; and makes them amount to 208,000. Theſe were not the whole people able to bear arms in BELGIUM: For the ſame hiſtorian tells us, that the BELLOVACI could have brought a hundred thouſand men into the field, tho' they engaged only for ſixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this proportion of ten to ſix, the ſum of fighting men in all the ſtates of BELGIUM was about 350,000; the whole inhabitants a million and a half. And BELGIUM being about the fourth of GAUL, that country might contain ſix millions, which is not the third of its preſent inhabitants *. We are informed by CÆSAR,

‖ *De bello Gallico*; lib. 2.

* It appears from CÆSAR's account, that the GAULS had no domeſtic ſlaves, who formed a different order from the *Plebes*. The whole common people were indeed a kind of ſlaves to the nobility, as the people of POLAND are at this day: And a nobleman of GAUL had ſometimes ten thouſand dependants of this kind. Nor can we doubt, that the armies were compoſed of the people as well as of the nobility: An army of 100,000 noblemen from a very ſmall ſtate is incredible. The fighting men amongſt the HELVETII were the fourth part of the whole inhabitants; a clear proof that all the males of military age bore arms. See CÆSAR *de bello Gall.* lib. 1.

We may remark, that the numbers in CÆSAR's commentaries can be more depended on than thoſe of any other antient author, becauſe of the GREEK tranſlation, which ſtill remains, and which checks the LATIN original.

that the GAULS had no fixed property in land; but that the chieftains, when any death happened in a family, made a new diviſion of all the lands among the ſeveral members of the family. This is the cuſtom of *Taniſtry*, which ſo long prevailed in IRELAND; and which retained that country in a ſtate of miſery, barbariſm, and deſolation.

THE antient HELVETIA was 250 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to the ſame author †; yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of BERNE alone has, at preſent, as many people.

AFTER this computation of APPIAN and DIODORUS SICULUS, I know not, whether I dare affirm, that the modern DUTCH are more numerous than the antient BATAVI.

SPAIN is deſtroyed from what it was three centuries ago; but if we ſtep backward two thouſand years, and conſider the reſtleſs, turbulent, unſettled condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclined to think, that it is now much more populous. Many SPANIARDS killed themſelves when deprived of their arms by the ROMANS ‡. It appears from PLU-

† *De bello Gallico*; lib. 1.

‡ *Titi Livii*; lib. 34. cap. 17.

TARCH,

TARCH ‖, that robbery and plunder were eſteemed honourable among the SPANIARDS. HIRTIUS † repreſents in the ſame light the ſituation of that country in CÆSAR's time; and he ſays, that every man was obliged to live in caſtles and walled towns for his ſecurity. It was not till its final conqueſt under AUGUSTUS, that theſe diſorders were repreſſed *. The account which STRABO † and JUSTIN ‡ give of SPAIN, correſponds exactly with thoſe above mentioned. How much, therefore, muſt it diminiſh from our idea of the populouſneſs of antiquity, when we find, that CICERO, comparing ITALY, AFRIC, GAUL, GREECE, and SPAIN, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the peculiar circumſtance which rendered this latter country formidable §.

ITALY, 'tis probable however, has decayed: But how many great cities does it ſtill contain? VENICE, GENOA, PAVIA, TURIN, MILAN, NAPLES, FLO-

‖ *In vita Marii.* † *De bello Hiſp.*

* *Vell. Paterc.* lib. 2. § 90. † Lib. 3. ‡ Lib. 44.

§ "Nec numero Hiſpanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate "Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipſo hujus gen-"tis, ac terræ domeſtico nativoque ſenſu, Italos ipſos ac Lati-"nos—ſuperavimus." *De haruſp. reſp.* cap. 9. The diſorders of SPAIN ſeem to have been almoſt proverbial: "Nec impa-"catos a tergo horrebis Iberos." *Virg. Georg.* lib. 3. The IBERI are here plainly taken, by a poetical figure, for robbers in general.

RENCE, LEGHORN, which either ſubſiſted not in antient times, or were then very inconſiderable? If we reflect on this, we ſhall not be apt to carry matters to ſo great an extreme as is uſual, with regard to this ſubject.

WHEN the ROMAN authors complain, that ITALY, which formerly exported corn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never aſcribe this alteration to the increaſe of its inhabitants, but to the neglect of tillage and agriculture *. A natural effect of that pernicious practice of importing corn, in order to diſtribute it *gratis* among the ROMAN citizens, and a very bad means of multiplying the inhabitants of any country †. The *ſportula*, ſo much talked of by MARTIAL and JUVENAL, being preſents regularly made by the great lords to their ſmaller clients, muſt have had a like tendency to produce idleneſs, debauchery, and a continual decay among the people. The pariſh-rates have at preſent the ſame bad conſequences in ENGLAND.

* VARRO *de re ruſtica*, lib. 2. præf. COLUMELLA præf. SUETON. AUGUST. cap. 42.

† Tho' the obſervations of L'Abbé du Bos ſhould be admitted, that ITALY is now warmer than in former times, the conſequence may not be neceſſary, that it is more populous or better cultivated. If the other countries of EUROPE were more ſavage and woody, the cold winds that blowed from them, might affect the climate of ITALY.

WERE

WERE I to aſſign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might poſſibly contain more inhabitants than at preſent, I ſhould pitch upon the age of TRAJAN and the ANTONINES; the great extent of the ROMAN empire being then civilized and cultivated, ſettled almoſt in a profound peace both foreign and domeſtic, and living under the ſame regular police and government *. But we are told, that all extenſive

* The inhabitants of MARSEILLES loſt not their ſuperiority over the GAULS in commerce and the mechanic arts, till the ROMAN dominion turned the latter from arms to agriculture and civil life. See STRABO, Lib. 4. That author, in ſeveral places, repeats the obſervation concerning the improvement ariſing from the ROMAN arts and civility: And he lived at the time when the change was new, and would be more ſenſible. So alſo PLINY: "Quis enim non, communicato orbe terrarum, majeſtate ROMANI imperii, profeciſſe vitam putet commercio rerum ac ſocietate feſtæ pacis, omniaque etiam, quæ occulta antea fuerant, in promiſcuo uſu facta. Lib. 14. proœm. Numine deum electa (ſpeaking of ITALY) quæ cœlum ipſum clarius faceret, ſparſa congregaret imperia, rituſque molliret, & tot populorum diſcordes, feraſque linguas ſermonis commercio contraheret ad colloquia, & humanitatem hominī daret; breviterque una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria fieret;" lib. 2. cap. 5. Nothing can be ſtronger to this purpoſe than the following paſſage from TERTULLIAN, who lived about the age of SEVERUS. "Certe quidem ipſe orbis in promptu eſt, cultior de die & inſtructior priſtino. Omnia jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotioſa. Solitudines famoſas re-

tro

tenſive governments, eſpecially abſolute monarchies, are deſtructive to population, and contain a ſecret vice and

" tro fundi amœniſſimi obliteraverunt, ſilvas arva domuerunt, " feras pecora fugaverunt; arenæ ſeruntur, ſaxa panguntur, pa- " ludes eliquantur, tantæ urbes, quantæ non caſæ quon- " dam. Jam nec inſulæ horrent, nec ſcopuli terrent; " ubique domus, ubique populus, ubique reſpublica, ubique " vita. Summum teſtimonium frequentiæ humanæ, onerosi " ſumus mundo, vix nobis elementa ſufficiunt; & neceſſitates " arctiores, & querelæ apud omnes, dum jam nos natura non " ſuſtinet." De anima, cap. 30. The air of rhetoric and declamation which appears in this paſſage, diminiſhes ſomewhat from its authority, but does not intirely deſtroy it. The ſame remark may be extended to the following paſſage of ARISTIDES the ſophiſt, who lived in the age of ADRIAN. " The whole " world," ſays he, addreſſing himſelf to the ROMANS, " ſeems " to keep one holiday; and mankind, laying aſide the ſwords " which they formerly wore, now betake themſelves to feaſting " and to joy. The cities, forgetting their antient contentions, " preſerve only one emulation, which ſhall embelliſh itſelf moſt " by every art and ornament? Theatres every where ariſe, am- " phitheatres, porticoes, aqueducts, temples, ſchools, academies; " and one may ſafely pronounce, that the ſinking world has " been again raiſed by your auſpicious empire. Nor have cities " alone received an increaſe of ornament and beauty; but the " whole earth, like a garden or paradiſe, is cultivated and " adorned: Inſomuch, that ſuch of mankind as are placed out " of the limits of your empire (who are but few) ſeem to merit " our ſympathy and compaſſion."

'Tis

and poiſon, which deſtroy the effect of all theſe promiſing appearances †. To confirm this, there is a paſſage cited from PLUTARCH ‡, which being ſomewhat ſingular, we ſhall here examine it.

THAT author, endeavouring to account for the ſilence of many of the oracles, ſays, that it may be

'Tis remarkable, that tho' DIODORUS SICULUS makes the whole inhabitants of ÆGYPT, when conquered by the ROMANS, amount only to three millions; yet JOSEPH. *de bello Jud.* lib. 2. cap. 16. ſays, that its inhabitants, excluding thoſe of ALEXANDRIA, were ſeven millions and a half, in the reign of NERO: And he expreſsly ſays, that he drew this account from the books of the ROMAN publicans, who levied the poll-tax. STRABO, lib. 17. praiſes the ſuperior police of the ROMANS with regard to the finances of ÆGYPT, above that of its former monarchs. And no part of adminiſtration is more eſſential to the happineſs of a people. Yet we read in ATHENÆUS, (lib. 2. cap. 25.) who flouriſhed during the reign of the ANTONINES, that the town MAREIA, near ALEXANDRIA, which was formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not, properly ſpeaking, a contradiction. SUIDAS (AUGUST.) ſays, that the Emperor AUGUSTUS, having numbered the whole ROMAN empire, found it contained only 4,101,017 men (*ανδρες.*) There is here ſurely ſome great miſtake, either in the author or tranſcriber. But this authority, feeble as it is, may be ſufficient to counterbalance the exaggerated accounts of HERODOTUS and DIODORUS SICULUS with regard to moſt early times.

† *L'Eſprit des loix*, liv. 23. chap. 19.

‡ *De orac. defectu.*

aſcribed

aſcribed to the preſent deſolation of the world, proceeding from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen heavier upon GREECE than on any other country; inſomuch, that the whole could ſcarce at preſent furniſh three thouſand warriors; a number which, in the time of the MEDIAN war, were ſupplied by the ſingle city of MEGARA. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have ſuppreſſed many of their oracles, and deign not to uſe ſo many interpreters of their will to ſo diminutive a people.

I MUST confeſs, that this paſſage contains ſo many difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may obſerve, that PLUTARCH aſſigns, for a cauſe of the decay of mankind, not the extenſive dominion of the ROMANS, but the former wars and factions of the ſeveral nations; all which were quieted by the ROMAN arms. PLUTARCH's reaſoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference which is drawn from the fact he advances.

POLYBIUS ſuppoſes, that GREECE had become more proſperous and flouriſhing after the eſtabliſhment of the ROMAN yoke*; and tho' that hiſtorian wrote

* Lib. 2. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined, that POLYBIUS, being dependent on ROME, would naturally extol the ROMAN dominion. But, in the *firſt* place, POLYBIUS, tho' one

wrote before theſe conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from TACITUS †, that the ſeverity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reaſon to think that extenſive monarchy ſo deſtructive as it is often repreſented.

WE learn from STRABO ‡, that the ROMANS, from their regard to the GREEKS, maintained, to his time, moſt of the privileges and liberties of that celebrated nation; and NERO afterwards rather increaſed them ‖. How therefore can we imagine, that the ROMAN yoke was ſo burdenſome over that part of the world? The oppreſſion of the proconſuls was checked; and the magiſtracies in GREECE being all beſtowed, in the ſeveral cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no great neceſſity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to ſeek their fortunes in ROME, and ad-

one ſees ſometimes inſtances of his caution, diſcovers no ſymptoms of flattery. *Secondly*, This opinion is only delivered in a ſingle ſtroke, by the by, while he is intent upon another ſubject; and 'tis allowed, if there be any ſuſpicion of an author's inſincerity, that theſe oblique propoſitions diſcover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct aſſertions.

† *Annal.* lib. 1. cap. 2.

‡ Lib. 8. & 9.

‖ PLUTARCH. *De his qui ſero a numine puniuntur.*

vance

vance themſelves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them would return with the fortunes which they had acquired, and thereby inrich the GRECIAN commonwealths.

BUT PLUTARCH ſays, that the general depopulation had been more ſenſibly felt in GREECE than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its ſuperior privileges and advantages?

BESIDES, this paſſage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. *Only three thouſand men able to bear arms in all* GREECE! Who can admit ſo ſtrange a propoſition, eſpecially if we conſider the great number of GREEK cities, whoſe names ſtill remain in hiſtory, and which are mentioned by writers long after the age of PLUTARCH? There are there ſurely ten times more people at preſent, when there ſcarce remains a city in all the bounds of ancient GREECE. That country is ſtill tolerably cultivated, and furniſhes a ſure ſupply of corn, in caſe of any ſcarcity in SPAIN, ITALY, or the ſouth of FRANCE.

WE may obſerve, that the antient frugality of the GREEKS, and their equality of property, ſtill ſubſiſted during the age of PLUTARCH; as appears from LUCIAN †. Nor is there any ground to imagine, that

† *De mercede conductis.*

that

that country was poſſeſſed by a few maſters, and a great number of ſlaves.

'TIS probable, indeed, that military diſcipline, being intirely uſeleſs, was extremely neglected in GREECE after the eſtabliſhment of the ROMAN empire; and if theſe commonwealths, formerly ſo warlike and ambitious, maintained each of them a ſmall city-guard, to prevent mobbiſh diſorders, 'tis all they had occaſion for: And theſe, perhaps, did not amount to 3000 men, thro'out all GREECE. I own, that if PLUTARCH had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very groſs paralogiſm, and aſſigns cauſes no way proportioned to the effects. But is it ſo great a prodigy, that an author ſhould fall into a miſtake of this nature *?

BUT

* I muſt confeſs, that that diſcourſe of PLUTARCH, concerning the ſilence of the oracles, is in general of ſo odd a texture, and ſo unlike his other productions, that one is at a loſs what judgment to form of it. 'Tis wrote in dialogue, which is a method of compoſition that PLUTARCH commonly little affects. The perſonages he introduces advance very wild, abſurd, and contradictory opinions, more like the viſionary ſyſtems or ravings of PLATO than the ſolid ſenſe of PLUTARCH. There runs alſo thro' the whole an air of ſuperſtition and credulity, which reſembles very little the ſpirit that appears in other philoſophical compoſitions of that author. For 'tis remarkable, that tho' PLUTARCH be an hiſtorian as ſuperſtitious as HERO-

DOTUS

BUT whatever force may remain in this paſſage of PLUTARCH, we ſhall endeavour to counterbalance it by as remarkable a paſſage in DIODORUS SICULUS, where the hiſtorian, after mentioning NINUS's army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horſe, endeavours to ſupport the credibility of this account by ſome poſterior facts; and adds, that we muſt not form a notion of the antient populouſneſs of mankind from the preſent emptineſs and depopulation which is ſpread

DOTUS or LIVY, yet there is ſcarcely, in all antiquity, a philoſopher leſs ſuperſtitious, excepting CICERO and LUCIAN. I muſt therefore confeſs, that a paſſage of PLUTARCH, cited from this diſcourſe, has much leſs authority with me, than if it had been found in moſt of his other compoſitions.

There is only one other diſcourſe of PLUTARCH liable to like objections, *viz.* that *concerning thoſe whoſe puniſhment is delayed by the Deity*. It is alſo wrote in dialogue, contains like ſuperſtitious, wild viſions, and ſeems to have been chiefly compoſed in rivalſhip to PLATO, particularly his laſt book, *de republica*.

And here I cannot but obſerve, that Monſ FONTENELLE, a writer eminent for candor, ſeems to have departed a little from his uſual character, when he endeavours to throw a ridicule upon PLUTARCH on account of paſſages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The abſurdities here put into the mouths of the ſeveral perſonages are not to be aſcribed to PLUTARCH. He makes them refute each other; and, in general, he ſeems to intend the ridiculing of thoſe very opinions, which FONTENELLE would ridicule him for maintaining. See *Hiſtoire des oracles*.

over

over the world †. Thus an author, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is repreſented as moſt populous ‡, complains of the deſolation which then prevailed, gives the preference to former times, and has recourſe to antient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming the preſent, and admiring the paſt, is ſtrongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence even on perſons endued with the profoundeſt judgment and moſt extenſive learning.

† Lib. 2.

‡ He was cotemporary with CÆSAR and AUGUSTUS.

ESSAY

ESSAY XII.

Of the ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

AS no party, in the preſent age, can ſupport itſelf, without a philoſophical or ſpeculative ſyſtem of principles, annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the parties, into which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that ſcheme of actions, which it purſues. The people being commonly very rude builders, eſpecially in this ſpeculative way, and more eſpecially ſtill, when actuated by party zeal; 'tis natural to imagine, that their workmanſhip muſt be a little unſhapely, and diſcover evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was raiſed. The one party, by tracing up the origin of government to the DEITY, endeavour to render government ſo ſacred and inviolate, that it muſt be little leſs than ſacrilege, however diſorderly it may become, to touch or invade it, in the ſmalleſt article. The other party, by founding government altogether on

on the conſent of the PEOPLE, ſuppoſe that there is a kind of *original contract*, by which the ſubjects have reſerved the power of reſiſting their ſovereign, whenever they find themſelves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purpoſes, voluntarily entruſted him. Theſe are the ſpeculative principles of the two parties; and theſe too are the practical conſequences deduced from them.

I SHALL venture to affirm, *That both theſe* ſyſtems *of ſpeculative principles are juſt; tho' not in the ſenſe, intended by the parties:* And *That both the* ſchemes *of practical conſequences are prudent; tho' not in the extremes, to which each party, in oppoſition to the other, has commonly endeavoured to carry them.*

THAT the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any one who admits a general providence, and allows, that all events in the univerſe are conducted by an uniform plan and directed to wiſe purpoſes. As 'tis impoſſible for human race to ſubſiſt, at leaſt in any comfortable or ſecure ſtate, without the protection of government; government muſt certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his creatures: And as it has univerſally, in fact, taken place, in all countries, and all ages; we may conclude, with ſtill greater certainty, that it was intended by that omniſcient

omniſcient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or operation. But ſince he gave riſe to it, not by any particular or miraculous interpoſition, but by his concealed and univerſal efficacy; a ſovereign cannot, properly ſpeaking, be called his vicegerent, in any other ſenſe than every power or force, being derived from him, may be ſaid to act by his commiſſion. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the greateſt and moſt lawful prince any more reaſon, upon that account, to plead a peculiar ſacredneſs or inviolable authority, than an inferior magiſtrate, or even an uſurper, or even a robber and a pyrate. The ſame divine ſuper-intendant, who, for wiſe purpoſes, inveſted an ELIZABETH or a HENRY * with authority, did alſo, for purpoſes, no doubt, equally wiſe, tho' unknown, beſtow power on a BORGIA or an ANGRIA. The ſame cauſes, which gave riſe to the ſovereign power in every ſtate, eſtabliſhed likewiſe every petty juriſdiction in it, and every limited Authority. A conſtable therefore, no leſs than a king, acts by a divine commiſſion, and poſſeſſes an indefeaſible right.

WHEN we conſider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we muſt neceſſarily allow, that nothing but their own conſent

* HENRY the 4th of FRANCE.

could, at firſt, aſſociate them together, and ſubject them to any authority. The people, if we trace up government to its firſt origin in the woods and deſerts, are the ſource of all power and juriſdiction, and voluntarily, for the ſake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to ſubmit, were either expreſt, or were ſo clear and obvious, that it might well be eſteemed ſuperfluous to expreſs them. If this, then, be meant by the *original contract*, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at firſt, founded on a contract, and that the moſt ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed entirely by that principle. In vain, are we ſent to the records to ſeek for this charter of our liberties. It was not wrote on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the uſe of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, which we find in all the individuals of that ſpecies. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of eſtabliſhed government. A man's natural force conſiſts only in the vigour of his limbs, and the firmneſs of his courage; which could never ſubject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own conſent, and their ſenſe of the advantages of peace and order, could have had that influence.

BUT philoſophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms) are not contented with theſe conceſſions. They aſſert, not only that government in its earlieſt infancy aroſe from conſent, or the voluntary combination of the people; but alſo, that, even at preſent, when it has attained its full maturity, it reſts on no other foundation. They affirm, that all men are ſtill born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unleſs bound by the obligation and ſanction of a *promiſe*. And as no man, without ſome equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and ſubject himſelf to the will of another; this promiſe is always underſtood to be conditional, and impoſes on him no obligation, unleſs he meets with juſtice and protection from his ſovereign. Theſe advantages the ſovereign promiſes him in return; and if he fails in the execution, he has broke, on his ſide, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his ſubjects from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to theſe philoſophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and ſuch the right of reſiſtance, poſſeſt by every ſubject.

BUT would theſe reaſoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the leaſt, correſponds to their ideas, or can warrant ſo refined and philoſophical a ſyſtem. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their ſub-

jects as their property, and aſſert their independent right of ſovereignty, from conqueſt or ſucceſſion. We find alſo, every where, ſubjects, who acknowledge this right in their princes, and ſuppoſe themſelves born under obligations of obedience to a certain ſovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. Theſe connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our conſent, in PERSIA and CHINA; in FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines abovementioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or ſubjection becomes ſo familiar, that moſt men never make any enquiry about its origin or cauſe, more than about the principle of gravity, reſiſtance, or the moſt univerſal laws of nature. Or if curioſity ever move them; ſo ſoon as they learn, that they themſelves and their anceſtors have, for ſeveral ages, or from time immemorial, been ſubject to ſuch a government or ſuch a family; they immediately acquieſce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in moſt parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary conſent or a mutual promiſe, the magiſtrate would ſoon impriſon you, as ſeditious, for looſening the tyes of obedience; if your friends did not before ſhut you up, as delirious, for advancing ſuch abſurdities. 'Tis ſtrange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is ſuppoſed to have formed, and after he came to the uſe of reaſon too,

other-

otherwiſe it could have no authority; that this act, I ſay, ſhould be ſo unknown to all of them, that over the face of the whole earth there ſcarce remain any traces or memory of it.

BUT the contract, on which government is founded, is ſaid to be the *original contract*; and conſequently may be ſuppoſed too old to fall under the knowledge of the preſent generation. If the agreement, by which ſavage men firſt aſſociated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being ſo antient, and being obliterated by a thouſand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be ſuppoſed to retain any authority. If we would ſay any thing to the purpoſe, we muſt aſſert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which impoſes any duty of allegiance on the ſubject, was, at firſt, founded on conſent and a voluntary compact. But beſides that this ſuppoſes the conſent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the moſt remote generations (which republican writers will never allow) beſides this, I ſay, it is not juſtified by hiſtory or experience, in any age or country of the world.

ALMOST all the governments, which exiſt at preſent, or of which there remains any record in ſtory, have been founded originally, either on uſurpation or conqueſt, or both, without any pretence of a fair conſent, or voluntary ſubjection of the people. When

an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, 'tis often eaſy for him, by employing ſometimes violence, ſometimes falſe pretences, to eſtabliſh his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no ſuch open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leiſure to aſſemble together in a body to oppoſe him. Even all thoſe, who are the inſtruments of his uſurpation, may wiſh his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the ſole cauſe of his ſecurity. By ſuch arts as theſe many governments have been eſtabliſhed; and this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boaſt of.

THE face of the earth is continually changing, by the encreaſe of ſmall kingdoms into great empires, by the diſſolution of great empires into ſmaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing diſcoverable in all theſe events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary aſſociation ſo much talked of?

EVEN the ſmootheſt way, by which a nation may receive a foreign maſter, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but ſuppoſes them

them to be diſpoſed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleaſure or intereſt of their rulers.

BUT where no force interpoſes, and election takes place; what is this election ſo highly vaunted? 'Tis either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no oppoſition: Or 'tis the fury of a rabble, that follow a ſeditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.

ARE theſe diſorderly elections, which are rare too, of ſuch mighty authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?

IN reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total diſſolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of the new eſtabliſhment depend upon a number which nearly approaches the body of the people: For it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wiſe man, then, wiſhes to ſee, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may ſpeedily ſeize the prize, and give to the people a maſter, which they are ſo unfit to chooſe for themſelves. So little correſpondent is fact and reality to thoſe philoſophical notions.

LET not the eſtabliſhment at the *revolution*, deceive us, or make us ſo much in love with a philoſophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monſtrous and irregular. Even that event was far from correſponding to theſe refined ideas. It was only the ſucceſſion, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed: And it was only the majority of ſeven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk, of theſe ten millions acquieſced willingly in the determination: But was the matter left, in the leaſt, to their choice? Was it not juſtly ſuppoſed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man puniſhed, who refuſed to ſubmit to the new ſovereign? How otherways could the matter have ever been brought to any iſſue or concluſion?

THE republic of ATHENS was, I believe, the moſt extenſive democracy, which we read of in hiſtory: Yet if we make the requiſite allowances for the women, the ſlaves, and the ſtrangers, we ſhall find, that that eſtabliſhment was not, at firſt, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of thoſe, who are bound to pay obedience to it. Not to mention the iſlands and foreign dominions, which the ATHENIANS claimed as theirs by right of conqueſt. And as 'tis well known, that popular aſſemblies in that city were always full of licence and diſorder, notwithſtanding the forms and laws by which they were checked:

How

How much more diſorderly muſt they be, where they form not the eſtabliſhed conſtitution, but aſſemble tumultuouſly on the diſſolution of the antient government, in order to give riſe to a new one? How chimerical muſt it be to talk of a choice in any ſuch circumſtances?

THE ACHÆANS enjoyed the freeſt and moſt perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they employed force to oblige ſome cities to enter into their league, as we learn from POLYBIUS *.

HARRY the IVth and HARRY the VIIth of ENGLAND, had really no other title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, for fear of weakening their authority. Strange! if the only real foundation of all authority be conſent and promiſe.

'TIS in vain to ſay, that all governments are, or ſhould be, at firſt, founded on popular conſent, as much as the neceſſity of human affairs will admit. This favours entirely my pretenſion. I maintain, that human affairs never will admit of this conſent; ſeldom of the appearance of it: But that conqueſt or uſurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by diſſolving the antient governments, is the origin of almoſt all the new ones, which ever were eſtabliſhed in the

* Lib. 2, cap. 38.

world. And that in the few cases, where consent may seem to have taken place, it was commonly so irregular, so confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted.

Were all men possest of so inflexible a regard to justice, that, of themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others; they had for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without subjection to any magistrates or political society: But this is a state of perfection, of which human nature is justly esteemed incapable. Again; were all men possest of so perfect an understanding, as always to know their own interest, no form of government had ever been submitted to, but what was established on consent, and was fully canvast by each member of the society: But this state of perfection is likewise much superior to human nature. Reason, history and experience show us, that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular; and were one to choose a pe-

a period of time, when the people's consent was least regarded in public transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations are often studied; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.

When a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and must carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family, whom, at first, they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourse to any notion of voluntary consent or promise, which, they know, never was, in this case, either expected or demanded. The original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their consent gives their prince a title: But they willingly consent, because they think,

that, from long poſſeſſion, he has acquired a title independent of their choice or inclination.

SHOULD it be ſaid, that by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, every individual has given a *tacit* conſent to his authority, and promiſed him obedience; it may be anſwered, That ſuch implied conſent can only take place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under eſtabliſhed governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain government; it would be abſurd to infer a conſent or choice, which he expreſſly, in this caſe, renounces and abjures.

CAN we ſeriouſly ſay, that a poor peaſant or artizan has a free choice to leave his own country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the ſmall wages which he acquires? We may as well aſſert, that a man, by remaining in a veſſel, freely conſents to the dominion of the maſter; tho' he was carried on board while aſleep, and muſt leap into the ocean, and periſh, the moment he leaves her.

WHAT if the prince forbid his ſubjects to quit his dominions; as in TIBERIUS's time, it was regarded as a crime in a ROMAN knight that he had attempted to fly to the PARTHIANS, in order to eſcape the tyranny

ranny of that emperor[a]? Or as the antient MUSCOVITES prohibited all travelling under pain of death? And did a prince obſerve, that many of his ſubjects were ſeized with the frenzy of tranſporting themſelves to foreign nations, he would doubtleſs, with great reaſon and juſtice, reſtrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own country. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his ſubjects, by ſo wiſe and reaſonable a law? Yet the freedom of their choice is ſurely, in that caſe, raviſhed from them.

A COMPANY of men, who ſhould leave their native country, in order to people ſome uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom; but they would ſoon find, that their prince ſtill laid claim to them, and called them his ſubjects, even in their new ſettlement. And in this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.

THE trueſt *tacit* conſent of this kind, which is ever obſerved, is when a foreigner ſettles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he muſt ſubmit: Yet is his allegiance, tho' more voluntary, much leſs expected or depended on, than that of a natural born ſubject. On the contrary, his native prince ſtill aſſerts a claim to him. And if he puniſhes not the renegade,

[a] TACIT. Ann. 6. cap. 14.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA DOMUS TIBI DABITUR

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when he ſeizes him in war with his new prince's commiſſion; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the priſoner; but on the conſent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent reprisals.

SUPPOSE an uſurper, after having baniſhed his lawful prince and royal family, ſhould eſtabliſh his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and ſhould preſerve ſuch exact diſcipline in his troops, and ſo regular a diſpoſition in his garriſons, that no inſurrection had ever been raiſed, or even murmur heard, againſt his adminiſtration: Can it be aſſerted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treaſon, have tacitly conſented to his authority, and promiſed him allegiance, merely becauſe, from neceſſity, they live under his dominion? Suppoſe again their natural prince reſtored, by means of an army, which he aſſembles in foreign countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and ſhew plainly with what reluctance they had ſubmitted to any other yoke. I may now aſk, upon what foundation the prince's title ſtands? Not on popular conſent ſurely: For tho' the people willingly acquieſce in his authority, they never imagine, that their conſent makes him ſovereign. They conſent; becauſe they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful ſovereign. And as to

that

that tacit conſent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and uſurper.

WHEN we aſſert, that all lawful government ariſes from the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they deſerve, or even expect and deſire from us. After the ROMAN dominions became too unwieldy for the republic to govern, the people, over the whole known world, were extremely grateful to AUGUSTUS for that authority, which, by violence, he eſtabliſhed over them; and they ſhewed an equal diſpoſition to ſubmit to the ſucceſſor, whom he left them, by his laſt will and teſtament. It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular ſucceſſion; but that their line of princes was continually broke, either by private aſſaſſinations or public rebellions. The *prætorian* bands, on the failure of every family, ſet up one emperor; the legions in the Eaſt a ſecond; thoſe in GERMANY, perhaps, a third: And the ſword alone could decide the controverſy. The condition of the people, in that mighty monarchy, was to be lamented; not becauſe the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But becauſe they never fell under any ſucceſſion of maſters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and bloodſhed, occaſioned by every new ſettlement;

ment; thoſe were not blameable, becauſe they were inevitable.

THE houſe of LANCASTER ruled in this iſland about ſixty years; yet the partizans of the white roſe ſeemed daily to multiply in ENGLAND. The preſent eſtabliſhment has taken place during a ſtill longer period. Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguiſhed; even tho' ſcarce any man now alive had arrived at years of diſcretion, when it was expelled, or could have conſented to its dominion, or have promiſed it allegiance? A ſufficient indication ſurely of the general ſentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partizans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time, during which they have preſerved their imaginary fidelity. We blame them for adhering to a family, which, we affirm, has been juſtly expelled, and which, from the moment the new ſettlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.

BUT would we have a more regular, at leaſt, a more philoſophical refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular conſent; perhaps, the following obſervations may ſuffice.

ALL *moral* duties may be divided into two kinds. The *firſt* are thoſe, to which men are impelled by a natural inſtinct or immediate propenſity, which operates

rates in them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which reſults to ſociety from ſuch humane inſtincts, we pay them the juſt tribute of moral approbation and eſteem: But the perſon, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any ſuch reflection.

THE *ſecond* kind of moral duties are ſuch as are not ſupported by any original inſtinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a ſenſe of obligation, when we conſider the neceſſities of human ſociety, and the impoſſibility of ſupporting it, if theſe duties were neglected. 'Tis thus *juſtice* or a regard to the property of others, *fidelity* or the obſervance of promiſes, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as 'tis evident, that every man loves himſelf better than any other perſon, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquiſitions as much as poſſible; and nothing can reſtrain him in this propenſity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total diſſolution of ſociety, which muſt enſue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or inſtinct, is here checked and reſtrained by a ſubſequent judgment or obſervation.

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THE caſe is preciſely the ſame with the political or civil duty of *allegiance*, as with the natural duties of juſtice and fidelity. Our primary inſtincts lead us, either to indulge ourſelves in unlimited liberty, or to ſeek dominion over others: And 'tis reflection only, which engages us to ſacrifice ſuch ſtrong paſſions to the intereſts of peace and order. A very ſmall degree of experience and obſervation ſuffices to teach us, that ſociety cannot poſſibly be maintained without the authority of magiſtrates, and that this authority muſt ſoon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The obſervation of theſe general and obvious intereſts is the ſource of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it.

WHAT neceſſity, therefore, is there to found the duty of *allegiance* or obedience to magiſtrates on that of *fidelity* or a regard to promiſes, and to ſuppoſe, that 'tis the conſent of each individual, which ſubjects him to government; when it appears, that both allegiance and fidelity ſtand preciſely on the ſame foundation, and are both ſubmitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent intereſts and neceſſities of human ſociety? We are bound to obey our ſovereign, 'tis ſaid; becauſe we have given a tacit promiſe to that purpoſe. But why are we bound to obſerve our promiſe? It muſt here be aſſerted, that the commerce and intercourſe of mankind, which are of ſuch mighty

advantage,

advantage, can have no ſecurity where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be ſaid, that men could not live at all in ſociety, at leaſt in a civilized ſociety without laws and magiſtrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the ſtrong upon the weak, of the violent upon the juſt and equitable. 'The obligation to allegiance, being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by reſolving the one into the other. The general intereſts or neceſſities of ſociety are ſufficient to eſtabliſh both.

IF the reaſon is aſked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily anſwer: *becauſe ſociety could not otherwiſe ſubſiſt*: And this anſwer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your anſwer is, *becauſe we ſhould keep our word*. But beſides, that no body, till trained in a philoſophical ſyſtem, can either comprehend or reliſh this anſwer: Beſides this, I ſay, you find yourſelf embarraſſed, when 'tis aſked, *why we are bound to keep our word?* And you can give no other anſwer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

BUT *to whom is allegiance due? And who are our lawful ſovereigns?* This queſtion is often the moſt difficult of any, and liable to infinite diſcuſſions. When people are ſo happy, that they can anſwer, *Our preſent*

ſent ſovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from anceſtors, that have governed us for many ages; this anſwer admits of no reply; even tho' hiſtorians, in tracing up to the remoteſt antiquity the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that its firſt authority was derived from uſurpation and violence. 'Tis confeſt, that private juſtice or the abſtinence from the properties of others, is a moſt cardinal virtue: Yet reaſon tells, that there is no property in durable objects, ſuch as lands or houſes, when carefully examined in paſſing from hand to hand, but muſt, in ſome period, have been founded on fraud and injuſtice. The neceſſities of human ſociety, neither in private nor public life, will allow of ſuch an accurate enquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, with facility, be refined away, if we indulge a falſe philoſophy, in ſifting and ſcrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or poſition, in which it may be placed.

THE queſtions with regard to private property have filled infinite volumes of law and philoſophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text; and in the end, we may ſafely pronounce, that many of the rules, there eſtabliſhed, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion may be formed with regard to the ſucceſſions and rights of princes and forms of government. Many caſes, no doubt, occur, eſpecially in the infancy of any government,

vernment, which admit of no determination from the laws of juſtice and equity: And our hiſtorian RAPIN, allows, that the controverſy between EDWARD the the third and PHILIP de VALOIS was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence.

WHO ſhall tell me, whether GERMANICUS or DRUSUS ought to have ſucceeded TIBERIUS, had he died, while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his ſucceſſor? Ought the right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the ſame effect in private families, and had already, in two inſtances, taken place in the public? Ought GERMANICUS to be eſteemed the eldeſt ſon becauſe he was born before DRUSUS; or the younger, becauſe he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldeſt brother had no advantage in the ſucceſſion of private families? Ought the ROMAN empire, at that time, to be eſteemed hereditary, becauſe of two examples; or ought it, even ſo early, to be regarded as belonging to the ſtronger or the preſent poſſeſſor, as being founded on ſo recent an uſurpation?

COMMODUS mounted the throne after a pretty long ſucceſſion of excellent emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public election, but by the fictitious

fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murdered by a conſpiracy ſuddenly formed between his wench and her gallant, who happened at that time to be *Prætorian Præfect*, or to have the command of the guards; theſe immediately deliberated about chooſing a maſter to human kind, to ſpeak in the ſtyle of thoſe ages; and caſt their eyes on PERTINAX. Before the tyrant's death was known, the *Præfect* went ſecretly to that ſenator, who, on the appearance of the ſoldiers, imagined that his execution had been ordered by COMMODUS. He was immediately ſaluted emperor by the officer and his attendants; chearfully proclaimed by the populace; unwillingly ſubmitted to by the guards; formally recognized by the ſenate; and paſſively received by the provinces and armies of the empire.

THE diſcontent of the *Prætorian* bands ſoon broke out in a ſudden ſedition, which occaſioned the murther of that excellent prince: And the world being now without a maſter and without government, the guards thought proper to ſet the empire formally to ſale. JULIAN, the purchaſer, was proclaimed by the ſoldiers, recognized by the ſenate, and ſubmitted to by the people, and muſt alſo have been ſubmitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begot oppoſition and reſiſtance. PESCENNIUS NIGER in SYRIA elected himſelf emperor, gained the

tumultuary conſent of his army, and was attended with the ſecret good-will of the ſenate and people of ROME. ALBINUS in BRITAIN found an equal right to ſet up his claim; but SEVERUS, who governed PANNONIA, prevailed in the end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the imperial crown, profeſt at firſt, an intention only of revenging the death of PERTINAX. He marched as general into ITALY, defeated JULIAN; and without our being able to fix any preciſe commencement even of the ſoldiers conſent, he was from neceſſity acknowledged emperor by the ſenate and people; and fully eſtabliſhed in his violent authority by ſubduing NIGER and ALBINUS *.

Inter hæc Gordianus CÆSAR (ſays CAPITOLINUS, ſpeaking of another period) *ſublatus a militibus*, Imperator *eſt appellatus, quia non erat alius in præſenti.* 'Tis to be remarked that GORDIAN was a boy of fourteen years of age.

FREQUENT inſtances of a like nature occur in the hiſtory of the emperors; in that of ALEXANDER's ſucceſſors; and of many other countries: Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a deſpotic government of that kind; where the ſucceſſion is diſjointed and irregular, and muſt be determined, on every occaſion,

* HERODIAN, lib. 2.

by

by force or election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is alſo much leſs dangerous. The intereſts of liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the ſucceſſion of the crown. And the conſtitution, being compounded of parts, may ſtill maintain a ſufficient ſtability, by reſting on the ariſtocratical or democratical members, tho' the monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

In an abſolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to the throne, it may ſafely be determined to belong to the firſt occupier. Inſtances of this kind are but too frequent, eſpecially in the eaſtern monarchies. When any race of princes expires, the will or deſtination of the laſt ſovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the baſtard prince to the ſucceſſion in caſe of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in ſuch an event, have ſome authority *. Thus the will of CHARLES the ſecond diſpoſed

* 'Tis remarkable, that in the remonſtrance of the duke of BOURBON and the legitimate princes, againſt this deſtination of LOUIS the XIVth, the doctrine of the *original contract* is inſiſted on, even in that abſolute government. The FRENCH nation, ſay they, chooſing HUGH CAPET and his poſterity to rule over them and their poſterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit

poſed of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The ceſſion of the antient proprietor, eſpecially when joined to conqueſt, is likewiſe eſteemed a very good title. The general bond or obligation, which binds us to government, is the intereſt and neceſſities of ſociety; and this obligation is very ſtrong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Preſent poſſeſſion has conſiderable authority in theſe caſes, and greater than in private property; becauſe of the diſorders, which attend all revolutions and changes of government *.

tacit right reſerved to chooſe a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the baſtard princes to the throne, without the conſent of the nation. But the Compte de BOULAINVILLIERS, who wrote in defence of the baſtard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, eſpecially when applied to HUGH CAPET; who mounted the throne, ſays he, by the ſame arts, which have ever been employed by all conquerors and uſurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the ſtates after he had put himſelf in poſſeſſion: But is this a choice or contract? The Compte de BOULAINVILLIERS, we may obſerve, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very converſant in hiſtory, he knew the people were never almoſt conſulted in theſe revolutions and new eſtabliſhments, and that time alone beſtowed right and authority on what was commonly at firſt founded on force and violence. See *Etat de la* FRANCE, Vol. III.

* The crime of rebellion, amongſt the antients was commonly marked by the terms νεωτερίζειν, *novas res moliri*,

We ſhall only obſerve, before we conclude, that tho' an appeal to general opinion may juſtly, in the ſpeculative ſciences of metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or aſtronomy, be eſteemed unfair and inconcluſive, yet in all queſtions with regard to morals, as well as criticiſm, there is really no other ſtandard, by which any controverſy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common ſentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government to an *original contract*, or conſent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ableſt of its partizans, in proſecution of it, ſcrupled to affirm, *that abſolute monarchy is inconſiſtent with civil ſociety, and ſo can be no form of civil government at all* *; *and that the ſupreme power in a ſtate cannot take from any man by taxes and impoſitions, any part of his property, without his own conſent or that of his repreſentatives* †. What authority any moral reaſoning can have, which leads into opinions, ſo wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this ſingle kingdom, 'tis eaſy to determine ‡.

* See Locke on government, chap. 7. §. 90.

† Id. chap. 11. §. 138, 139, 140.

‡ The only paſſage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is aſcribed to a promiſe is in Plato

PLATO *in Critone*; where SOCRATES refuſes to eſcape from priſon, becauſe he had tacitly promiſed to obey the laws. Thus he builds a *tory* conſequence of paſſive obedience, on a *whig* foundation of the original contract.

New diſcoveries are not to be expected in theſe matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any ſuch foundation.

ESSAY XIII.

Of PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

IN the former eſſay, we endeavour to refute the *ſpeculative* ſyſtems of politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious ſyſtem of the one party, as the philoſophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* conſequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the meaſures of ſubmiſſion due to ſovereigns.

As the obligation to juſtice is founded intirely on the intereſts of ſociety, which require mutual abſtinence from property, in order to preſerve peace among mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of juſtice would be attended with very pernicious conſequences, that virtue muſt be ſuſpended, and give place to public utility, in ſuch extraordinary and ſuch preſſing emergencies. The maxim, *fiat Juſtitia & ruat Cælum*, let juſtice be performed, tho' the univerſe be deſtroyed, is apparently falſe, and by ſacrificing the end to the means, ſhews a prepoſterous idea of the

ſubordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any ſcruple of burning the ſuburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or what general abſtains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceſſities of war require it, and he cannot otherwiſe maintain his army? The caſe is the ſame with the duty of allegiance; and common ſenſe teaches us, that as government obliges to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty muſt always, in extraordinary caſes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi ſuprema Lex*, the ſafety of the people is the ſupreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the ſentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the inſurrections againſt a NERO, or a PHILIP, ſo infatuated with party-ſyſtems, as not to wiſh ſucceſs to the enterprize, and praiſe the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in ſpite of their ſublime theory, are forced, in ſuch caſes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the reſt of mankind.

RESISTANCE, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queſtion can only be, among good reaſoners, with regard to the degree of neceſſity, which can juſtify reſiſtance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I muſt confeſs, that I ſhall always incline to *their* ſide, who draw the bond of allegiance the cloſeſt poſſible, and conſider an

an infringement of it, as the laſt refuge in deſperate caſes, when the public is in the higheſt danger, from violence and tyranny. For beſides the miſchiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends inſurrection; 'tis certain, that where a diſpoſition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cauſe of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent meaſures, which they never would have embraced, had every one ſeemed inclined to ſubmiſſion and obedience. 'Tis thus the *tyrannicide* or aſſaſſination, approved of by ancient maxims, inſtead of keeping tyrants and uſurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now juſtly, upon that account, aboliſhed by the laws of nations, and univerſally condemned as a baſe and treacherous method of bringing to juſtice theſe diſturbers of ſociety.

Besides; we muſt conſider, that as obedience is our duty in the common courſe of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more prepoſterous than an anxious care and ſollicitude in ſtating all the caſes, in which reſiſtance may be allowed. Thus, tho' a philoſopher reaſonably acknowledges, in the courſe of an argument, that the rules of juſtice may be diſpenſed with in caſes of urgent neceſſity; what ſhould we think of a preacher or caſuiſt, who ſhould make it his chief ſtudy to find out ſuch caſes, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be bet-

ter employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in diſplaying the particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclined, of ourſelves, to embrace, and to extend?

THERE are, however, two reaſons, which may be pleaded in defence of that party among us, who have, with ſo much induſtry, propagated the maxims of reſiſtance; maxims, which, it muſt be confeſt, are, in general, ſo pernicious, and ſo deſtructive of civil ſociety. The *firſt* is, that their antagoniſts carrying the doctrine of obedience to ſuch an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary caſes (which might, perhaps, be excuſable) but even poſitively to exclude them; it became neceſſary to inſiſt on theſe exceptions, and defend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The *ſecond*, and, perhaps, better reaſon, is founded on the nature of the BRITISH conſtitution and form of government.

'TIS almoſt peculiar to our conſtitution to eſtabliſh a firſt magiſtrate with ſuch high pre-eminence and dignity, that, tho' limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, ſo far as regards his own perſon, above the laws, and can neither be queſtioned nor puniſhed for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. His miniſters alone, or thoſe who act by his miſſion, are obnoxious to juſtice; and while the prince

prince is thus allured, by the proſpect of perſonal ſafety, to give the laws their free courſe, an equal ſecurity is, in effect, obtained, by the puniſhment of leſſer offenders, and at the ſame time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible conſequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the ſovereign. But tho' the conſtitution pays this ſalutary compliment to the prince, it can never reaſonably be underſtood, by that maxim, to have determined its own deſtruction, or to have eſtabliſhed a tame ſubmiſſion, where he protects his miniſters, perſeveres in injuſtice, and uſurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This caſe, indeed, is never expreſsly put by the laws; becauſe it is impoſſible for them, in their ordinary courſe, to provide a remedy for it, or eſtabliſh any magiſtrate, with ſuperior authority, to chaſtiſe the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a remedy would be the greateſt of all abſurdities; the remedy in this caſe, is the extraordinary one of reſiſtance, when affairs come to that extremity, that the conſtitution can be defended by it alone. Reſiſtance, therefore, muſt, of courſe, become more frequent in the British government, than in others, which are ſimpler, and conſiſt of fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an abſolute ſovereign, he has little temptation to commit ſuch enormous tyranny as may juſtly provoke rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great vices, may run

him into that perilous ſituation. This is commonly ſuppoſed to have been the caſe with CHARLES the Firſt; and if we may now ſpeak truth, after animoſities are laid, this was alſo the caſe with JAMES the Second. Theſe were harmleſs, if not, in their private character, good men; but miſtaking the nature of our conſtitution, and engroſſing the whole legiſlative power, it became neceſſary to oppoſe them with ſome vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that authority, which he had uſed with ſuch imprudence and indiſcretion.

ESSAY

ESSAY XIV.

Of the COALITION of PARTIES.

TO aboliſh all diſtinctions of party may not be practicable, perhaps not deſirable, in a free government. The only parties, which are dangerous, are ſuch as entertain oppoſite views with regard to the eſſentials of government, the ſucceſſion of the crown, or the more conſiderable privileges belonging to the ſeveral members of the conſtitution; where there is no room for any compromize or accommodation, and where the controverſy may appear ſo momentous as to juſtify even an oppoſition by arms to the pretenſions of antagoniſts. Of this nature was the animoſity continued for above a century between the parties in ENGLAND; an animoſity which broke out ſometimes into civil war, which occaſioned violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the peace and tranquillity of the nation. But as there has appeared of late the ſtrongeſt ſymptoms of an univerſal deſire to aboliſh theſe party-diſtinctions;

this tendency to a coalition affords the moſt agreeable proſpect of future happineſs, and ought to be carefully cheriſhed and promoted by every lover of his country.

THERE is not a more effectual method of promoting ſo good an end, than to prevent all unreaſonable inſult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all diſputes, to perſuade each that its antagoniſt may poſſibly be ſometimes in the right, and ſo keep a balance in the praiſe and blame which we beſtow on either ſide. The two former Eſſays, concerning the *original contract* and *paſſive obedience*, are calculated for this purpoſe with regard to the *philoſophical* controverſies between the parties, and tend to ſhow that neither ſide are in theſe reſpects ſo fully ſupported by reaſon as they endeavour to flatter themſelves. We ſhall proceed to exerciſe the ſame moderation with regard to the *hiſtorical* diſputes between the parties, by proving that each of them was juſtified by plauſible topics; that there were on both ſides wiſe men who meant well to their country, and that the paſt animoſity between the parties had no better foundation than narrow prejudice or intereſted paſſion.

THE popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of whigs, might juſtify by very ſpecious argu-

ments, that oppoſition to the crown, from which our preſent free conſtitution is derived. Tho' obliged to acknowledge, that precedents in favour of prerogative had uniformly taken place during many reigns before CHARLES the Firſt, they thought, that there was no reaſon for ſubmitting any longer to ſo dangerous an authority. Such might have been their reaſoning: The rights of mankind are ſo ſacred, that no preſcription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority ſufficient to aboliſh them. Liberty is ſo ineſtimable a bleſſing, that, wherever there appears any probability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards, and ought not even to repine at the greateſt effuſion of blood or treaſure. All human inſtitutions, and none more than government, are in continual fluctuation. Kings are ſure to embrace every opportunity of extending their prerogatives: And if favourable incidents be not alſo laid hold of to extend and ſecure the privileges of the people, an univerſal deſpotiſm muſt for ever prevail amongſt mankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations prove, that it is no longer ſafe to entruſt with the crown the ſame exorbitant prerogatives which had formerly been exerciſed during rude and ſimple ages. And tho' the example of many late reigns may be pleaded in favour of a power in the prince ſomewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns afford inſtances of ſtricter limitations impoſed on the crown; and thoſe pretenſions of the parliament, now branded with the title

of

of innovations, are only a recovery of the juſt rights of the people.

THESE views, far from being odious, are ſurely large, and generous, and noble: To their prevalence and ſucceſs the kingdom owes its liberty; perhaps its learning, its induſtry, commerce, and naval power: By them chiefly the ENGLISH name is diſtinguiſhed among the ſociety of nations, and aſpires to a rivalſhip with that of the freeſt and moſt illuſtrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as all theſe mighty conſequences could not reaſonably be foreſeen at the time when the conteſt began, the royaliſts of that age wanted not ſpecious arguments on their ſide, by which they could juſtify their defence of the then eſtabliſhed prerogatives of the crown. We ſhall ſtate the queſtion, as it might appear to them at the aſſembling of that parliament, which by their violent encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.

THE only rule of government, they might have ſaid, known and acknowleged among men, is uſe and practice: Reaſon is ſo uncertain a guide that it will always be expoſed to doubt and controverſy: Could it ever render itſelf prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their ſole rule of conduct: They had ſtill continued in the primitive, unconnected ſtate of nature, without ſubmitting to political government, whoſe ſole baſis is, not pure rea-

ſon, but authority and precedent. Diſſolve theſe tyes, and you break all the bonds of civil ſociety, and leave every man at liberty to conſult his particular intereſt, by thoſe expedients, which his appetite, diſguiſed under the appearance of reaſon, ſhall dictate to him. The ſpirit of innovation is in itſelf pernicious, however favourable its particular object may ſometimes appear: A truth ſo obvious, that the popular party themſelves are ſenſible of it, and therefore cover their encroachments on the crown by the plauſible pretence of their recovering the antient liberties of the people.

BUT the preſent prerogatives of the crown, granting all the ſuppoſitions of that party, have been inconteſtibly eſtabliſhed ever ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of TUDOR; a period, which, as it now comprehends an hundred and ſixty years, may be allowed ſufficient to give ſtability to any conſtitution. Would it not have appeared ridiculous, in the reign of the Emperor ADRIAN, to talk of the conſtitution of the republic as the rule of government; or to ſuppoſe that the former rights of the ſenate, and conſuls and tribunes were ſtill ſubſiſting?

BUT the preſent claims of the ENGLISH monarchs are infinitely more favourable than thoſe of the ROMAN emperors during that age. The authority of AUGUSTUS

AUGUSTUS was a plain uſurpation, grounded only on military violence, and forms ſuch an æra in the ROMAN hiſtory, as is obvious to every reader. But if HENRY VII. really, as ſome pretend, enlarged the power of the crown, it was only by inſenſible acquiſitions, which eſcaped the apprehenſion of the people, and have ſcarcely been remarked even by hiſtorians and politicians. The new government, if it deſerves the name, is an imperceptible tranſition from the former; is entirely engrafted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be conſidered only as one of thoſe gradual revolutions, to which human affairs, in every nation, will be for ever ſubject.

THE Houſe of TUDOR, and after them that of STUART, exerciſed no prerogatives, but what had been claimed and exerciſed by the PLANTAGENETS. Not a ſingle branch of their authority can be ſaid to be altogether an innovation. The only difference is, that perhaps the former kings exerted theſe powers only by intervals, and were not able by reaſon of the oppoſition of their barons, to render them ſo ſteddy a rule of adminiſtration*. But the ſole inference from this fact is,

* The author believes that he was the firſt writer who advanced that the family of TUDOR poſſeſſed in general more authority than their immediate predeceſſors: An opinion, which, he

is, that theſe antient times were more turbulent and ſeditious; and that royal authority, the conſtitution, and the laws have happily of late gained the aſcendant.

UNDER what pretence can the popular party now talk of recovering the antient conſtitution? The former controul over the kings was not placed in the commons, but in the barons: The people had no authority, and even little or no liberty, till the crown, by ſuppreſſing theſe factious tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged all the ſubjects equally to reſpect each others rights, privileges, and properties. If we muſt return to the antient barbarous and GOTHIC conſtitution; let thoſe gentlemen, who now behave themſelves with ſo much inſolence to their ſovereign, ſet the firſt example. Let them make court to be admitted as retainers on a neighbouring baron; and by ſubmitting to ſlavery under him acquire ſome protection to themſelves; together with the power of exerciſing rapine and oppreſſion over their inferior ſlaves and villains. This was the

he hopes, will be ſupported by hiſtory, but which he propoſes with ſome diffidence. There are ſtrong ſymptoms of arbitrary power in ſome former reigns, even after ſigning of the charters. The power of the crown in that age depended leſs on the conſtitution than on the capacity and vigour of the prince who wore it.

condition

condition of the commons among their remote anceſtors.

But how far back ſhall we go, in having recourſe to antient conſtitutions and governments? There was a conſtitution ſtill more antient than that to which their innovators affect ſo much to appeal. During that period there was no *magna charta*: The barons themſelves poſſeſſed few regular, ſtated privileges: And the houſe of commons probably had not an exiſtence.

It is pleaſant to hear a houſe, while they are uſurping the whole power of government, talk of reviving antient inſtitutions. Is it not known, that, tho' the repreſentatives received wages from their conſtituents; to be a member of their houſe was always conſidered as a burthen, and a freedom from it as a privilege? Will they perſuade us, that power, which of all human acquiſitions is the moſt coveted, and in compariſon of which even reputation and pleaſure and riches are ſlighted, could ever be regarded as a burthen by any man?

The property acquired of late by the commons, it is ſaid, entitles them to more power than their anceſtors enjoyed. But to what is this encreaſe of their
rty owing, but to an encreaſe of their liberty
ir ſecurity? Let them therefore acknowledge,
that

that their anceſtors, while the crown was reſtrained by the ſeditious barons, really enjoyed leſs liberty than they themſelves have attained, after the ſovereign acquired the aſcendant: And let them enjoy that liberty with moderation; and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims, and by rendering it a pretence for endleſs innovations.

THE true rule of government is the preſent eſtabliſhed practice of the age. That has moſt authority, becauſe it is recent: It is alſo better known, for the ſame reaſon. Who has aſſured thoſe tribunes, that the PLANTAGENETS did not exerciſe as high acts of authority as the TUDORS? The hiſtorians, they ſay, do not mention them. But the hiſtorians are alſo ſilent with regard to the chief exertions of prerogative by the TUDORS. Where any power or prerogative is fully and undoubtedly eſtabliſhed, the exerciſe of it paſſes for a thing of courſe, and readily eſcapes the notice of hiſtory and annals. Had we no other monuments of ELIZABETH's reign, than what are preſerved even by CAMDEN, the moſt copious, judicious, and exact of our hiſtorians, we ſhould be entirely ignorant of the moſt important maxims of her government.

WAS not the preſent monarchical government, to its full extent, authorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquieſced in,

in, nay paſſionately cheriſhed, by the people in general; and all this during a period of at leaſt a hundred and ſixty years, and till of late, without the leaſt murmur or controverſy? This general conſent ſurely, during ſo long a time, muſt be ſufficient to render a conſtitution legal and valid. If the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from the people; here is their conſent in the fulleſt and moſt ample terms that can be deſired or imagined.

BUT the people muſt not pretend, becauſe they can, by their conſent, lay the foundations of government, that therefore they are to be permitted, at their pleaſure, to overthrow and ſubvert them. There is no end of theſe ſeditious and arrogant claims. The power of the crown is now openly ſtruck at: The nobility are alſo in viſible peril: The gentry will ſoon follow: The popular leaders, who will then aſſume the name of gentry, will next be expoſed to danger: And the people themſelves, become incapable of civil government, and lying under the reſtraint of no authority, muſt, for the ſake of peace, admit, inſtead of their legal and mild monarchs, a ſucceſſion of military and deſpotic tyrants.

THESE conſequences are the more to be dreaded, that the preſent fury of the people, tho' gloſſed over
enſions to civil liberty, is in reality incited by
iciſms of religion; a principle the moſt blind,
headſtrong

headſtrong and ungovernable, by which human nature can ever poſſibly be actuated. Popular rage is dreadful from whatever motive derived: But muſt be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences, when it ariſes from a principle, which diſclaims all controul by human law, reaſon, or authority.

THESE are the arguments, which each party may make uſe of to juſtify the conduct of their predeceſſors, during that great criſis. The event has ſhown, that the reaſonings of the popular party were better founded; but perhaps, according to the eſtabliſhed maxims of lawyers and politicians, the views of the royaliſts ought, beforehand, to have appeared more ſolid, more ſafe, and more legal. But this is certain, that the greater moderation we now employ in repreſenting paſt events; the nearer we ſhall be to produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire acquieſcence in our preſent happy eſtabliſhment. Moderation is of advantage to every eſtabliſhment: Nothing but zeal can overturn a ſettled power: And an over-active zeal in friends is apt to beget a like ſpirit in antagoniſts. The tranſition from a moderate oppoſition againſt an eſtabliſhment, to an entire acquieſcence in it is eaſy and inſenſible.

THERE are many invincible arguments, which ſhould induce the malecontent party to acquieſce entirely

tirely in the preſent ſettlement of the conſtitution. They now find, that the ſpirit of civil liberty, tho' at firſt connected with religious fanaticiſm, could purge itſelf from that pollution, and appear under a more genuine and engaging aſpect; a friend to toleration, and an encourager of all the enlarged and generous ſentiments, that do honour to human nature. They may obſerve, that the popular claims could ſtop at a proper period; and after retrenching the exorbitant prerogatives of the crown, could ſtill maintain a due reſpect to monarchy, to nobility, and to all antient inſtitutions. Above all, they muſt be ſenſible, that the very principle, which made the ſtrength of their party, and from which it derived its chief authority, has now deſerted them, and gone over to their antagoniſts. The plan of liberty is ſettled; its happy effects are proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it ſtability; and whoever would attempt to overturn it, and to recall the paſt government or abdicated family, would, beſides other more criminal imputations, be expoſed in their turn to the reproach of faction and innovation. While they peruſe the hiſtory of paſt events, they ought to reflect, both that theſe rights of the crown are long ſince annihilated, and that the tyranny, and violence, and oppreſſion, to which they often gave riſe, are ills, from which the eſtabliſhed

rty of the conſtitution has now at laſt happily pro-

tected

tected the people. Theſe reflections will prove a better ſecurity to our freedom and privileges, than to deny, contrary to the cleareſt evidence of facts, that ſuch regal powers ever had any exiſtence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a cauſe, than to lay the ſtreſs of the argument on a wrong place, and by diſputing an untenable poſt, enure the adverſaries to ſucceſs and victory.

ESSAY

ESSAY XV.

Of the PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.

I SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King WILLIAM or Queen ANNE, while the eſtabliſhment of the *Proteſtant Succeſſion* was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would chooſe in that important queſtion, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide. I believe the following particulars would have entered into his conſideration.

HE would eaſily perceive the great advantages reſulting from the reſtoration of the STUART family; by which we ſhould preſerve the ſucceſſion clear and undiſputed, free from a pretender, with ſuch a ſpecious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the plain, the ſtrongeſt and moſt eaſily comprehended. 'Tis in vain to ſay, as many have done, that the queſtion with regard to *governors*,

independent of *government*, is frivolous, and little worth diſputing, much leſs fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into theſe ſentiments; and 'tis much happier, I believe, for ſociety, that they do not, but rather continue in their natural prejudices and prepoſſeſſions. How could ſtability be preſerved in any monarchical government, (which, tho' perhaps, not the beſt, is, and always has been, the moſt common of any) unleſs men had ſo paſſionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even tho' weak in underſtanding, or infirm in years, gave him ſo great a preference above perſons the moſt accompliſhed in ſhining talents, or celebrated for great atchievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulſions? The condition of the ROMAN empire, ſurely, was not, in this reſpect, much to be envied; nor is that of the *Eaſtern* nations, who pay little regard to the title of their ſovereigns, but ſacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humour of the populace or ſoldiery. 'Tis but a fooliſh wiſdom, which is ſo carefully diſplayed, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of mankind. To be ſure, an anatomiſt finds no more in the greateſt monarch than in the loweſt peaſant or day labourer; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, frequently find leſs. But what

what do all theſe reflections tend to? We, all of us, ſtill retain theſe prejudices in favour of birth and family; and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that ſhould repreſent the adventures of ſailors, or porters, or even of private gentlemen, would preſently diſguſt us; but one that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or ſhould a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom, to get entirely above ſuch prepoſſeſſions, he would ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them, for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe welfare he would perceive to be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cheriſh ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their princes; as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety. And tho' the lives of twenty thouſand men be often ſacrificed to maintain a king in poſſeſſion of his throne, or preſerve the right of ſucceſſion undiſturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loſs, on pretence that every individual of theſe was, perhaps, in himſelf, as valuable as the prince he ſerved. He conſiders the conſequences of violating the hereditary rights of kings: Conſequences, which may be felt for many centuries; while the loſs of ſeveral thouſand men brings ſo little prejudice to a large kingdom, that it may not be perceived a few years afterwards.

THE advantages of the HANOVER ſucceſſion are of an oppoſite nature, and ariſe from this very circumſtance, that it violates hereditary right; and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. 'Tis evident to any one who conſiders the hiſtory of this iſland, that the privileges of the people have, during the two laſt centuries, been continually upon the increaſe, by the diviſion of the church-lands, by the alienations of the barons eſtates, by the progreſs of trade, and above all, by the happineſs of our ſituation, which, for a long time, gave us ſufficient ſecurity, without any ſtanding army or military eſtabliſhment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almoſt in every other nation of EUROPE, been, during the ſame period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were diſguſted at the hardſhips of the old GOTHIC militia, and choſe rather to intruſt their prince with mercenary armies, which he eaſily turned againſt themſelves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that ſome of our BRITISH ſovereigns miſtook the nature of the conſtitution, and genius of the people; and as they embraced all the favourable precedents left them by their anceſtors, they overlooked all thoſe which were contrary, and which ſuppoſed a limitation in our government. They were encouraged in this miſtake, by the example of all the neighbouring princes, who, bearing the ſame title or appellation, and being adorned with the ſame enſigns of authority, naturally led them to claim

claim the ſame powers and prerogatives *. The flattery of courtiers farther blinded them; and above all that

* It appears from the ſpeeches, and proclamations, and whole train of King JAMES I.'s actions, as well as his ſon's, that they conſidered the ENGLISH government as a ſimple monarchy, and never imagined that any conſiderable part of their ſubjects entertained a contrary idea. This made them diſcover their pretenſions, without preparing any force to ſupport them; and even without reſerve or diſguiſe, which are always employed by thoſe, who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. King JAMES told his parliament plainly, when they meddled in ſtate affairs, *Ne ſitor ultra crepidam.* He uſed alſo, at his table, in promiſcuous companies, to advance his notions, in a manner ſtill more undiſguiſed: As we may learn from a ſtory told in the life of Mr. WALLER, and which that poet uſed frequently to repeat. When Mr. WALLER was young, he had the curioſity to go to court; and he ſtood in the circle, and ſaw King JAMES dine, where, amongſt other company, there ſat at table two biſhops. The King, openly and aloud, propoſed this queſtion, *Whether he might not take his ſubjects money, when he had occaſion for it, without all this formality of parliament?* The one biſhop readily replied, *God forbid you ſhould not: For you are the breath of our noſtrils.* The other biſhop declined anſwering, and ſaid he was not ſkilled in parliamentary caſes: But upon the King's urging him, and ſaying he would admit of no evaſion, his lordſhip replied very pleaſantly, *Why, then, I think your majeſty may lawfully take my brother's money: For he offers it.* In Sir WALTER RALEIGH's preface to the Hiſtory of the

that of the clergy, who from ſeveral paſſages of *ſcripture*, and theſe wreſted too, had erected a regular and avowed ſyſtem of tyranny and deſpotic power. The only method of deſtroying, at once, all theſe exorbitant claims and pretenſions, was to depart from the true hereditary line, and chooſe a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the crown on conditions, expreſſed and avowed, found his authority eſtabliſhed on the ſame bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious ſubjects, who

World, there is this remarkable paſſage. PHILIP II. *by ſtrong hand and main force, attempted to make himſelf not only an* abſolute monarch *over the* Netherlands, *like unto the kings and ſovereigns of* England *and* France; *but* Turk-like, *to tread under his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges, and antient rights.* SPENSER, ſpeaking of ſome grants of the ENGLISH kings to the IRISH corporations, ſays, "All which, tho', at the time "of their firſt grant, they were tolerable, and perhaps reaſon-"able, yet now are moſt unreaſonable and inconvenient. But "all theſe will eaſily be cut off with the ſuperior power of her "Majeſty's prerogative, againſt which her own grants are not "to be pleaded or inforced." *State of* IRELAND, p. 1537. Edit. 1706.

As theſe were very common, if not, perhaps, the univerſal notions of the times, the two firſt princes of the houſe of STUART were the more excuſable for their miſtake. And RAPIN, ſuitable to his uſual malignity and partiality, ſeems to treat them with too much ſeverity, upon account of it.

might

might, in future emergencies, disturb the government by their cabals and pretensions: By rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniencies of elective monarchy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we secured all our constitutional limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The people cherish monarchy, because protected by it: The monarch favours liberty, because created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained by the new establishment, as far as human skill and wisdom can extend itself.

THESE are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in the house of STUART, or in that of HANOVER. There are also disadvantages in each establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order to form a just judgment upon the whole.

THE disadvantages of the Protestant succession consist in the foreign dominions, which are possessed by the princes of the HANOVER line, and which, it might be supposed, would engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and lose us, in some measure, the inestimable advantage we possess of being surrounded and guarded by the sea, which we command. The disadvantages of recalling the abdicated family consist chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to society than that established amongst us,

is contrary to it, and affords no toleration, or peace, or *f* ..ility to any other religion.

It appears to me, that all these advantages and disadvantages are allowed on both sides; at least, by every one, who is at all susceptible of argument or reasoning. No subject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the disputed title and foreign dominions of the present royal family are a loss. Nor is there any partizan of the STUART family, but will confess, that the claim of hereditary, indefeasible right, and the Roman Catholic religion, are also disadvantages in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philosopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all these circumstances in the scale, and assign to each of them its proper poise and influence. Such an one will readily, at first, acknowledge, that all political questions are infinitely complicated, and that there scarce ever occurs in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Consequences, mixed and varied, may be foreseen to flow from every measure: And many consequences, unforeseen, do always in fact, result from it. Hesitation, and reserve, and suspense, are, therefore, the only sentiments he brings to this essay or trial. Or if he indulges any passion, 'tis that of derision and ridicule against the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the nicest questions, of which, from want of

temper,

temper, perhaps ſtill more than of underſtanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

BUT to ſay ſomething more determinate on this head, the following reflections will, I hope, ſhow the temper, if not the underſtanding, of a philoſopher.

WERE we to judge merely by firſt appearance, and by paſt experience, we muſt allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the houſe of HANOVER are much greater than thoſe of an undiſputed hereditary title in the houſe of STUART; and that our fathers acted wiſely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as the houſe of STUART reigned in BRITAIN, which, with ſome interruption, was above 80 years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contentions between the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropt, the noiſe of diſputes continued: Or if theſe were ſilenced, jealouſy ſtill corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an unnatural ferment and diſorder. And while we were thus occupied in domeſtic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to public liberty, erected itſelf in EUROPE, without any oppoſition from us, and even ſometimes with our aſſiſtance.

BUT during theſe laſt ſixty years, when a parliamentary eſtabliſhment has taken place; whatever

factions may have prevailed either among the people or in public aſſemblies, the whole force of our conſtitution has always fallen to one ſide, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preſerved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſhed almoſt without interruption: Trade, and manufactures, and agriculture, have increaſed: The arts, and ſciences, and philoſophy, have been cultivated. Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancour: And the glory of the nation has ſpread itſelf all over EUROPE; while we ſtand the bulwark againſt oppreſſion, and the great antagoniſt of that power which threatens every people with conqueſt and ſubjection. So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of: Nor is there another inſtance in the whole hiſtory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

BUT tho' this recent inſtance ſeems clearly to decide in favour of the preſent eſtabliſhment, there are ſome circumſtances to be thrown into the other ſcale; and 'tis dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.

WE have had two rebellions during the flouriſhing period above mentioned, beſides plots and conſpira-

cies without number. And if none of theſe have produced any very fatal event, we may aſcribe our eſcape chiefly to the narrow genius of thoſe princes who diſputed our eſtabliſhment; and may eſteem ourſelves ſo far fortunate. But the claims of the baniſhed family, I fear, are not yet antiquated; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater diſorder?

THE diſputes betwixt privilege and prerogative may eaſily be compoſed by laws, and votes, and conferences, and conceſſions; where there is tolerable temper or prudence on both ſides, or on either ſide. Among contending titles, the queſtion can only be determined by the ſword, and by devaſtation, and by civil war.

A PRINCE who fills the throne with a diſputed title, dares not arm his ſubjects; the only method of ſecuring a people fully, both againſt domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign conqueſt.

NOTWITHSTANDING all our riches and renown, what a critical eſcape did we lately make from dangers, which were owing not ſo much to bad conduct and ill ſucceſs in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the ſtill more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances? Such

fatal meaſures could never have been embraced, had it not been to ſecure a precarious eſtabliſhment *.

But to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather than a parliamentary one, which is not ſupported by any other views or motives; a man needs only tranſport himſelf back to the æra of the reſtoration, and ſuppoſe, that he had had a ſeat in that parliament which recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greateſt diſorders that ever aroſe from the oppoſite pretenſions of prince and people. What would have been thought of one, that had propoſed, at that time, to ſet aſide Charles II. and ſettle the crown on the Duke of York or Glocester, merely in order to exclude all high claims, like thoſe of their father and grandfather? Would not ſuch an one have been regarded as a very extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could tamper and play with a government and national conſtitution, like a quack with a ſickly patient?

The advantages which reſult from a parliamentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are too refined ever to enter into the conception of

* Thoſe who conſider how univerſal this pernicious practice of funding has become all over Europe, may perhaps diſpute this laſt opinion. But we lay under leſs neceſſity than other ſtates.

the vulgar. The bulk of mankind would never allow them to be ſufficient for committing what would be regarded as an injuſtice to the prince. They muſt be ſupported by ſome groſs, popular, and familiar topics; and wiſe men, tho' convinced of their force, would reject them, in compliance with the weakneſs and prejudices of the people. An incroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his miſconduct, is able to enrage the nation, and render practicable what was always, perhaps, deſireable.

IN reality, the reaſon aſſigned by the nation for excluding the race of STUART, and ſo many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their hereditary title (which, however juſt in itſelf, would, to vulgar apprehenſions, have appeared altogether abſurd) but on account of their religion. Which leads us to compare the diſadvantages above mentioned of each eſtabliſhment.

I CONFESS, that, conſidering the matter in general, it were rather to be wiſhed, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all his attention to the government of this iſland. For, not to mention ſome real inconveniencies that may reſult from territories on the continent, they afford ſuch a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily ſeized by the people, who are always diſpoſed to think ill of their ſuperiors. It muſt, however, be acknowledged,

knowledged, that HANOVER is, perhaps, the ſpot of ground in EUROPE the leaſt inconvenient for a King of BRITAIN. It lies in the heart of GERMANY, at a diſtance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own ſovereign, and it ſerves only to connect us more cloſely with the houſe of AUSTRIA, which is our natural ally.

IN the laſt war, it has been of ſervice to us, by furniſhing us with a conſiderable body of auxiliary troops, the braveſt and moſt faithful in the world. The Elector of HANOVER is the only conſiderable prince in the empire, who has purſued no ſeparate end, and has raiſed up no ſtale pretenſions, during the late commotions of EUROPE; but has acted, all along, with the dignity of a king of BRITAIN. And ever ſince the acceſſion of that family, it would be difficult to ſhow any harm we have ever received from the electoral dominions, except that ſhort diſguſt in 1718, with CHARLES XII. who, regulating himſelf by maxims very different from thoſe of other princes, made a perſonal quarrel of every public injury.

THE religious perſuaſion of the houſe of STUART is an inconvenience of a much deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more diſmal conſequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its huge train of prieſts and friers, is vaſtly more expenſive than ours;

Even

Even tho' unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquiſitors, and ſtakes, and gibbets, it is leſs tolerating: And not contented with dividing the ſacerdotal from the regal office (which muſt be prejudicial to any ſtate) it beſtows the former on a foreigner, who has always a ſeparate, and may often have an oppoſite intereſt to that of the public.

BUT were this religion ever ſo advantageous to ſociety, it is contrary to that which is eſtabliſhed among us, and which is likely to keep poſſeſſion, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And tho' it is much to be hoped, that the progreſs of reaſon and philoſophy will, by degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of oppoſite religions all over EUROPE; yet the ſpirit of moderation has, as yet, made too ſlow advances to be intirely truſted. The conduct of the SAXON family, where the ſame perſon can be a Catholic King and a Proteſtant Elector, is, perhaps, the firſt inſtance, in modern times, of ſo reaſonable and prudent a behaviour. And the gradual progreſs of the Catholic ſuperſtition does, even there, prognoſticate a ſpeedy alteration: After which, 'tis juſtly to be apprehended, that perſecutions will put a ſpeedy period to the Proteſtant religion in the place of its nativity.

THUS, upon the whole, the advantages of the ſettlement in the family of STUART, which frees us from

from a diſputed title, ſeem to bear ſome proportion with thoſe of the ſettlement in the family of HANOVER, which frees us from the claims of prerogative: But at the ſame time, its diſadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic, are much greater than thoſe of the other eſtabliſhment, in ſettling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of K. WILLIAM or Q. ANNE, would have choſen amidſt theſe oppoſite views, may, perhaps, to ſome appear hard to determine. For my part, I eſteem liberty ſo invaluable a bleſſing in ſociety, that whatever favours its progreſs and ſecurity, can ſcarce be too fondly cheriſhed by every one who is a lover of human kind.

BUT the ſettlement in the houſe of HANOVER has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without ſolicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legiſlative body. They have, ſince their acceſſion, diſplayed, in all their actions, the utmoſt mildneſs, equity, and regard to the laws and conſtitution. Our own miniſters, our own parliaments, ourſelves have governed us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourſelves. What a reproach muſt we become among nations, if, diſguſted with a ſettlement ſo deliberately made, and whoſe conditions have been ſo religiouſly obſerved, we ſhould throw every thing again into

into confuſion; and by our levity and rebellious diſpoſition, prove ourſelves totally unfit for any ſtate but that of abſolute ſlavery and ſubjection?

THE greateſt inconvenience attending a diſputed title, is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wiſe man, to avoid this inconvenience, would run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that ſo long poſſeſſion, ſecured by ſo many laws, muſt, ere this time, in the apprehenſion of a great part of the nation, have begot a title in the houſe of HANOVER, independent of their preſent poſſeſſion: So that now we ſhould not, even by a revolution, obtain the end of avoiding a diſputed title.

No revolution made by national forces, will ever be able, without ſome other great neceſſity, to aboliſh our debts and incumbrances, in which the intereſt of ſo many perſons is concerned. And a revolution made by foreign forces, is a conqueſt: A calamity with which the precarious balance of power very nearly threatens us, and which our civil diſſenſions are likely, above all other circumſtances, to bring ſuddenly upon us.

ESSAY

ESSAY XVI.

IDEA of a PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.

OF all mankind, there are none ſo pernicious as political projectors, if they have power; nor ſo ridiculous, if they want it: As on the other hand, a wiſe politician is the moſt beneficial character in nature, if accompanied with authority; and the moſt innocent, and not altogether uſeleſs, even if deprived of it. 'Tis not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can diſcover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may ſafely be made, even tho' the ſucceſs be doubtful. An eſtabliſhed government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumſtance of its being eſtabliſhed; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reaſon, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try projects merely upon the credit of ſuppoſed argument and philoſophy, can

can never be the part of a wiſe magiſtrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and tho' he may attempt ſome improvement for the public good, yet will he adjuſt his innovations, as much as poſſible, to the antient fabric, and preſerve intire the chief pillars and ſupports of the conſtitution.

THE mathematicians in EUROPE have been much divided concerning that figure of a ſhip, which is the moſt commodious for ſailing; and HUYGENS, who at laſt determined this controverſy, is juſtly thought to have obliged the learned, as well as commercial world; tho' COLUMBUS had ſailed to AMERICA, and Sir FRANCIS DRAKE made the tour of the world, without any ſuch diſcovery. As one form of government muſt be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men; why may we not inquire what is the moſt perfect of all, tho' the common botched and inaccurate governments ſeem to ſerve the purpoſes of ſociety, and tho' it be not ſo eaſy to eſtabliſh a new government, as to build a veſſel upon a new plan? The ſubject is ſurely the moſt worthy curioſity of any the wit of man can poſſibly deviſe. And who knows, if this controverſy were fixed by the univerſal conſent of the learned, but, in ſome future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a diſſolution of the old governments, or the combination

combination of men to form a new one, in ſome diſtant part of the world? In all caſes, it muſt be advantageous to know what is moſt perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real conſtitution or form of government as near it as poſſible, by ſuch gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great diſturbance to ſociety.

ALL I pretend to in the preſent eſſay is to revive this ſubject of ſpeculation; and therefore I ſhall deliver my ſentiments in as few words as poſſible. A long diſſertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard ſuch diſquiſitions both as uſeleſs and chimerical.

ALL plans of government, which ſuppoſe great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the *Republic* of PLATO, and the *Utopia* of Sir THOMAS MORE. The OCEANA is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has as yet been offered to the public.

THE chief defects of the OCEANA ſeem to be theſe. *Firſt*, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments. *Secondly*, Its *Agrarian* is impracticable. Men will ſoon learn the art, which was practiſed in antient ROME, of concealing their poſſeſſions under

other

other people's names; till at laſt, the abuſe will become ſo common, that they will throw off even the appearance of reſtraint. *Thirdly*, The OCEANA provides not a ſufficient ſecurity for liberty, or the redreſs of grievances. The ſenate muſt propoſe, and the people conſent; by which means, the ſenate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of infinitely greater conſequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King's negative of the ſame nature in the ENGLISH conſtitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he would be an abſolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houſes, it is of little conſequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the ſame thing. When a popular bill has been debated in the two houſes, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be preſented for the royal aſſent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous deſire of the people. But could the King cruſh a diſagreeable bill in embryo (as was the caſe for ſome time, in the SCOTCH parliament, by means of the lords of the articles) the BRITISH government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redreſſed: And 'tis certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, ſo much as from neglecting to remedy the abuſes which frequently riſe from the old ones. A government, ſays MACHIAVEL, muſt often be brought back

back to its original principles. It appears then, that in the OCEANA the whole legiſlature may be ſaid to reſt in the ſenate; which HARRINGTON would own to be an inconvenient form of government, eſpecially after the *Agrarian* is aboliſhed.

HERE is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, diſcover any conſiderable objection.

LET GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 pariſhes, making in all 10,000. If the country purpoſed to be erected into a commonwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminiſh the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, 'twere better to enlarge the pariſhes, or throw more pariſhes into a county, than increaſe the number of counties.

LET all the free-holders of ten pounds a-year in the country, and all the houſe-holders worth 200 pounds in the town-pariſhes, meet annually in the pariſh-church, and chuſe, by ballot, ſome freeholder of the county for their member, whom we ſhall call the county *repreſentative*.

LET the 100 county repreſentatives, two days after their election, meet in the county-town, and chuſe by ballot, from their own body, ten county *magiſtrates*, and

and one *ſenator*. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 ſenators, 1100 county magiſtrates, and 10,000 county repreſentatives. For we ſhall beſtow on all ſenators the authority of county magiſtrates, and on all county magiſtrates the authority of county repreſentatives.

LET the ſenators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambaſſadors, and, in ſhort, all the prerogatives of a BRITISH King, except his negative.

LET the county repreſentatives meet in their particular counties, and poſſeſs the whole legiſlative power of the commonwealth; the greateſt number of counties deciding the queſtion; and where thoſe are equal, let the ſenate have the caſting vote.

EVERY new law muſt firſt be debated in the ſenate; and tho' rejected by it, if ten ſenators inſiſt and proteſt, it muſt be ſent down to the counties. The ſenate may join to the copy of the law, their reaſons for receiving or rejecting it.

BECAUSE it would be troubleſome to aſſemble the whole county repreſentatives for every trivial law, that may be requiſite, the ſenate have their choice of

ſending

ſending down the law either to the county magiſtrates or county repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates, tho' the law be referred to them, may, if they pleaſe, call the repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination.

WHETHER the law be referred by the ſenate to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, a copy of it, and of the ſenate's reaſons, muſt be ſent to every repreſentative eight days before the day appointed for the aſſembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And tho' the determination be, by the ſenate, referred to the magiſtrates, if five repreſentatives of the county order the magiſtrates to aſſemble the whole court of repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination, they muſt obey.

EITHER the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives may give, to the ſenator of the county, the copy of a law to be propoſed to the ſenate; and if five counties concur in the ſame order, the law, tho' refuſed by the ſenate, muſt come either to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.

ANY twenty counties, by a vote either of their magiſtrates or repreſentatives, may throw any man out

of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

THE ſenate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The ſenate cannot throw out twice in a year the ſenator of the ſame county.

THE power of the old ſenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county repreſentatives. Then all the new ſenators are ſhut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, ſuch as that of VENICE or MALTA, they chuſe the following magiſtrates; a protector, who repreſents the dignity of the commonwealth, and preſides in the ſenate; two ſecretaries of ſtate; theſe ſix councils, a council of ſtate, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty, each council conſiſting of five perſons; together with ſix commiſſioners of the treaſury and a firſt commiſſioner. All theſe muſt be ſenators. The ſenate alſo names all the ambaſſadors to foreign courts, who may either be ſenators or not.

THE ſenate may continue any or all of theſe, but muſt re-elect them every year.

THE

thrown out of the ſenate by a vote of the court, takes his ſeat in the court of competitors.

THE ſenate poſſeſſes all the judicative authority of the houſe of Lords, that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewiſe nominates the Lord Chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

EVERY county is a kind of republic within itſelf, and the repreſentatives may make county-laws; which have no authority 'till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is ſent to the ſenate, and to every other county. The ſenate, or any ſingle county, may, at any time, annul any law of another county.

THE repreſentatives have all the authority of the BRITISH juſtices of peace in trials, commitments, *&c.*

THE magiſtrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All cauſes with regard to the revenue are appealed ultimately to the magiſtrates. They paſs the accompts of all the officers; but muſt have all their own accompts examined and paſſed at the end of the year by the repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates name rectors or miniſters to all the pariſhes.

THE Preſbyterian government is eſtabliſhed; and the higheſt eccleſiaſtical court is an aſſembly or ſynod of all the preſbyters of the county. The magiſtrates may take any cauſe from this court, and determine it themſelves.

THE magiſtrates may try, and depoſe or ſuſpend any preſbyter.

THE militia is eſtabliſhed in imitation of that in SWISSERLAND, which being well known, we ſhall not inſiſt upon it. It will only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamped during ſix weeks in ſummer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

THE magiſtrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The ſenate all upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards, and his commiſſion is good for a twelvemonth. But after that it muſt be confirmed by the magiſtrates of the county to which the regiment belongs. The magiſtrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the ſenate may do the ſame to any officer in the ſervice. If the magiſtrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.

ALL

THE protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the council of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics. The council of state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.

THE council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That of trade inspects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inspects all the abuses of laws by the inferior magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inspects the militia and its discipline, magazines, stores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

NONE of these councils can give orders themselves, except where they receive such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must communicate every thing to the senate.

WHEN the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

BESIDES these councils or courts, there is another called the court of *competitors*; which is thus consti-

tuted. If any candidates for the office of ſenator have have more votes than a third of the repreſentatives, that candidate, who has moſt votes, next to the ſenator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magiſtrate or repreſentative: But he takes his ſeat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court which may ſometimes conſiſt of a hundred members, ſometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year aboliſhed.

The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inſpection of public accounts, and the accuſing any man before the ſenate. If the ſenate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they pleaſe, appeal to the people, either magiſtrates or repreſentatives. Upon that appeal, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives meet on the day appointed by the court of competitors, and chuſe in each county three perſons; from which number every ſenator is excluded. Theſe to the number of 300 meet in the capital, and bring the perſon accuſed to a new trial.

The court of competitors may propoſe any law to the ſenate; and if refuſed, may appeal to the people; that is, to the magiſtrates or repreſentatives, who examine it in their counties. Every ſenator, who is

thrown

TEN thouſand, even tho' they were not annually elected, are a large enough baſis for any free government. 'Tis true, the nobles in POLAND are more than 10,000, and yet theſe oppreſs the people. But as power continues there always in the ſame perſons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Beſides, the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

ALL free governments muſt conſiſt of two councils, a leſs and a greater, or, in other words, of a ſenate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON obſerves, would want wiſdom, without the ſenate: The ſenate, without the people, would want honeſty.

A LARGE aſſembly of 1000, for inſtance, to repreſent the people, if allowed to debate, would fall into diſorder. If not allowed to debate, the ſenate has a negative upon them, and the worſt kind of negative, that before reſolution.

HERE therefore is an inconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the eaſieſt to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confuſion: If they do not debate, they can only reſolve; and then the ſenate carves for them. Divide the people into many ſeparate bodies; and then they may debate with ſafety, and every inconvenience ſeems to be prevented.

CARDINAL de RETZ ſays, that all numerous aſſemblies, however compoſed, are mere mob, and ſwayed in their debates by the leaſt motive. This we find confirmed by daily experience. When an abſurdity ſtrikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and ſo on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and tho' every member be only of middling ſenſe, 'tis not probable, that any thing but reaſon can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being removed, good ſenſe will always get the better of bad among a number of people. Good ſenſe is one thing: But follies are numberleſs; and every man has a different one. The only way of making a people wiſe, is to keep them from uniting into large aſſemblies.

THERE are two things to be guarded againſt in every *ſcheme*: Its combination, and its diviſion. Its combination is moſt dangerous. And againſt this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1. The great dependence of the ſenators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undiſtinguiſhing rabble, like the ENGLISH electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2. The ſmall power they are allowed. They have few offices to diſpoſe of. Almoſt all are given by the magiſtrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors, which being compoſed of men that are their rivals, next to

ALL crimes are tryed within the county by the magiſtrates and a jury. But the ſenate can ſtop any trial, and bring it before themſelves.

ANY county may indict any man before the ſenate, for any crime.

THE protector, the two ſecretaries, the council of ſtate, with any five more that the ſenate appoints, on extraordinary emergencies, are poſſeſſed of *dictatorial* power for ſix months.

THE protector may pardon any perſon condemned by the inferior courts.

IN time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field, can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

THE capital, which we ſhall call LONDON, may be allowed four members in the ſenate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The repreſentatives of each of theſe chuſe one ſenator, and ten magiſtrates. There are therefore in the city four ſenators, forty four magiſtrates, and four hundred repreſentatives. The magiſtrates have the ſame authority as in the counties. The repreſentatives alſo have the ſame authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes in their particular county, or diviſion of hundreds.

When they enact any city-law, the greateſt number of counties or diviſions determines the matter. And where theſe are equal, the magiſtrates have the caſting vote.

The magiſtrates chuſe the mayor, ſheriff, recorder, and other officers of the city.

In the commonwealth, no repreſentative, magiſtrate, or ſenator, as ſuch, has any ſalary. The protector, ſecretaries, councils, and ambaſſadors, have ſalaries.

The firſt year in every century is ſet apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have produced in the repreſentative. This muſt be done by the legiſlature.

The following political aphoriſms may explain the reaſon of theſe orders.

The lower ſort of people and ſmall proprietors are good enough judges of one not very diſtant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuſe the beſt, or nearly the beſt repreſentative: But they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

Ten

BUT leſt that ſhould not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, ſerves to the ſame purpoſe.

NOR is that all: For the 10,000 may reſume the power, whenever they pleaſe; and not only when they all pleaſe, but when any five of a hundred pleaſe, which will happen upon the very firſt ſuſpicion of a ſeparate intereſt.

THE 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almoſt the whole body of the people.

A SMALL commonwealth is the happieſt government in the world within itſelf; becauſe every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be ſubdued by great force from without. This ſcheme ſeems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

EVERY county-law may be annulled either by the ſenate or another county; becauſe that ſhows an oppoſition of intereſt: In which caſe no part ought to decide for itſelf. The matter muſt be referred to the whole, which will beſt determine what agrees with general intereſt.

As to the clergy and militia, the reaſons of theſe orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiſtrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have ſecurity or ſtability.

In many governments, the inferior magiſtrates have no rewards but what ariſe from their ambition, vanity, or public ſpirit. The ſalaries of the French judges amount not to the intereſt of the ſums they pay for their offices. The Dutch burgo-maſters have little more immediate profit than the English juſtices of peace, or the members of the houſe of commons formerly. But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that this would beget negligence in the adminiſtration, (which is little to be feared, conſidering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magiſtrates have competent ſalaries. The ſenators have acceſs to ſo many honourable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the repreſentatives.

That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who conſiders the reſemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, formerly one of the wiſeſt and moſt renowned governments that ever was in the world. The alterations in the preſent ſcheme are all evidently to the better. 1. The repreſentation is more equal.

2. The

them in intereſt, and uneaſy in their preſent ſiuation will be ſure to take all advantages againſt them.

THE diviſion of the ſenate is prevented, 1. By the ſmallneſs of their number. 2. As faction ſuppoſes a combination to a ſeparate intereſt, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious member. 'Tis true, when another member of the ſame ſpirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they ſhould; for that ſhows the humour to be in the people, and probably ariſes from ſome ill conduct in public affairs. 4. Almoſt any man, in a ſenate ſo regularly choſen by the people, may be ſuppoſed fit for any civil office. 'Twould be proper, therefore, for the ſenate to form ſome *general* reſolutions with regard to the diſpoſing of offices among the members: Which reſolutions would not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary ſtupidity on the other, appears in any ſenator; but yet they would be ſufficient to prevent brigue and faction, by making the diſpoſal of the offices a thing of courſe. For inſtance, let it be a reſolution, That no man ſhall enjoy any office, till he has ſat four years in the ſenate: That, except ambaſſadors, no man ſhall be in office two years following: That no man ſhall attain the higher offices but thro' the lower: That no man ſhall

ſhall be protector twice, &c. The ſenate of VENICE govern themſelves by ſuch reſolutions.

IN foreign politics the intereſt of the ſenate can ſcarce ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the ſenate abſolute with regard to them; otherwiſe there could be no ſecrecy nor refined policy. Beſides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the ſenate is ſtill ſufficiently dependant. Not to mention, that the legiſlative power being always ſuperior to the executive, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives may interpoſe, whenever they think proper.

THE chief ſupport of the BRITISH government is the oppoſition of intereſts; but that, tho' in the main ſerviceable, breeds endleſs factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The *competitors* have no power of controlling the ſenate: They have only the power of accuſing, and appealing to the people.

'TIS neceſſary, likewiſe, to prevent both combination and diviſion in the thouſand magiſtrates. This is done ſufficiently by the ſeparation of places and intereſts.

BUT

ment, of which it muſt at laſt inevitably periſh. I muſt, however, confeſs, that SWEDEN ſeems, in ſome meaſure, to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia, with its limited monarchy, as well as a ſtanding army, which is leſs dangerous than the BRITISH.

WE ſhall conclude this ſubject, with obſerving the falſehood of the common opinion, that no large ſtate, ſuch as FRANCE or BRITAIN, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that ſuch a form of government can only take place in a city or ſmall territory. The contrary ſeems evident. Tho' 'tis more difficult to form a republican government in an extenſive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preſerving it ſteady and uniform, without tumult and faction. 'Tis not eaſy, for the diſtant parts of a large ſtate to combine in any plan of free government; but they eaſily conſpire in the eſteem and reverence for a ſingle perſon, who, by means of this popular favour, may ſeize the power, and forcing the more obſtinate to ſubmit, may eſtabliſh a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the ſame notions of government, the natural equality of property favours liberty, and the nearneſs of habitation enables the citizens mutually to aſſiſt each other. Even under abſolute princes, the ſubordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties

ties and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their constitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were most admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.

'Tis needless to inquire, whether such a government would be immortal. I allow the justness of the poet's exclamation on the endless projects of human race, *Man and for ever!* The world itself probably is not immortal. Such consuming plagues may arise as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not to what lengths enthusiasm,

2. The unlimited power of the burgo maſters in the towns, which forms a perfect ariſtocracy in the DUTCH commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county-repreſentatives: 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon the whole body of the DUTCH republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the impoſition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the preſent plan, are not ſo independent of each other, nor do they form ſeparate bodies ſo much as the ſeven provinces; where the jealouſy and envy of the ſmaller provinces and towns againſt the greater, particularly HOLLAND and AMSTERDAM, have frequently diſturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, tho' of the ſafeſt kind, are intruſted to the ſenate than the States-General poſſeſs; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and ſecret in their reſolutions, than 'tis poſſible for the latter.

THE chief alterations that could be made on the BRITISH government, in order to bring it to the moſt perfect model of limited monarchy, ſeem to be the following. *Firſt*, The plan of the republican parliament ought to be reſtored, by making the repreſentation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county-elections who poſſeſs not a property of 200 pounds value. *Secondly*, As ſuch a houſe of Commons would be too weighty for a frail houſe of Lords, like

like the preſent, the Biſhops and SCOTCH Peers ought to be removed, whoſe behaviour, *in former parliaments*, deſtroyed entirely the authority of that houſe: The number of the upper houſe ought to be raiſed to three or four hundred: Their ſeats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner ſhould be allowed to refuſe a ſeat that was offered him. By this means, the houſe of Lords would conſiſt entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and intereſt of the nation; and every turbulent leader in the houſe of Commons might be taken off, and connected in intereſt with the houſe of Peers. Such an ariſtocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and againſt it. At preſent, the balance of our government depends in ſome meaſure on the ability and behaviour of the ſovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumſtances.

I ALLOW, that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is ſtill liable to three great inconveniencies. *Firſt*, It removes not entirely, tho' it may ſoften, the parties of *court* and *country*. *Secondly*, The King's perſonal character muſt ſtill have a great influence on the government. *Thirdly*, The ſword is in the hands of a ſingle perſon, who will always neglect to diſcipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a ſtanding army. 'Tis evident, that this is a mortal diſtemper in the BRITISH government,

enthuſiaſm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may tranſport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereſt is removed, whimſical and unaccountable factions often ariſe, from perſonal favour or enmity. Perhaps ruſt may grow to the ſprings of the moſt accurate political machine, and diſorder its motions. Laſtly, extenſive conqueſts, when purſued, muſt be the ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments ſooner than of the imperfect; becauſe of the very advantages which the former poſſeſs above the latter. And tho' ſuch a ſtate ought to eſtabliſh a fundamental law againſt conqueſts; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and preſent intereſt makes men forgetful of their poſterity. 'Tis a ſufficient incitement to human endeavours, that ſuch a government would flouriſh for many ages; without pretending to beſtow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty ſeems to have refuſed to his own productions.

END of the SECOND VOLUME.


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